Abstract
This paper synthesizes confirmation by instances and confirmation by successful predictions, and thereby the Hempelian and the hypothetico-deductive traditions in confirmation theory. The merger of these two approaches is subsequently extended to the piecemeal confirmation of entire theories. It is then argued that this synthetic account makes a useful contribution from both a historical and a systematic perspective.
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Sprenger, J. A Synthesis of Hempelian and Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation. Erkenn 78, 727–738 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9487-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9487-7