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A Uniform Price Auction for Conservation Easements in the Canadian Prairies

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Abstract

This paper describes the application of a uniform price auction with a hidden reserve price in a field project aimed at discovering Canadian landowners’ willingness to accept compensation for placing conservation easements on their lands. This is the only project of this kind in Canada to date, and one of the few worldwide. The paper discusses the design of the auction, describes its implementation, and presents its results. The bids received in the auction conformed with known factors affecting opportunity costs and willingness to accept. The information from this auction was successful in guiding a long-term easement procurement program.

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Author notes

  1. Wanjing Hu

    Present address: Alberta Environment, Edmonton, AB, Canada

  2. Brian Gray

    Present address: Natural Resources Canada, Ottawa, ON, Canada

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada

    Laura K. Brown, Elizabeth Troutt & Wanjing Hu

  2. Ducks Unlimited Canada, Regina, SK, Canada

    Cynthia Edwards & Brian Gray

Authors
  1. Laura K. Brown
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  2. Elizabeth Troutt
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  3. Cynthia Edwards
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  4. Brian Gray
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  5. Wanjing Hu
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Elizabeth Troutt.

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Brown, L.K., Troutt, E., Edwards, C. et al. A Uniform Price Auction for Conservation Easements in the Canadian Prairies. Environ Resource Econ 50, 49–60 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9461-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9461-2

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