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The Effects of Issue Salience on Political Decision-making

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Abstract

Game-theoretic models of political decision-making regard policy outcomes as a combined result of actor preferences and institutions. This paper explores the effects of adding relative issue salience to the analysis. I focus on non-cooperative models of complete and perfect information that are based on the concept of structure-induced equilibrium (Shepsle in Am J Polit Sci 23(1):27–59, 1979). Assuming a progressive agenda-setter and two conservative voters, I show how a change of the relative issue salience for players in a game results in a different equilibrium outcome in a political decision-making body.

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Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Bernard Steunenberg and Robert Thomson for useful comments. Financial support from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) is gratefully acknowledged.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, University of Nottingham, NG7 2RD, Nottingham, UK

    Torsten J. Selck

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  1. Torsten J. Selck
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Correspondence to Torsten J. Selck.

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Selck, T.J. The Effects of Issue Salience on Political Decision-making. Constit Polit Econ 17, 5–13 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-006-6790-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-006-6790-1

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