1 Introduction

The American philosopher Jaegwon Kim defines “nonreductive physicalism” as follows: “Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to physical phenomena” (see e.g., Kim 1989). Our definition is different: “Physical phenomena integrated across levels cannot be reduced to a multiple number of single level physical phenomena”. Our definition has neither property dualism nor is it based on frameworks that include integrated information as having a fundamental ontological role (see Tononi 2008). More importantly, it is unknown how phenomenal (or experiential) quantum information can be integrated with sense-organ conveyed information arising from the environment, even when dual-aspect information is taken to be valid (Chalmers 1995). There is a more fundamental problem because without nonreductive physicalism, the quantum level is characterized by indeterminism (Pratt 2003; Clarke 2014) and so, if based on reductionism, the integrated information theory is in practice impossible.

Mentalism remains unexplainable within the existing reductive materialist framework of brain science because the mind is conceived as a dynamically local process (Arbib et al. 1998; Ito 2000). Frameworks based on aspect monism (which refer to all frameworks that include latent experiential entities in addition to the physical, e.g. dual-aspect, triple-aspect and multiple-aspect) postulate ‘mental’ aspect to be ‘potentiality’ as primary, yet there are fundamental, aspects belonging to the fundamental reality of energy that carries ‘mental states’ or ‘mental properties’. However, there is no mental/physical incongruity since mental and physical are epistemological, rather than ontological aspects. This gives impetus for their elimination (i.e., eliminativism) including the dismissal of aspect monism frameworks that are based on nonphysical and nonmaterial aspects. Mental concepts can be reduced to the biology that is biological naturalism (Searle 2004). The approach is integrative and underlies the basis of what John Searle calls a unified conscious field, originating at a fundamental level where quantum information unfolds in what can be described as a discrete conscious field through ‘atomistic’ conceptions of subjective experiences, for example, ‘impressions’, ‘ideas’ etc. Understanding the unification process from a discrete conscious field to a unified conscious field remains one of the unsolved mysteries of contemporary neurophilosophy.

Philosophies contradictory to materialism (or physicalism) include idealism, pluralism, dualism, aspectism and other forms of monism. Monism is the metaphysics of materialism in certain limited cases. Neutral monism claims there is a single neutral entity, which is neither experiential nor physical from which the experiential and physical both arise. The major problem is how experiential and physical entities arise from this aspect-less neutral entity? In the Orch-OR theory (Hameroff and Penrose 2017) for example, it comes about from space–time geometry in the quantum realm. However, the problem with Orch-OR theory is the assumption that quantum consciousness arises from the collapse of the “wave function” (Copenhagen interpretation of QM) from inside cytoplasmic microtubules, which can transcend into ‘mental’ causation. Yet, all neurons exhibit quantum-level events, but only some large-scale connectivity patterns among neurons of the cortico-thalamic complex enable consciousness (Baars and Edelman 2012). This criticism of quantum consciousness when viewed through nonreductive physicalism points to specific brain regions where the macroscopic quantum states of consciousness are contingent on cognitive brain functions (Hameroff 2007).

Materialist monism, which is based on reductionism, constitutes the traditional or orthodox materialism. We do not subscribe to traditional (orthodox) materialism based on reductionism and complexity theory (Tononi and Edelman 1998; Nunez 2016) as it does not capture the essence of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, i.e., the “what it is like to be” (or feeling) experienced in a first-person perspective (Carruthers and Veillet 2007; Levin 2006). Instead Dialectical materialism (DiaMat) encompasses all the above in a framework where actions and the resultant effects of such actions bring on self-referential properties from the specific motion (emergent interactionism) and the action of brain states through transduction of energy. Dialectical materialism constitutes: (i) nonreductive (biology), (ii) dynamicism, (iii) emergent interactionism, and (iv) phase transition from quantity to quality. How the quantitative changes leading to qualitative changes in the brain can causally affect cognition and higher-order brain functions remains unclear (Woolf et al. 2009; Holcman and Yuste 2015).

Exclusion of (i) gives way for physics or orthodox materialism, but in biology (i) is required. In Diamat where action, interaction and change between material entities govern brain states. That is, if consciousness is a biological phenomenon and we know that it is (Searle 2004)- it must also be a brain state (Searle 2000).

Material monism, of which the Russellian version is the most prominent (Seager 2013), claims that ‘mental’ phenomena arise through physical interactions. This is in contrast with anomalous monism, which claims that there are no “natural laws” connecting mental phenomena and assumes supervenience of mental over the physical. In the light of Chalmers (1996) work, that conscious processes supervene upon physical processes in the brain. Searle (2007) ‘biological naturalism’ tries to explain that there is nothing in the brain that does not supervene upon physical processes but fails to give physical support for this claim. Searle (2004) advanced emergent materialism, but claimed nothing on the issues of reductionism in ‘biological naturalism’ (but see Macdonald and Papineau 2006 where teleosemantics is a type of reduction to biological properties based on a naturalistically acceptable explanation of mental representation).

Chalmers (1996) claimed that conscious processes are determined by, but not identical to, the functional organization of the physical processes in the brain. However, how do conscious processes emerge from brain functioning? The answer to this question rests on introducing nonreductive physicalist ontology and a teleological functionalist epistemology where teleofunction is synonymous with subneuronal brain function (Siekevitz et al. 2004). Note that conscious processes originate from a discrete conscious field made of teleofunctions that become unified through a functionally-linked teleosemantic hierarchy of intrinsic information content of mental states. We make no claims that this leads to ‘semantic’ information that is carried by linguistic descriptions of sentences as a subjective process. The interconnectedness of intrinsic information content of brain states is encapsulated through a discrete conscious field of nonlocal causal dynamical relations (Pereira 2007), which are biological signatories of mental representations.

Our perspective is fundamentally different from Bohm (1990) on mind and matter as two-aspects. We also differ from Chalmers (2006) and claim that intrinsic information content of brain states that emerge in conscious processes depend on the “way it feels” and are not inherently phenomenological, but are an emergent feature of complex hierarchical systems that carry intrinsic dispositions (Mallet and Feinberg 2017). Intrinsic dispositions are not ‘pure manifestations’ and should not be considered as psychical qualities or phenomenal concepts, but physical processes. That is, mental phenomena including ‘mental’ information are considered to be physical in the same way as Shannon information, but originating from within the inner scale of brain disposition and not externally from the environmental cues. For example, subjective ‘meaning’ can be analyzed, in terms of specialized signals that carry intrinsic dispositions through teleosemantic hierarchy of intrinsic information content of mental states. It should be understood that the information we are discussing is intrinsic in the sense of the Bohm’s hidden variable theory applied in the neuropsychological context (Pribram 1991). It is neither quantum information nor integrated information, but interconnected information that remains ‘hidden’ from the operational explanations of cognitive capacities. The two main tenets of intrinsic information are:(i) content of mental states are non-computational, reflecting upon the intrinsic nature of the system and (ii) interconnected information that remains ‘hidden’, manifests its influence on conscious cognition. These two tenets encapsulate the basic idea of what constitutes intrinsic information content of mental states; what we define as ‘subjectivity’.

The consensus is that consciousness is an unified mental state, not a process or a thing. Consciousness is not just any mental state, however, it is a unified mental state, where unification does not imply integration. The recoherence process (see Pereira et al. 2017) integrates the ensemble of mental states into an interconnected “whole” (Gestalt). The recoherent state corresponds to the temporal integration of teleofunctions, which are spatially distributed and propels the evolution of teleosemantics, forming new a brain function that carries value judgment or subjectivity. Based on this we can surmise that integration of information (Tononi 2008) is not equivalent to consciousness. According to Tononi and Edelman (1998) it is in the large assembly of neural networks that are firing in concert. According to others it occurs through different brain signals that are more subtle and nonlocal at the quantum level (Hameroff 2010; Hagan and Hirafuji 1999). Mental representations are spontaneous and reflect upon the unidirectional transfer of intrinsic information content of brain states through the  transfer of energy based on the two-brains hypothesis (Goodman et al. 2015; Bercovich et al. 2017). This paper will address how this comes about specifically in a complex structure like the brain. The difficulty in locating the mental states which are attributed to brain activity is explored in this paper through nonreductive physicalism, which claims that all mental phenomena can be explained by the functioning of their neurobiological correlates through information. That is, higher level of brain functioning with different properties with respect to their constituents emerges and influences causally brain activity. This is not emerging reductionism-unlike in philosophy of mind, we do not subscribe to different ontology from DiaMat, which claims that consciousness is not an immaterial spirit. How this happens is the notion of teleofunctional components with intrinsic information of the material component that includes activity in brain structure. This differs from externalism as shown in Fig. 1 through proto-consciousness or cosmic consciousness interacting with brain’s neural dynamics.

Fig. 1
figure 1

Reproduced with permission from Tressoldi et al. (2016)

There is a difference between identity theory (mind = brain) on the left hand side and externalism (cosmic consciousness interacting with the brain) on the right hand side. The identity theory of the mind claims that subjective experiences are just brain processes, not merely correlated with brain processes (externalism) and the mind is work done by the brain.

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2 Teleonomic Emergence of Teleofunctionality

It is usual to note that teleofunctions are distinct from the causal-role functions involved in functionalism. For example, with ordinary function the elements are irrelevant, while in teleofunction they are relevant because the function concerns what something is for and the notion of what something was selected for counts. This is a “teleological” notion of function, which can be minimally defined as the activity of the structure. Moreover, teleofunctions carry a value judgment or ‘meaning’ (unlike ordinary function, which carry only action or resultant effect).

There is meaning attached to the interconnectedness of intrinsic information content of mental states and their interrelationship during the unification process. We call this the emergence ‘functionality’. The integration of brain functions results in a new category because of the functionally-linked continuum that is referred to as teleosemantic hierarchy of intrinsic content of brain states. Since the quantum realm is characterized by indeterminism, i.e., non-causal effects, this is incongruent to nonreductive physicalism where quantum mechanisms must be acausal. The unification of mental states associated with the brain’s hierarchical organization allows quantum-like causality to take on a subtle role in the brain leading to teleofunctionality. The unification of mental states arises from the teleosemantic hierarchy of interconnected intrinsic information content of mental states. We also note that quantum causality is a dynamic process, not a structural one, as genes play no role in consciousness (Baluška et al. 2016).

It is teleonomic emergence of teleofunctionality that evolves subjectivity in terms of a trajectory in ‘teleofunctional space'. The interconnectedness of intrinsic information content of mental states relies on continuity of levels (Lycan 1999). Teleofunctionality carries a value judgment of brain functions that we define as teleosemantics, which is observer-independent semantics akin to subjective ‘meaning’. The conceptual underpinning of teleofunctionality is teleonomy (Mayr 1974). Teleonomic processes are goal directed without the implication that the end is causally effective. This is true also for subjective ‘meaning’ acting causally through bottom-up brain processes, but has no causal effect at the top-down cognitive processes (Searle 2000). We claim that subjective ‘meaning’ is a teleonomic process since it is goal-directed without being effective causally, occurring by way of intrinsic information context of mental states surmised from teleofunctions.

In other words, the interconnectedness of intrinsic information content in mental states is a spontaneous teleonomic process, i.e., goal-directed or purposeful where teleology subsumes both teleomatic and teleonomic processes, which means teleological functions have both an objective and subjective aspect constituting a ‘sui generis’ segregation of subjectively in mental states and objectivity in brain states. These teleofunctions carry an element of the subjective ‘meaning’ through teleosemantic hierarchy of interconnected intrinsic information that reconciles the epistemological qualities with higher-order causation mechanisms. The nonlocal causal dynamical relations between teleofunctionsi create ‘teleofunctional space’ of interconnected intrinsic information as a way of compensating for the partial information. This compensatory mechanism is broadly defined as “uncertainty” (Solms 2017) or ‘mental misrepresentation’.

The teleosemantic hierarchy associated with the interconnectedness of intrinsic information content of mental states has a direction of evolution described as a teleofunctionality vector potential, which is a one-way teleonomic process transcending to an epistemological object. The teleofunctionality vector potential is a continuous trajectory through ‘teleofunctional space’ (see Fig. 1). It is based on the continuous trajectories through neurolinguistic state space in the continuity of mind thesis (Spivey 2007). The nonlocal causality is capable of transcendence of teleofunctionality as a one-way informational signal if the teleofunctions are interconnected. We define dipolar vector potentials (Atkins and Friedman 2005) as isomorphic to teleofunctionality vector potential in the absence of teleofunctions. This differs from a magnetic vector potential that arises in homogenous matter (i.e. inanimate), but see Szasz et al. (2009) and Bokkon and Salari (2010) for derivation based on inhomogeneous living matter. The teleofunctionality vector potential is mental representation as a continuous trajectory in the ‘teleofunctional space’ or ‘mental space’ (Spivey 2007).

3 How Subjectivity Emerges from Teleofunctionality

We hypothesize that consciousness is a manifestation of conscious processes owing to cortical–cortical dynamics (Vincent et al. 2007) emerging from teleofunctionality- the unification of mental states. Interconnectedness of intrinsic information evolves into teleofunctionality via a teleosemantic hierarchy. In other words, there is ‘meaning’ attached to the interrelationship between hierarchies during their evolution, where each teleofunction carries a specific intrinsic informational content depending on where it occurs and with what it interacts in forming a discrete conscious field that becomes unified mental state through a functionally-linked continuum. How can it be possible to make a model of a new category to emerge if the mental states are not defined within the biological structure? To answer this, it is suggested that quantum dynamical effects produce an uncontrollable and unpredictable change that are not observable classically. All mental states arise as a result of continuity of nonlocal causal dynamical relations between interconnected teleofunctions evolving through the teleofunctionality vector potential (see Fig. 2).

Fig. 2
figure 2

Teleofunctionality arises from the functionally-linked continuum of interconnected intrinsic information. The teleofunctionality vector potential arises spontaneously (cf. magnetic field vector potential) as a continuous trajectory from nonlocal causative effects. A local combination of multiple functions is insufficient to drive the teleofunctionality vector potential (as indicated by individual vectors) through a teleosemantic hierarchy of interconnected intrinsic information in quantized space. Nonlocal causal dynamic relations between teleofunctions create 'teleofunctional space' of interconnected intrinsic information. A physical organization of brain function is non-existent, contrary to common ideas, that brain functions are confined to certain fixed locations. The functionally-linked teleosemantic hierarchy of interconnected intrinsic information is represented by nonlocal casual dynamical relations between teleofunctions. This is illustrated as a hemi-sphere where functional continuance emerges from quantized space of interconnected intrinsic information. This results in  a discrete conscious field where teleosemantic hierarchy of interconnected intrinsic information content of mental states at the lowest level becomes the desired meaning at a higher-order intrinsic information content of mental states

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Teleofunctionality is a reflection of subjectivity in the teleofunctionalist epistemology. Although subjectivity is assumed to originate as the interconnectedness of intrinsic information content of mental states. Brain functions do not operate independently of consciousness (Pylkkänen 2017) since teleofunctions form the basis of teleosemantics, which is a measure of subjective ‘meaning’ if occurring in functionally-linked continuum; a discrete conscious field. Teleosemantics is the entailment of nonlocal causal dynamical relations (Pereira 2003) of teleological functions that evolves ‘teleofunctionality’ as an epistemologically teleofunctional phenomenon across specialized brain regions/areas or modules. Brain structure is hierarchical (and heterogeneous), teleofunctionality involves quantum-like coherent nonlocal causal dynamical relations between teleofunctions. The nonlocal causal dynamical relations occupy a three-dimensional teleosemantic hierarchy of interconnected intrinsic information as  shown in Fig. 2. The absence of nonlocal teleofunctional interactions results in local brain functions (see small arrows in Fig. 2) and hence the teleosemantic hierarchy of interconnected intrinsic information is not evolving from the dynamically discrete nonlocal causal dynamical relations. Each brain function evolves by itself (see small arrows in Fig. 2). However, nonlocal causal dynamical relations are needed to interconnect teleofunctions. The subtle role of the nonlocal dynamical relations occurs at the quantum-like protectorate.

4 Self-Replication of Teleofunctions in a Physical Mind

Brain functions do not supervene on brain activities, but they are associated with intrinsic information of the material component that includes activity within brain structures. In other words, teleofunctional component is an information component of brain activity in a nonreductive physicalist perspective. The teleofunctional component itself is totally dependent on the context of the whole brain activity and it carries no meaning outside that context. Reducing the brain to its hierarchical components loses information irreversibly, that is, teleofunctional component carries intrinsic information of the whole brain. Teleofunctions are ‘spread’ across the hierarchical organization of the brain. These teleofunctional components are the ontological embodiment of the non-reductionist structures like the brain. The self-replication of teleofunctions encompasses the evolution of teleofunctionality arising from its teleofunctional components as a physical process of brain activity that is represented in terms of intrinsic information in the context of wholeness and nonreductive physicalism.

Basically, intrinsic information is a bridge that transfers physicality from brain activity or brain state to teleofunctions self-replicated in the subtle realm of quantized space in the brain. This can be considered a mental state. Therefore,  giving important insight that there is no immaterial or non-physical mind state as assumed in aspect monism, idealism and other metaphysics described in philosophy of mind, but a physical mind that is hidden in quantized space. Even more important is that non-physicality of teleofunctions is false; teleofunctions are produced from within brain structure. There is no evidence to prove that a mental state manifests due to the teleofunctions of different brain states. In fact, the mental states in the brain are due to the manifestation of physical interactions arising from material component of brains. It is in the deeper and more subtle scale within brains where the physical mind resides in quantized space. The goal is to understand how the physical mind becomes the “self”. Assigning physicality to concepts like “mind”, “teleofunction”, and “mental states” via intrinsic information is a huge step forward. The next step is to see what direction nonreductive physicalism will take us.

5 Conclusions

The emergence of subjective ‘meaning’ stems from the teleosemantic hierarchy of interconnected intrinsic information content of mental states to higher levels of awareness. The unification of subjective ‘meaning’ across the whole relation that is defined as teleofunctionality when reflected as built-in-function, which are causally responsible for the teleonomic process, and naturally leads to a teleological notion of function and teleosemantics. There, teleofunctional continuance of higher-order intrinsic information carries teleosemantics already retained at the lowest level of the hierarchy from more subtle intrinsic information measured through a teleofunctionality vector potential. Thus nonlocal causal dynamical relations interconnecting teleofunctions of intrinsic information form a teleofunctional space of interconnectedness in the evolution of teleosemantics. Consequently, the notion of inherent natural function specific to the mind becomes reality in the context of teleosemantics through an epistomenology functionalist approach.

That bird singing out the window that you see, hear and enjoy the effect, is part of your cognitive processing that is influenced by your consciousness in a subtle way. This subtlety in your perception and  thinking of the bird is your subjective awareness that is driven by consciousness. However, that bird does not influence how your consciousness “works”. This is the problem with phenomenological externalism (materialism or idealism). It attributes consciousness outside the “box” not as a physical entity in the brain. Consciousness can be attributed to spontaneity of potentiality, which most importantly is unidirectional. In other words, it can influence cognition, perception, but not the other way around and  therefore cosmic consciousness is implausible. The idea is similar to Hagan and Hirafuji (1999) yet they considered a bi-directional informational content allowing for cosmic consciousness to take place. From the work of Penrose (1989), however, this is impossible. Teleofunctionality entails the unification of mental states, which manifest into subjectivity from a teleosemantic hierarchy of interconnected intrinsic information while self-replicating itself in the context of the whole relation that is defined to be a unified mental state we know to be consciousness.