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Concepts of Animal Welfare in Relation to Positions in Animal Ethics

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Abstract

When animal ethicists deal with welfare they seem to face a dilemma: On the one hand, they recognize the necessity of welfare concepts for their ethical approaches. On the other hand, many animal ethicists do not want to be considered reformist welfarists. Moreover, animal welfare scientists may feel pressed by moral demands for a fundamental change in our attitude towards animals. The analysis of this conflict from the perspective of animal ethics shows that animal welfare science and animal ethics highly depend on each other. Welfare concepts are indispensable in the whole field of animal ethics. Evidence for this can be found by analyzing the structure of theories of animal ethics and the different ways in which these theories employ welfare concepts. Furthermore, the background of values underneath every welfare theory is essential to pursue animal welfare science. Animal ethics can make important contributions to the clarification of underlying normative assumptions with regard to the value of the animal, with regard to ideas about what is valuable for the animal, and with regard to the actions that should follow from the results of animal welfare science.

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Notes

  1. For a current overview of the aims and methods of animal welfare science cf. Appleby and Hughes 2003; Benson and Rollin 2004; Webster 2005.

  2. As I will show in chapter 2, this is not only a problem with regard to the implementation of a particular ethical framework. Empirical findings are also indispensable for theory formation, for example to determine the scope of the moral realm.

  3. I will discuss Regan’s approach in more detail in Sect. 2.2.

  4. Cf. Regan (1983, 243ff).

  5. Cf. for example the literature cited in DeGrazia (1996).

  6. See for an overview of the evidence for pain in animals and a rebuttal of Carruther’s claim DeGrazia (1996, 108–115).

  7. Francione (2008, 21).

  8. For a characterization of different welfare “schools” cf. Broom this volume and Nordenfelt this volume.

  9. Normative criteria guide our actions. In contrast, empirical criteria (e.g. sentience) are not necessarily linked to (moral) actions, but help to categorize different entities (e.g. beings with or without a moral status).

  10. Thus, although the term “pathocentric” is often used as nearly equivalent to “zoocentric”, it is best considered not as an additional bioethical perspective on the first level but as a normative criterion on the third level.

  11. With the exception of utilitarianism, I will focus on approaches that are usually not considered as typical welfare theories.

  12. This holds, for instance, for Holtug (1996) and Smith (2002).

  13. Webster (2005, 18).

  14. Crisp (1997, 20).

  15. Frey (1996, 195).

  16. Regan (1983, 243) [my emphasis]. Contrary to the utilitarian sentience-criterion, being a subject of a life is not a necessary but an adequate condition for moral status, cf. Regan (1983, 246).

  17. Regan (1983, 187).

  18. Regan (1983, 94).

  19. Regan (1983, 95).

  20. Cf. Regan (1983, 95).

  21. Nussbaum (2004, 309).

  22. Nussbaum (2004, 315).

  23. Nussbaum (2004, 307).

  24. Nussbaum (2004, 318).

  25. Haynes (2008, 141).

  26. Haynes (2008, 140).

  27. Haynes (2008, 151).

  28. Donovan and Adams (2007, 2).

  29. Since the care tradition includes a variety of different theories, one can find very different answers to the questions on the three levels of argumentation. For an overview of care approaches in animal ethics cf. the contributions in Donovan and Adams (2007).

  30. Donovan and Adams (2007, 3).

  31. Tannenbaum (1991, 1360).

  32. Broom (1991, 4168). Cf. also Broom this volume.

  33. Tannenbaum (1991, 1361).

  34. Cf. Duncan and Fraser (2003, 20).

  35. This does not mean that an action is always influenced by the complete set of moral and non-moral values of the actor. But every action is at least influenced by a positive evaluative judgment of the actor’s purpose. See for the normative structure of action Gewirth (1978).

  36. Duncan and Fraser (2003, 19f).

  37. Tannenbaum (1991, 1372).

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  1. Institut für Philosophie, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 44801, Bochum, Germany

    Kirsten Schmidt

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Schmidt, K. Concepts of Animal Welfare in Relation to Positions in Animal Ethics. Acta Biotheor 59, 153–171 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10441-011-9128-y

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