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Effects of rent dependency on quality of government

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Abstract

This paper introduces quality of government rather than regime type as dependent variable in studies of political effects of natural resources. It consists of two parts. First, it argues for an effect of fiscal dependency of oil and gas rents on quality of government. Second, it finds significant, negative effects of oil and gas rent dependency on three empirical indicators of quality of government—low corruption, bureaucratic quality and legal impartiality—in a sample of 139 states in the period 1984–2006. The results hold for inclusion of control variables such as regime type, income, region and religion.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. External Relations, School of Business, Economics and Law University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden

    Mette Anthonsen

  2. Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden

    Åsa Löfgren & Joakim Westerlund

  3. Department of Political Science, Lund University, Lund, Sweden

    Klas Nilsson

Authors
  1. Mette Anthonsen
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  2. Åsa Löfgren
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  3. Klas Nilsson
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  4. Joakim Westerlund
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Correspondence to Åsa Löfgren.

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Anthonsen, M., Löfgren, Å., Nilsson, K. et al. Effects of rent dependency on quality of government. Econ Gov 13, 145–168 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-011-0105-3

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