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Impediments to the management of shared aquifers: A political economy perspective

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Abstract

The reliance on aquifers which are shared by more than one country is increasing. Yet, shared aquifers are only rarely addressed in international treaties, despite the wide recognition of the desirability of comprehensive coordinated management. In order to identify the impediments to reaching agreements on the management of shared aquifers, and the factors that may assist in overcoming these impediments, the political economy of transboundary groundwater exploitation is outlined, and the Israeli-Palestinian case examined. It is argued that the main impediment to the conclusion of international agreements on groundwater is the array of domestic power structures, and particularly the power of small cohesive interest groups. The analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian 1995 interim agreement, and the negotiations leading to it, suggest that this impediment can be overcome, if the domestic interests are recognized in advance, and addressed in the agreement. It also shows that high level politics can play a positive role in forcing water negotiators to conclude an agreement.

Résumé

La confiance dans les aquifères partagés par plusieurs pays s’améliore. Cependant, les aquifères partagés sont rarement repris dans les traités internationaux, malgré la reconnaissance du désir d’une gestion coordonnée et compréhensive. En identifiant les entraves aux accords sur la gestion des aquifères partagés, et les facteurs qui permettraient de surmonter ces entraves, les processus importants sont mis en lumière. À cette fin la politique économique de l’exploitation des eaux souterraines transfrontalières est dessinée, et le cas Israélo-Palestinien est examiné. La principale entrave aux accords internationaux sur les eaux souterraines, est l’organisation des structures de pouvoir domestique, et en particulier les petits groupes d’intérêts cohésifs. L’analyse de l’accord israelo-palestinien intérimaire de 1995, et les négociations ayant conduit à celui-ci, suggèrent que les entraves peuvent être surmontées, si les intérêts domestiques sont reconnus par avance, et inscrits dans l’agrément. Il est également montré que les politiques de haut niveau peuvent jouer un rôle positif en forçant les négociateurs de l’eau à conclure à un accord.

Resumen

La dependencia en acuíferos que son compartidos por más de un país está incrementando. Sin embargo, los acuíferos compartidos rara vez son tomados en cuenta en tratados internacionales, a pesar de que es ampliamente reconocido el deseo de una gestión coordinada extensiva. Se destacan los procesos importantes al identificar los impedimentos para alcanzar acuerdos en la gestión de acuíferos compartidos y los factores que pueden ayudar en vencer esos impedimentos. Al respecto se delimita la economía política de la explotación de aguas subterráneas transfronterizas y se examina el caso Palestino-Israelí. Se discute que el principal obstáculo para alcanzar acuerdos internacionales en aguas subterráneas es el arreglo de estructuras de poder domésticas, y particularmente el poder de grupos de interés cohesivos pequeños. El análisis del acuerdo provisional Palestino-Israelí de 1995 y las negociaciones que condujeron al mismo sugieren que este obstáculo puede ser vencido si se reconocen por adelantado los intereses domésticos y si se tratan los mismos en el acuerdo. El análisis también muestra que la política de alto nivel puede jugar un rol positivo en forzar a los negociadores a alcanzar un acuerdo.

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Notes

  1. An indication of the extensiveness of such aquifers is a questionnaire-based UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) inventory of twenty five countries, mostly in Europe, which identified 89 transboundary aquifers (Almassy and Buzas, 1999).

  2. See Sophocleous (2003) and Koussis et al. (2003) for examples and specifications of such processes.

  3. The term “regulations” includes all forms of government intervention, including levies, taxes, quotas (both tradable and non-tradable) and pumping or drilling restrictions.

  4. On the importance of such entrepreneurship and of ‘policy windows’ in setting agendas and implementing policies, as well as for definitions of these terms, see Kingdon (1984).

  5. For expositions on the reasons that policy outcomes tend to favor interest groups, and particularly small cohesive ones, see Grossman and Helpman (1996), Coate and Morris (1995) or Lohmann (1998).

  6. See Lohmann (1998) for the theoretical substantiation of this statement.

  7. The form this struggle will take is a function of the local institutional structure. Yet, the incidence of such struggles is widespread, and may explain perhaps the difficulties that various water management institutions face in managing aquifers in many parts of the world (Shah, 2005)

  8. For a description of the Israeli water system see Arlosoroff (2001).

  9. This impasse was overcome for wastewater recycling in 1993 when planners and environmentalists were able to incorporate wastewater treatment as a pre-condition for residential development in the national plan for immigration absorption and development, thereby forcing housing interests to finance wastewater recycling.

  10. As there are differences between sources in estimates of prior use, which were made for different years in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a range is presented in Table 1. Extreme values which are clear outliers relative to all other sources were omitted.

  11. At the time of the negotiations only a draft interim report existed. However, several of the Palestinian negotiators were part of the research team, and the Israeli side was also well-informed. For a (later) description of the propositions made at this phase of the study see Feitelson and Haddad (1998).

  12. While it can be argued that the marginal value product of water for the Israeli economy is not high, the actual loss suffered by specific farmers in the affected areas may be substantial, and hence the expected opposition.

  13. Based on Palestinian sources Trottier (1999. p. 172) reports that some 1500 illegal wells were dug in the Gaza strip in 1995 alone following the Israeli withdrawal.

  14. See Trottier (1999) for an account of these interests and the difficulties faced by the PWA.

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Acknowledgements

The author thanks Itay Fischhendler, Meredith Giordano, Ramon Llamas and Aaron Wolf for helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. Needless to say, all remaining errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the author

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  1. Department of Geography and School of Public Policy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel

    Eran Feitelson

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Feitelson, E. Impediments to the management of shared aquifers: A political economy perspective. Hydrogeol J 14, 319–329 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10040-005-0481-2

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