Abstract
In this paper, we present a generalization of power indices which includes the preferences of the voters. Using a Multilinear Extension perspective (Owen in Manage Sci 18:p64–p72, 1972a) we measure the probability of the players’ voting “yes” for a particular political issue. Further, we randomize the issues and show the influence that the Agenda Setter can have on a player’s power. We demonstrate these results using data from the European Union to show how the power distribution may shift after enlargement and under the new Constitutional Treaty.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Baldwin R, Widgrén M (2004) Winners and losers under various dual-majority voting rules for the EU’s Council of Ministers. CEPS Policy Briefs
Banzhaf JF III (1965) Weighted voting doesn’t work: a mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Rev 19:317–343
Barr JM, Passarelli F (2004) Who has the power in the EU? Rutgers University, Newark Working Paper #2004-005
European Commission (2003a) Eurobarometer: public opinion in the European Union. vol 59, pp B103–B105, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm
European Commission (2003b) Candidate Countries Eurobarometer. Spring, B119-B121 http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/cceb_en.htm
Felsenthal DS, Machover M (2001) The treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting. Soc Choice Welf 18(3):431–464
Felsenthal DS, Machover M (2004) Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention. Social Choice Welf 23(1):1–20
Garrett G, Tsebelis G (1999) Why resist the temptation to apply power indices to the European Union?. J Theoret Polit 11:291–308
Grofman B, Lindner I, Owen G (2004) Modified power indices for indirect voting. mimeo
Grofman B, Owen G, Noviello N, Glazer A (1987) Stability and centrality of legislative choice in the spatial context. Am Polit Sci Rev 81:539–553
Holler MJ, Owen G (eds) (2001) Power indices and coalition formation. Kluwer, Boston
Kachigan SK (1991) Multivariate statistical analysis: a conceptual introduction, 2nd edn. Radius Press, New York
Laruelle A, Widgrén M (1998) Is the allocation of voting power among the EU states fair? Public Choice 94(3–4):317–339
Lawley DN, Maxwell AE (1971) Factor analysis as a statistical method. American Elsevier Publishing, New York
Leech D (2002) Designing the voting system for the council of the European Union. Public Choice 113(3–4):437–464
Monderer D, Samet D (2002) Variations on the Shapley value. In: Aumann RJ, Hart S (eds) Handbook of game theory, vol 3. Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, pp 2055–2076
Napel S, Widgrén M (2004a) The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU Codecision. Soc Choice Welf (in press) [CESifo Working Paper No. 1347, Munich]
Napel S, Widgrén M (2004b) Power measurement as sensitivity analysis – a unified approach. J Theoret Polit 16(4):517–538
Napel S, Widgrén M (2005) The possibility of a preference-based power index. J Theoret Polit 17(3):379–389
Owen G (1972a) Multilinear extensions of games. Manage Sci 18:P64–P72
Owen G (1972b) Political games. Naval Res Logist Q 18:345–354
Owen G, Shapley LS (1989) Optimal location of candidates in ideological space. Int J Game Theory 18:339–356
Rabinowitz G, Macdonald SE (1986) The power of the states in U.S. presidential elections. Am Polit Sci Rev 80:65–87
Rapoport A, Golan E (1985) Assessment of political power in the Israeli knesset. Am Polit Sci Rev 79:673–692
Shapley LS (1977) A comparison of power indices and a nonsymmetric generalization. The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Paper P-5872
Shapley LS, Shubik M (1954) A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system. Am Polit Sci Rev 48:787–792
Straffin PD (1977) Homogeneity, independence, and power indices. Public Choice 30:107–118
Weber RJ (1988) Probabilistic values for games. In: Roth AE (eds) The Shapley Value: essays in honor of Lloyd S. Shapley. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 101–119
Widgrén M (1994) Voting power in the EC and the consequences of two different enlargements. Eur Econ Rev 38:1153–1170
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Passarelli, F., Barr, J. Preferences, the Agenda Setter, and the Distribution of Power in the EU. Soc Choice Welfare 28, 41–60 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0155-6
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0155-6