Abstract
Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the discontinuities of correspondences of standard equilibrium concepts like correlated, Nash, and robust equilibrium, or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resulting equivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across different equilibrium concepts for 2 × 2 games; larger games are also studied. It is argued that the procedure leads to broad and game-theoretically meaningful distinctions of games as well as to alternative ways of representing, comparing and testing equilibrium concepts.
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Germano, F. On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games. Int J Game Theory 34, 561–581 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0033-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0033-6