Abstract
The theory and behavior of the clock version of the ascending auction has been well understood for at least 20 years. The more widely used oral outcry version of the ascending auction that allows bidders to submit their own bids has been the subject of some recent controversy mostly in regard to whether or not jump bidding, i.e. bidders submitting bids higher than required by the auctioneer, should be allowed. Isaac, Salmon & Zillante (2005) shows that the standard equilibrium for the clock auction does not apply to the non-clock format and constructs an equilibrium bid function intended to match with field data on ascending auctions. In this study, we will use economic experiments to provide a direct empirical test of that model while simultaneously providing empirical evidence to resolve the policy disputes centered around the place of jump bidding in ascending auctions.
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Received: March 2005
The authors would like to thank Florida State University for providing the funding for the experiments in this paper and Bradley Andrews for programming assistance.
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Isaac, R.M., Salmon, T.C. & Zillante, A. An experimental test of alternative models of bidding in ascending auctions. Int J Game Theory 33, 287–313 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0203-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0203-y