Abstract
In this paper I argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate. Taking a discussion of John Pollock as a starting point, I argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified. I then consider another version of internalistic foundationalism and claim that it, too, is open to important objections. Finally, I note that both varieties of foundationalism fail to account for the epistemic status of our justified nonoccurrent beliefs, and hence are drastically incomplete.
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Senor, T.D. Internalistic foundationalism and the justification of memory belief. Synthese 94, 453–476 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064489
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064489