This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
References
Alston, W. P.: 1986a, ‘Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology’,Philosophical Topics XIV, 79–221.
Alston, W. P.: 1986b, ‘Epistemic Circularity’,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XLVII, 1–30.
Audi, Robert: 1986, ‘Belief, Reason, and Inference’,Philosophical Topics XIV, 27–65.
Bonjour, Laurence: 1985,The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Foley, Richard: 1985, ‘What's Wrong With Reliability?’,The Monist 68, 188–202.
Ginet, Carl: 1975,Knowledge, Perception, and Memory, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Goldman, Alvin I.: 1976, ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge’,Journal of Philosophy 73, 771–91.
Moser, Paul K.: 1985,Empirical Justification, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Swain, Marshall: 1981,Reasons and Knowledge, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
An earlier version of this paper was delivered at a Conference on Epistemic Justification, honoring Roderick Chisholm, at Brown University in November, 1986. I am grateful to the participants in that conference for many penetrating remarks, and especially to my commentator, Marshall Swain.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Alston, W.P. An internalist externalism. Synthese 74, 265–283 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869630
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869630