Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods

  • Published:
International Journal of Game Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

A cooperative venture yields a nonnegative surplus. Agents are differentiated by their opportunity costs only. Two surplus sharing methods (equal sharing, proportional sharing) are characterized with the help of four axioms. Separability and No Advantageous Reallocation deal with coalitional changes in the opportunity costs. Additivity and Path Independence take into account variations in the surplus level.Any triple of these axioms characterizes equalor proportional sharing. Any pair of axioms characterize a distinct, infinite family of methods, compromising between equal and proportional sharing.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Aczel J (1966) Functional equations and their applications. Academic Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  2. Aumann RJ, Maschler M (1985) Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy from the talmud. J Econ Theory 36:195–213

    Google Scholar 

  3. Banker R (1981) Equity considerations in traditional full-cost allocation practices: an axiomatic perspective. In: Moriarty S (ed) Joint Cost Allocations. University of Oklahoma, Norman

    Google Scholar 

  4. Chun Y (1985) The Proportional solution for rights problems. Forthcoming in Math Soc Sciences

  5. Kolm S (1976) Unequal inequalities. Journal of Economic Theory 12:416–442

    Google Scholar 

  6. Mirman L, Taumann Y (1982) Demand compatible equitable cost sharing prices. Maths of Operations Research 7(1):40–56

    Google Scholar 

  7. Moulin H (1985) Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in quasi-linear bargaining. Econometrica 53(1):49–68

    Google Scholar 

  8. Moulin H (1985) The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods. J Econ Theory 36/1: 120–148

    Google Scholar 

  9. Moulin H (1985) Binary choices with compensations. Mimeo, University of California, San Diego

    Google Scholar 

  10. O'Neill B (1982) A problem of right arbitration in the talmud. Math Soc Sciences 2:345–371

    Google Scholar 

  11. Owen G (1982) Game theory, 2nd ed. Academic Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  12. Peleg B (1986) On the reduced game property and its converse. Int J of Game Theory 15/3: 187–200

    Google Scholar 

  13. Peleg S (1985) An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side-payments. Mimeo, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem

  14. Sobolev AI (1975) The characterization of the nucleolus by functional equations. In: Vorobiev NN (ed) Matematicheskie metodyv socialnix naukax. Vipusk 6:94–151

  15. Young HP (1984) Consistency and optimality in taxation. Mimeo, University of Maryland

  16. Young HP (1984) Taxation and bankruptcy. Mimeo, University of Maryland

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 24061, Blacksburg, Virginia

    H. Moulin

Authors
  1. H. Moulin
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

This research was supported under NSF Grant SES-8419465. Encouragements and criticisms from H. P. Young at an early stage of this research and detailed comments by C. Holt have been most precious. They are gratefully acknowledged.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Moulin, H. Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods. Int J Game Theory 16, 161–186 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01756289

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01756289

Keywords

Search

Navigation