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Internal processes governing party positions in elections

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Johns Hopkins University, USA

    James S. Coleman

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  1. James S. Coleman
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This paper was prepared with the aid of NSF Research Grant GS25 – 26, for work on problems of collective decisions. It was stimulated by an approach to the problem of parties' positions taken by Robert Harris and Gudmund Hernes in a seminar on collective decisions at Johns Hopkins in early 1970. Harris and Hernes pointed out that the usual mathematical approach to optimum party position neglects the fact of competition for leadership within the party, assuming party leaders are completely free to respond to the larger electorate, which of course they are not. Aranson and Ordeshook (1971), also begin to adopt this more organizationally sophisticated approach.

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Coleman, J.S. Internal processes governing party positions in elections. Public Choice 11, 35–60 (1971). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01726211

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01726211

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