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Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?

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Abstract

This paper reviews recent advances on the role of the central bank in the money supply process and its effects on inflation. The literature is presented according to a three-stage process, with the central bank acting first as social player, then as monetary agent, and finally as a combined monetary and banking agent.

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  1. Paolo Baffi Centre and IGIER, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy

    Donato Masciandaro

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Masciandaro, D. Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?. Open Econ Rev 6, 399–410 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01000390

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