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The intended interpretation of intuitionistic logic

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I am grateful to David McCarty for useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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Weinstein, S. The intended interpretation of intuitionistic logic. J Philos Logic 12, 261–270 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00247190

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