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Why so much stability

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  1. Center for Study of Public Choice, USA

    Gordon Tullock

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  1. Gordon Tullock
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This article was much improved by comments from T. Nicolaus Tideman.

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Tullock, G. Why so much stability. Public Choice 37, 189–204 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00138239

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