Abstract
If there are groups whose endorsements voters can use as positive (or negative) cues, we demonstrate that voters do not need to know anything directly about candidate positions to be able to identify the candidate whose issue positions and performance is likely to be closest to the voter's own preferences. In one dimension we show that, given certain simplifying assumptions, voters are best off adopting the choice recommended by the single reference group to which they are closest. We also show that even a decision by reference groups not to endorse any candidate may be informative to voters.
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We are indebted to Sue Pursche, Wilma Laws and the staff of the Word Processing Center, School of Social Sciences UCI, and Jerry Florence of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences for typing numerous drafts of this manuscript from hand-scribbled copy. It was begun while the first-named author was a Fellow at CASBS. This research was partially supported by NSF Grant SES #85-06376, Program in Decision and Management Sciences, awarded to the first-named author.
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Grofman, B., Norrander, B. Efficient use of reference group cues in a single dimension. Public Choice 64, 213–227 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124367
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124367