Skip to main content

Targets: Why Money and Credit?

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Remaking Monetary Policy in China
  • 265 Accesses

Abstract

The People’s Bank of China was not very explicit about its views on the transmission processes of monetary policy in the 2000s, but its statements were oriented around money and credit quantity targets. This contrasted with international ‘new macroeconomic consensus’ policy, which focused on interest rates. We explain why Chinese officials continued to use quantitative targets: mainly as an anchor for tighter policy, rather than any belief in a stable demand-for-money function. Interest rates were not appropriate as an intermediate target because policymakers doubted their influence on investment.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    The PBC had begun announcing M1 and M2 targets in 1994 as it began winding down the Credit Plan (Bell and Feng 2013, pp. 165–167), and decided on M2 as the key aggregate in 1996. It continued to announce M2 targets through the 2000s, but dropped M1 in 2007 (Sun 2013, p. 59).

  2. 2.

    The Mishkin textbook Dai promoted at the PBC introduces monetary policy through the control of the monetary base and the bank money multiplier, and the demand-for-money function. But it is presented explicitly as an over-simple model used for pedagogical purposes. Mishkin (1995, pp. 379–380, 383–402) acknowledges that variability in the money multiplier means that the central bank does not necessarily control the money supply even if it controls the monetary base. He also makes clear that the stability of demand for money in the United States seemed to break down after the mid-1970s and that the Federal Reserve abandoned monetary targets by the early 1990s (Mishkin 1995, p. 511). He describes the simple monetarist model of the transmission process of monetary policy as a ‘black box’, depending on statistical regularities between money supply and aggregate nominal income but not explaining the channel of cause and effect (Mishkin 1995, p. 657). (We refer to the edition most likely to have been originally distributed by Dai at the PBC, but these passages remain in later editions.)

  3. 3.

    A 2003 PBC report explained that hitting the monetary targets could be difficult because of time lags in the transmission process, and because the bank money multiplier varied (PBC 2003, Box 1).

  4. 4.

    As discussed below, the authorities would deal with the monetary effects of the large balance-of-payments surpluses of the 2000s with various sterilisation methods. The currency was also allowed to appreciate later in the decade.

  5. 5.

    Goodhart (1989, pp. 357–377) discusses this for the case of the United Kingdom, and Beggs (2015, pp. 230–243) for Australia.

  6. 6.

    Blinder (1998, p. 29) describes the US Federal Reserve’s turn to monetarism 1979–1982 as a political ‘marriage of convenience’ rather than an economic conversion: ‘Monetarist rhetoric provided the Fed with a political heat shield as it raised interest rates to excruciating heights’.

  7. 7.

    In later versions of the textbook, four of the nine transmission channels discussed run through bank loans (Mishkin 2004, p. 619).

References

  • Baharumshah, Ahmad Zubaidi, Siti Hamizah Mohd, and Marial Awou Yol. 2009. “Stock prices and demand for money in China: New evidence.” Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 19, pp. 171–187.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bahmani-Oskooee, Mohsen, and Yongqing Wang. 2007. “How stable is the demand for money in China?” Journal of Economic Development 32, pp. 21–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bai, Chong-En, Chang-Tai Hsieh, and Yingyi Qian. 2006. “The return to capital in China.” NBER Working Paper Series 12755.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beggs, Michael. 2015. Inflation and the making of Australian macroeconomic policy, 1945–85. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bell, Stephen, and Hui Feng. 2013. The rise of the People’s Bank of China: The politics of institutional change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bernanke, Ben S., and Alan S. Blinder. 1992. “The Federal funds rate and the channels of monetary transmission.” American Economic Review 82 (4), pp. 901–921.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernanke, Ben S., and Mark Gertler. 1995. “Inside the black box: The credit channel of monetary policy transmission.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (4), pp. 27–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blinder, Alan S. 1998. Central banking in theory and practice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bofinger, Peter. 2001. Monetary policy: Goals, institutions, strategies, and instruments. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burdekin, Richard C. K., and Pierre L. Siklos. 2008. “What has driven Chinese monetary policy since 1990? Investigating the People’s Bank’s policy rule.” Journal of International Money and Finance 27, pp. 847–859.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen, Baizhu. 1997. “Long-run money demand and inflation in China.” Journal of Macroeconomics 19 (3), pp. 609–617.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chick, Victoria. 1983. Macroeconomics after Keynes: A reconsideration of the general theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gerlach, Stefan, and Janet Kong. 2005. “Money and inflation in China.” Hong Kong Monetary Authority Research Memorandum 04/2005.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodhart, Charles A. E. 1989. Money, information, and uncertainty. Houndmills: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodhart, Charles A. E. 2007. “Whatever became of the monetary aggregates?” National Institute Economic Review 200, pp. 56–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hafer, Rik W., and Ali M. Kutan. 1994. “Economic reforms and long-run money demand in China: Implications for monetary policy.” Southern Economic Journal 60 (4), pp. 936–945.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huang, Guobo. 1994. “Money demand in China in the reform period: An error correction model.” Applied Economics 26, pp. 713–719.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Koivu, Tuuli. 2009. “Has the Chinese economy become more sensitive to interest rates? Studying credit demand in China.” China Economic Review 20 (3), pp. 455–470.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kothari, S. P., Jonathan Lewellen, and Jerold B. Warner. 2014. “The behaviour of aggregate corporate investment.” MIT Sloan School Working Papers 5112-14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laurens, Bernard J., and Rodolfo Maino. 2007. “China: Strengthening monetary policy implementation.” IMF Working Paper 07/14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mehrotra, Aaron. 2007. “Exchange and interest rate channels during a deflationary era: Evidence from Japan, Hong Kong and China.” Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (1), pp. 188–210.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mehrotra, Aaron. 2008. “Demand for money in transition: Evidence from China’s disinflation.” International Advances in Economic Research 14, pp. 36–47.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Michell, Jo. 2012. Credit and investment in China: A flow-of-funds analysis. PhD thesis, SOAS, University of London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mishkin, Frederic S. 1995. Economics of money, banking, and financial markets, 4th ed. New York: HarperCollins.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mishkin, Frederic S. 2004. Economics of money, banking, and financial markets, 7th ed. Boston: Addison Wesley.

    Google Scholar 

  • People’s Bank of China. 2003. Monetary Policy Report, Quarter 4. Beijing: People’s Bank of China.

    Google Scholar 

  • People’s Bank of China. 2005. Monetary Policy Report, Quarter 1. Beijing: People’s Bank of China.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sun, Rongrong. 2013. “Does monetary policy matter in China? A narrative approach.” China Economic Review 26, pp. 56–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wu, Ge. 2009. “Broad money demand and asset substitution in China.” IMF Working Paper 09/131.

    Google Scholar 

  • Xie, Ping. 2004. “China’s monetary policy: 1998–2002.” Stanford Center for International Development Working Paper 217.

    Google Scholar 

  • Xiong, Weibo. 2012. “Measuring the monetary policy stance of the People’s Bank of China: An ordered probit analysis.” China Economic Review 23 (3), pp. 512–533.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yan, Qingmin, and Jianhua Li. 2016. Regulating China’s shadow banks. Milton Park: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yu, Qiao, and Ping Xie. 1999. “Money aggregates management: Problems and prospects in China’s economic transition.” Contemporary Economic Policy 17 (1), pp. 33–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zuo, Haomiao, and Sung Y. Park. 2011. “Money demand in China and time-varying cointegration.” China Economic Journal 22 (3), pp. 330–343.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michael Beggs .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Beggs, M., Deer, L. (2019). Targets: Why Money and Credit?. In: Remaking Monetary Policy in China. Palgrave Pivot, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9726-4_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9726-4_3

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Pivot, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-13-9725-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-13-9726-4

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics