Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Armed Opposition Groups’ (and Foreign Fighters’) Abidance by International Human Rights Law: The Issue of Compliance in Syria and Iraq

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond

Abstract

This chapter will examine the extent to which International Human Rights Law (IHRL) regulates the activities of foreign fighters. Its starting point is that IHRL does not address foreign fighters as individual natural persons, but binds them in their quality as members of one of the parties to an internal strife. Their breaches of IHRL, therefore, may trigger the international responsibility of the entity which they are part of. On this assumption, the present investigation will aim at providing an answer to the following issues: (i) to what extent IHRL binds the parties to an internal conflict; (ii) under which conditions human rights violations committed by foreign fighters are attributable to them; and (iii) what legal consequences ensue from such violations. At variance with the general approach adopted in this volume, this chapter will focus solely on foreign fighters siding with armed opposition groups, since in relation to foreign elements fighting with governmental forces these issues are relatively uncontroversial and do not need further discussion. The analysis will be carried out by taking as case studies the internal conflicts ongoing in Syria and Iraq.

The author is Lecturer of Public International Law, University of Naples “Federico II”.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 229.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 299.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    See Chap. 10 by Heinsch in this volume.

  2. 2.

    International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc. A/RES/56/83 (2001), Annex, Part One, Chapter II, and Part Two.

  3. 3.

    Krähenmann 2014, p. 9.

  4. 4.

    Sivakumaran 2012 pp. 83–99.

  5. 5.

    The protection of the right to personal liberty during armed conflicts is an illustrative example in point. While safeguards against arbitrary detention are provided under both sets of norms, their content sensibly differs—which raises the issue as to how to reconcile them (for a recent attempt in this sense by the European Court of Human Rights, see Hassan v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 16 September 2014).

  6. 6.

    See however the discussion carried out supra in Chap. 9 by Sommario.

  7. 7.

    Kolb 2013, paras 29–30.

  8. 8.

    Clapham 2014, pp. 787–788. As is well known, despite its broadness of scope, Common Article 3 does not regulate all internal conflicts, but only those reaching a certain threshold of confrontation. In this connection, two criteria are generally taken into account, namely (i) hostilities must be severe enough to compel the government to resort to the military, instead of ordinary police forces; (ii) non-governmental party (or parties) must possess a certain command structure and have the capacity to sustain military operations (see Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case no. IT-03-66-T, 30 November 2005, paras 94–170).

  9. 9.

    Sivakumaran 2011, p. 244.

  10. 10.

    Henckaerts and Wiesener 2013, p. 152.

  11. 11.

    Ronen 2013, pp. 23–24.

  12. 12.

    Kleffner 2009, pp. 238–239.

  13. 13.

    Szablewska 2007, p. 358.

  14. 14.

    Moir 2002, p. 194; Ronen 2013.

  15. 15.

    Moir 2002, p. 194.

  16. 16.

    See the practice referred to by Tomuschat 2004; Constantinides 2010; Henckaerts and Wiesener 2013, pp. 154–159; and Clapham 2014, pp. 793–799.

  17. 17.

    Rodenhäuser 2012, p. 270; Ryngaert 2008, p. 368.

  18. 18.

    Rodley 1993, p. 298.

  19. 19.

    Rodley 1993, p. 300; Zegveld 2002, p. 54.

  20. 20.

    Sivakumaran 2012, p. 96.

  21. 21.

    See, for instance, UN Security Council, Res. 1193 (1998) (urging all ‘Afghan factions’—and thus not only those exerting territorial control—‘to put an end to the discrimination against girls and women and to other violations of human rights’). See also Rodenhäuser 2012, pp. 278, and 280–282.

  22. 22.

    McCorquodale 2002, p. 587.

  23. 23.

    Clapham 2006, p. 284.

  24. 24.

    Clapham 2006, p. 284.

  25. 25.

    Kleffner 2009, p. 242.

  26. 26.

    Ronen 2013, p. 35; Ryngaert 2008, pp. 363–365.

  27. 27.

    Clapham 2014, pp. 790–793.

  28. 28.

    See, in particular, section 702, entitled ‘Customary International Law of Human Rights’.

  29. 29.

    Crawford, 2012, pp. 642–643. Although the American Law Institute is currently working on a Fourth Restatement, the update of the list of customary norms of human rights does not appear at the top of its agenda, which is instead focused on jurisdiction, the domestic effect of treaties, and state immunities (see http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=28. Accessed 30 May 2015).

  30. 30.

    Section 702(b)(c)(d)(e).

  31. 31.

    Section 702(a)(f).

  32. 32.

    Section 702(g).

  33. 33.

    Pisillo Mazzeschi 2008. This obligation basically overlaps with the due diligence principle mentioned above (Shelton and Gould 2013, p. 582).

  34. 34.

    Ronen 2013, p. 27; Bellal et al. 2011, p. 72.

  35. 35.

    Rodenhäuser 2012, p. 274.

  36. 36.

    In this respect, it has been suggested applying, by analogy, the well-known jurisprudence of human rights courts and quasi-judicial bodies concerning extraterritorial obligations of States (Bellal et al. 2011, pp. 71–72; Ronen 2013, pp. 25–26).

  37. 37.

    Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012 (‘Second report’), para 122.

  38. 38.

    Second report, para 106.

  39. 39.

    In fact, there are ius cogens human rights norms, such as the prohibition of apartheid, which—because of their content—necessarily address well-organized, State-like entities.

  40. 40.

    Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, Annex II, para 122.

  41. 41.

    UNAMI-OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Non International Armed Conflict in Iraq: 5 June—5 July 2014 (‘UNAMI-OHCHR first report’), p. 6.

  42. 42.

    Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/27/60, 13 August 2014, paras 13–19.

  43. 43.

    Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria, 14 November 2014 (‘Rule of Terror’).

  44. 44.

    Rule of Terror, paras 20, 30, 73–74, and 77.

  45. 45.

    UNAMI-OHCHR first report, p. 13; Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq, 11 September—10 December 2014, p. 6 (‘UNAMI-OHCHR second report’), pp. 10–11.

  46. 46.

    Holliday 2012.

  47. 47.

    Ryngaert and d’Aspremont 2014, p. 7.

  48. 48.

    Second report, para 133(c).

  49. 49.

    Third report, para 154(a).

  50. 50.

    Kleffner 2009, pp. 262–264.

  51. 51.

    Zegveld 2002, p. 155.

  52. 52.

    ‘The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State’.

  53. 53.

    Kleffner 2009, p. 262.

  54. 54.

    ‘Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding articles shall nevertheless be considered an act of that State under international law if and to the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own’.

  55. 55.

    ‘The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance’.

  56. 56.

    ‘The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct’.

  57. 57.

    Article 30(a).

  58. 58.

    Articles 31, 34–37.

  59. 59.

    Article 30(b).

  60. 60.

    Ryngaert and d’Aspremont 2014, p. 10.

  61. 61.

    UNAMI-OHCHR first report, p. 21; UNAMI-OHCHR second report, p. 27.

  62. 62.

    Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, para 177(d).

  63. 63.

    Second report, para 133(a)(b).

  64. 64.

    Sivakumaran 2012, pp. 533–538.

  65. 65.

    Sivakumaran 2012, pp. 534–537. See also Chap. 11 by Capone in this volume.

  66. 66.

    This is shown, for instance, by their undertaking of commitments on humanitarian issues under the auspices of the Swiss-based NGO Geneva Call (http://www.genevacall.org/how-we-work/armed-non-state-actors. Accessed 30 May 2015). On the activities of Geneva Call, see, generally, Sivakumaran 2012, pp. 538–549.

  67. 67.

    B. Frelick, Why ISIS immune to ‘naming and shaming’. CNN (2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/28/opinion/frelick-isis-human-rights. Accessed 30 May 2015.

  68. 68.

    Kleffner 2009, p. 253.

  69. 69.

    See, on this point, Chap. 14 by de Guttry in this volume.

  70. 70.

    See, also for narrative summaries of reasons for listing, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/entities_other_groups_undertakings_associated_with_Al-Qaida.shtml. Accessed 30 May 2015. It is worth noting that, while the listing procedure is routinely carried out by an auxiliary body, the 1267 Sanctions Committee, on 15 August 2014 the Security Council, in a somewhat unusual move, directly sanctioned six individuals allegedly connected with ISIS and the al-Nusra Front UN Doc. S/RES/2170 (2014). Significantly, all of them are foreign fighters.

  71. 71.

    Kraehenmann 2014, p. 37.

  72. 72.

    UN Doc. S/RES/2199 (2015).

  73. 73.

    Institut de droit international, The Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars, Wiesbaden, Resolution of 14 August 1975, Article 2.

  74. 74.

    Christakis and Bannelier 2004, pp. 118–120.

  75. 75.

    Corten 2010, p. 296.

  76. 76.

    Conforti and Labella 2012, p. 127.

  77. 77.

    Christakis and Bannelier 2004; Corten 2010, pp. 288–300.

  78. 78.

    Akande and Vermeer 2015.

  79. 79.

    Van Steenberghe 2015.

  80. 80.

    Statement by the President, 7 August 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/07/statement-president. Accessed 30 May 2015.

  81. 81.

    For a more in-depth elaboration of these conditions, see Cassese 1999, pp. 27–28.

  82. 82.

    R. Spencer, US air strikes help halt Isil advance towards Kobane, The Telegraph (2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11226998/US-air-strikes-help-halt-Isil-advance-towards-Kobane.html. Accessed 30 May 2015.

  83. 83.

    See, for instance, Statement by Adama Dieng, Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, and Jennifer Welsh, Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect, on the situation in Kobane, Syria, 10 October 2014.

  84. 84.

    J.E. Barnes and S. Dagher, US Airdrops Weapons and Supplies to Besieged Syrian Kurds in Kobani, The Wall Street Journal (2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/us-airdrops-weapons-and-supplies-to-besieged-syrian-kurds-in-kobani-1413761080. Accessed 30 May 2015.

  85. 85.

    Ruys 2014, pp. 34–36.

References

  • Akande D, Vermeer Z (2015) The airstrikes against Islamic State in Iraq and the alleged prohibition on military assistance to governments in civil wars. EJIL: Talk! http://www.ejiltalk.org

  • Bellal A, Giacca G, Casey-Maslen S (2011) International law and armed non-state actors in Afghanistan. Int Rev Red Cross 93:47–79

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cassese A (1999) Ex iniuria ius oritur: are we moving towards international legitimation of forcible humanitarian countermeasures in the world community? Eur J Int Law 10:23–30

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Christakis T, Bannelier K (2004) Volenti Non Fit Injuria?: les effets du consentement à l’intervention militaire. Annuaire français de Droit Int 50:102–137

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clapham A (2006) Human rights obligations of non-state actors. OUP, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Clapham A (2014) Focusing on armed non-state actors. In: Clapham A, Gaeta P (eds) The Oxford handbook of international law in armed conflict. OUP, Oxford, pp 766–810

    Google Scholar 

  • Conforti B, Labella A (2012) An introduction to international law. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden/Boston

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Constantinides A (2010) Human rights obligations and accountability of armed opposition groups: the practice of the UN Security Council. Hum Rights Int Legal Discourse 4:88–110

    Google Scholar 

  • Corten O (2010) The law against war: the prohibition on the use of force in contemporary international law. Hart, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Crawford J (2012) Brownlie’s principles of public international law. OUP, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Henckaerts J-M, Wiesener C (2013) Human rights obligations of non-state armed groups: a possible contribution from customary international law? In: Kolb R, Gaggioli G (eds) Research handbook on human rights and humanitarian law, pp 146–169

    Google Scholar 

  • Holliday J (2012) Syria’s armed opposition. Institute for the Study of War, Washington. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrias_Armed_Opposition.pdf. Accessed 30 May 2015

  • Kleffner JK (2009) The collective accountability of organized armed groups for system crimes. In: van der Wilt H, Nollkaemper A (eds) System criminality in international law. CUP, Cambridge, pp 238–269

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Kolb R (2013) Human rights and humanitarian law. In: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL)

    Google Scholar 

  • Kräehenmann S (2014) Foreign fighters under international law. Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Geneva. http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/publications/Briefings%20and%20In%20breifs/Foreign%20Fighters%20Under%20International%20Law%20Briefing%20no7.pdf. Accessed 30 May 2015

  • McCorquodale R (2002) Overlegalizing silences: human rights and nonstate actors. Am Soc Int Law Proc 96:384–388

    Google Scholar 

  • Moir L (2002) The law of internal armed conflict. CUP, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Pisillo Mazzeschi R (2008) Responsabilité de l’état pour violation des obligations positives relatives aux droits de l’homme. Recueil des cours 333:175–506

    Google Scholar 

  • Rodenhäuser T (2012) Human rights obligations of non-state armed groups in other situations of violence: the Syria example. J Int Hum Legal Stud 3:263–290

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rodley NS (1993) Can armed opposition groups violate human rights? In: Mahoney KE, Mahoney P (eds) Human rights in the Twenty-first century. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, pp 297–318

    Google Scholar 

  • Ronen Y (2013) Human rights obligations of territorial non-state actors. Cornell Int Law J 46:21–50

    Google Scholar 

  • Ruys T (2014) Of arms, funding and “non-lethal assistance”—issues surrounding third-state intervention in the Syrian Civil War. Chin J Int Law 13:13–53

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ryngaert C (2008) Human rights obligations of armed groups. Revue belge de droit Int 41:355–381

    Google Scholar 

  • Ryngaert C, d’Aspremont J (2014) Third report of the ILA’s Non-State Actors Committee. http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1023. Accessed 30 May 2015

  • Shelton D, Gould A (2013) Positive and negative obligations. In: Shelton D (ed) The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law. OUP, Oxford, pp 562–583

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Sivakumaran S (2011) Re-envisaging the international law of internal armed conflict. Eur J Int Law 22:219–264

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sivakumaran S (2012) The law of non-international armed conflict. OUP, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Szablewska N (2007) Non-state actors and human rights in non-international armed conflicts. S Afr Yearb Int Law 32:345–360

    Google Scholar 

  • Tomuschat C (2004) The applicability of human rights law to insurgent movements. Krisensicherung und humanitärer Schutz = Crisis management and humanitarian protection: Festschrift für Dieter Fleck. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin, pp 573–591

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Steenberghe R (2015) The alleged prohibition on intervening in civil wars is still alive after the airstrikes against Islamic State in Iraq: a response to Dapo Akande and Zachary Vermeer. EJIL: Talk! http://www.ejiltalk.org

  • Zegveld L (2002) The accountability of armed opposition groups in international law. CUP, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Università Degli Studi di Napoli ‘Federico II’, Via Mezzocannone, 4, Naples, Italy

    Daniele Amoroso

Authors
  1. Daniele Amoroso
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Daniele Amoroso .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. DIRPOLIS, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa, Italy

    Andrea de Guttry

  2. DIRPOLIS, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa, Italy

    Francesca Capone

  3. T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Christophe Paulussen

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Amoroso, D. (2016). Armed Opposition Groups’ (and Foreign Fighters’) Abidance by International Human Rights Law: The Issue of Compliance in Syria and Iraq. In: de Guttry, A., Capone, F., Paulussen, C. (eds) Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-099-2_12

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-099-2_12

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-098-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-6265-099-2

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Societies and partnerships

Search

Navigation