Abstract
I have so far shown that the founding theories of corporate moral agency (that focus on the corporate structure as the locus of independent abilities) do not meet the morally relevant moral agency conditions of an ability to intend and an ability act. As regards the autonomy condition I have so far primarily considered the autonomy of members in their role as corporate agents performing actions on behalf of the corporate principal. I now turn to considering whether the corporation itself can qualify as a principal with autonomous intentions (that direct corporate agents into action).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
In Responsibility Incorporated (2007) Pettit draws on his earlier account (2002) of group autonomy to explicitly address the moral agency of groups. I shall however maintain focus on his 2002 account in Groups with Minds of Their Own because it provides a more extensive view of corporate autonomy which is my concern in this section. (Furthermore, Pettit’s (2007) conditions for moral agency are drawn from Christian catechisms for what constitutes responsibility for a serious sin. Besides autonomy these conditions do not correspond to the necessary conditions that I am employing, and it is unclear why Pettit regards Christian catechisms as a relevant foundation for moral agency conditions.)
- 2.
The issues need not be identical as in my abortion example but merely be “rationally connected” so that a decision on the new issue can be judged as consistent or inconsistent with regard to some past decision.
References
Pettit, P. 2002. Groups with minds of their own. In Socializing metaphysics, ed. F. Schmitt. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Pettit, P. 2007. Responsibility incorporated. Ethics 117: 171–201.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2015 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Rönnegard, D. (2015). Corporate Autonomy. In: The Fallacy of Corporate Moral Agency. Issues in Business Ethics, vol 44. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9756-6_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9756-6_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-017-9755-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-9756-6
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)