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Paraconsistent Logic

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Handbook of Philosophical Logic

Part of the book series: Handbook of Philosophical Logic ((HALO,volume 6))

Abstract

Paraconsistent logics are those which permit inference from inconsistent information in a non-trivial fashion. Their articulation and investigation is a relatively recent phenomenon, even by the standards of modern logic. (For example, there was no article on them in the first edition of the Handbook.) The area has grown so rapidly, though, that a comprehensive survey is already impossible. The aim of this article is to spell out the basic ideas and some applications. Paraconsist logic has interest for philosophers, mathematicians and computer scientists. As befits the Handbook, I will concentrate on those aspects of the subject that are likely to be of more interest to philosopher-logicians. The subject also raises many important philosophical issues. However, here I shall tread over these very lightly—except in the last section, where I shall tread over them lightly.

Indeed, even at this stage, I predict a time when there will be mathematical investigations of calculi containing contradictions, and people will actually be proud of having emancipated themselves from ‘consistency’.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1930.1

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  1. University of Queensland, Australia

    Graham Priest

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  1. King’s College, London, UK

    Dov M. Gabbay

  2. Centrum für Informations- und Sprachverarbeitung, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Germany

    F. Guenthner

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Priest, G. (2002). Paraconsistent Logic. In: Gabbay, D.M., Guenthner, F. (eds) Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0460-1_4

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