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Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfactuals

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Book cover Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science

Part of the book series: The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science ((WONS,volume 6a))

Abstract

This paper uses Popper’s treatment of probability and an epistemic constraint on probability assignments to conditionals to extend the Bayesian representation of rational belief so that revision of previously accepted evidence is allowed for. Results of this extension include an epistemic semantics for Lewis’ theory of counterfactual conditionals and a representation for one kind of conceptual change.

Article Note

This work was partially supported by Canada Council Grant 1302-C70-300.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Western Ontario, Canada

    William L. Harper

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  1. William L. Harper
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  1. University of Western Ontario, Ontario, Canada

    William L. Harper  & Clifford Alan Hooker  & 

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© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

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Harper, W.L. (1976). Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfactuals. In: Harper, W.L., Hooker, C.A. (eds) Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 6a. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1853-1_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1853-1_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0617-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1853-1

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