Abstract
Criteria for scientific progress?1 The Popperian tradition is opposed to criterion-philosophies.2 If we had come brandishing criteria we would immediately have been asked what their authority was. Since we hold that there is no (extra-logical) certainty either inside or outside science, we would have had to admit that they are fallible and that, in the event of a clash between our ‘criteria’ and scientific practice, it might be our ‘criteria’ that were wrong. Then why, we might very properly have been asked, set up as law-givers to science if you do not believe in your own law?
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
See K. R. Popper [1962, pp. 373–4]. Popper also said: ‘I do not propose any “criterion” for the choice of scientific hypotheses’ [1963, p. 218n].
See, for example, Urbach [1974].
Laplace spoke of ‘the perfection which [the human mind] has been able to give to astronomy’ [1820, p. vii].
On Peirce, see now Scheffler [1974].
The importance of theoretical exactness as a stumbling block for inductivism was emphasised by Popper [1963, p. 186].
Popper [1959, Chapter X and Appendix *ix] and [1963, pp. 228f. and 280f.].
See Hintikka [1964] and Howson [1973].
See Popper [1972, pp. 194f.].
[Added in 1977] It turns out that these three conditions cannot be collectively satisfied. This serious difficulty is examined below in §§7–9 of my reply.
Watkins [1975].
See for example Robinson [1964], pp. 84f.
See, for instance, Scheffler [1963], pp. 269f., and Goodman [1961], p. 150.
In Watkins [1964].
For instance, Carnap said of a quantitative inductive logic: “it tells him [the physicist] to what degree the hypothesis considered is supported by the observations; this is, so to speak, the degree of partial entailment or partial logical implication” [1950, p. 222].
Agassi in [1959] gave a nice example of a type (4) instance providing corroboration. The hypothesis “All freely falling bodies fall with constant acceleration” is tested by dropping steel balls down a mine-shaft. They are observed to fall with inconstant acceleration, and the hypothesis seems to be falsified. But then it is found that the mine-shaft passes through magnetic rock and that this accounts for their aberrant behaviour. The hypothesis has survived the test: these steel balls were not freely falling bodies after all.
[1902], p. 130.
“A century ago it was frankly confessed and proclaimed abroad that Nature loves simplicity; but Nature has proved the contrary since then on more than one occasion. We no longer confess this tendency, and we only keep of it what is indispensable, so that science may not become impossible.” Ibid., p. 130.)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1978 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Watkins, J. (1978). The Popperian Approach to Scientific Knowledge. In: Radnitzky, G., Andersson, G. (eds) Progress and Rationality in Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 58. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9866-7_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9866-7_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0922-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-9866-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive