Abstract
Philosophical analysis of the notion of justice must begin with the question: ‘Is justice the sole virtue concerning our relations with others or is it merely one of the virtues, in competition with others, such as equity, mercy and generosity?’ Plato chose the first of these alternatives in his works, while Aristotle has shown a distinct preference for the second. The choice made by each of them is by no means arbitrary, since it is explained by the difference between their philosophies.
Austin Lecture delivered at Durham on March 30, 1979. First published in Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Bd LXVI/1, 1980.
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Notes
See Ch. Perelman, ‘Concerning Justice’ (1945) in The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, p. 4.
Norman C. Gillespie, ‘On treating like cases differently, Philosophical Quarterly 25 (1975), 151–158.
Actes du XIV e Congrès International de Philosophie, Herder, Vienna, 1970, Vol. V, pp. 137–143.
Ibid., p. 139, following B. Wootton, Social Foundations of Wage Policy, London, 1958, p. 162.
I. Berlin, ‘Equality’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1955–56), p. 305.
See Ch. Perelman, ‘Le raisonnable et le déraisonnable en droit’, Archives de Philosophie du Droit 23 (1978), 35–42.
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© 1980 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Perelman, C., Berman, H.J. (1980). Justice Re-Examined. In: Justice, Law, and Argument. Synthese Library, vol 142. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9010-4_9
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