History, Discovery and Induction: Whewell on Kepler on the Orbit of Mars

Abstract

William Whewell’s stature among philosophers has slipped considerably since the late 1960s and early 1970s, when he was widely portrayed as providing an alternative to positivist philosophy of science. Partly as a result of shifting philosophical fashion and partly because the short-comings and idiosyncracies of the historicist approach have become clearer, philosophical interest in Whewell now tends to focus on his discussion of particular issues such as the role of consilience in theory choice rather than on his more general conception of scientific inquiry. Yet in redressing the balance we are in danger of losing sight of the gains that Whewell undoubtedly made. There remains much to be said for his contention that philosophy of science should be rooted in a close examination of actual scientific practice. And many of his specific insights concerning scientific discovery have still to be fully assimilated by philosophers of science.

I am pleased to have the opportunity to dedicate this paper to Robert Butts on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. While preparing it I have been often reminded of how much Butts has done to alert us to the importance (and limitations) of Whewell’s philosophy of science, Hopefully some of what I have learned from studying his work is reflected in what follows.