Abstract
Designers are regularly confronted with conflicting values in design: different values select different design options as best. This contribution deals with how one can deal with such value conflicts in design for values. A characterization of value conflict in design is given, and the notion is compared with the notion of moral dilemmas. It is further argued that value conflicts in design entail a kind of multi-criteria decision problems to which Arrow’s impossibility theorem applies. This theorem says that there is no procedure to aggregate scores on individual criteria (values) into an overall score unless one is willing to violate one of more minimally reasonable conditions for any such an aggregation procedure. Six methods to deal with value conflicts (cost-benefit analysis, direct trade-offs, maximin, satisficing, judgment, and innovation) are discussed. Three of these avoid Arrow’s theorem by assuming a form of value commensurability, although they may be too informationally demanding and have other disadvantages as well. The other three are non-optimizing methods that do not result in one best solution and therefore do not entirely solve the value conflict, although they are a way forward in some respects. In conclusion, an approach that combines the several methods is proposed as a way to deal with cases of conflicting moral values in design and which avoids many of the disadvantages of the single methods.
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Notes
- 1.
This is exactly why moral dilemmas have been characterized as hard choices (Levi 1986) and, also, why some philosophers deny the possibility of moral dilemmas because according to them there is always an overall point of view in which only one ought applies.
- 2.
What makes the assumption problematic is not just the assumption that “more value is better than less” but also the assumption that there is an obligation (an “ought”) rather than just a recommendation to choose the highest value. Even if “more value is better than less,” we might not be obliged to choose the object with higher value.
- 3.
A more detailed discussion can be found in van de Poel (1998).
- 4.
- 5.
It should be noted that coolants in the same flammability class are not necessarily equally flammable; neither are coolants in the same toxicity class necessarily equally toxic. Membership of certain flammability or toxicity class is determined by certain threshold values, and therefore does not reflect degrees of flammability or toxicity that follow the patterns shown in Fig. 1.
- 6.
To this social choice problem, the Arrow’s theorem also applies (Kroes et al. 2009).
- 7.
According to some ethical theories (e.g., Kantianism), all people would come to the same conclusion if they take an ethical point of view. In that case, the earlier assumption of there being just one decision-maker would be justified.
- 8.
- 9.
A difference is that the values have different degrees of importance, whereas in the original Arrow choice situation, each individual has equal weight. We can, however, repair this by replacing each value by x values where x is the (relative) degree of importance of that value (cf. Franssen 2005).
- 10.
If we assume only nonnegative utilities, ratio scale measurement is enough. However, if we also allow negative utilities, an additional commensurability assumption is needed for a reasonable aggregation procedure to be available (Tsui and Weymark 1997).
- 11.
Cost-benefit analysis does not only suppose ratio measurability but also value commensurability because the various values are measured on a common scale (i.e., money). Theoretically, it would be possible to construct a method that only supposes ratio measurability (but see also note 10). Such a method could, for example, proceed by multiplying the score on one value dimension (measured on a ratio scale) with the score on another value dimension (measured on another ratio scale) and then selecting the alternative with the highest score so attainted. It seems, however, doubtful whether that leads to a meaningful decision procedure for design, and as far as I know, no such decision methods have been proposed in the design literature. The multiplication of, for example, safety and sustainability, both measured on a (positive) ratio scale, for example, does not seem meaningful as a decision criterion. Note that in physics, such multiplications are sometimes meaningful, e.g., mass times velocity is a measure of momentum.
- 12.
The three non-optimizing methods discussed are the same as in Van de Poel (2009). There, I also discuss a fourth (diversity) that is not discussed here as it cannot be employed in a single design process (which I take to be the focus of this chapter). The discussion follows Van de Poel (2009) but has been updated and somewhat revised in several respects.
- 13.
The resulting costs can then be interpreted as the amount of money that one should be willing to pay for the increase in safety that is obtained by realizing the Delta plan.
- 14.
Note that GWP should be as low as possible, while LFL should be as high as possible.
- 15.
For a more detailed discussion, see the chapter “Design for Values and the Definition, Specification, and Operationalization of Values.”
- 16.
This paragraph draws from Van de Poel (2009).
- 17.
This and the next paragraph draw from Van de Poel (2013).
- 18.
Based on van de Poel (2001). See also the chapter “Design for Values and the Definition, Specification, and Operationalization of Values.”
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van de Poel, I. (2015). Conflicting Values in Design for Values. In: van den Hoven, J., Vermaas, P., van de Poel, I. (eds) Handbook of Ethics, Values, and Technological Design. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6970-0_5
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