Abstract
The chapter is an account of the relationships of the three fields or perspectives: logic, dialectic and rhetoric. I first explain the senses of these terms as they are used in the chapter. My thesis is that there is no one type of relationship among these three, but rather several—at least four, and there may be more. One is a conceptual or logical relation, for instance such that the properties of any one are logically independent of those of the others. A second is a contingent or empirical relationship, for instance such that there is a contingent correlation of some of the properties of one perspective with those of another. A third is a relationship of normative priority, such that for instance dialectical norms are always overriding. A fourth is a relationship of theoretical priority, such that for instance that the rhetorical perspective is theoretically basic. For each of these types of ways the three can be related, the question arises as to how they in fact are related. For each type there is not always only one way the three are related.
Reprinted, with permission, from F.H. van Eemeren, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard & A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation, (pp. 125–131). Amsterdam, SicSat. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the University of Windsor to the Windsor Group for Research in Argumentation and Informal Logic and a graduate class, at the Universiteit van Amsterdam to the Amsterdam Argumentation Research Group, at Rijksuniversiteit Groningen to the Groningen Logic research group, and at a session of the 5th International Society for the Study of Argumentation conference in Amsterdam. I thank those audiences for their comments and constructive criticisms, all of which influenced the paper in its present form.
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Notes
- 1.
The differences between Cohen’s characterizations of logic, dialectic and rhetoric and mine are not great, and I believe they are immaterial so far as this point goes. For Cohen, “In a purely deductive context, the logical axis could be replaced by a bivalent function, the two values being ‘valid’ and ‘invalid,’ for assessing inferences. But … the premises have to be weighed apart from their use in the inference at hand, … . In real-life contexts, logic is better conceived as providing a sliding scale measuring the relevance, sufficiency and acceptability … of the premises as reasons for the conclusion” (2001, p. 74). “An arguer has argued well dialectically when all of the objections and questions that have been raised have been answered satisfactorily” (pp. 74–75). “The rhetorical perspective examines the argument’s effects on the audience. … [S]uccessfully persuading the audience to accept a conclusion is one of the possible effects of an argument” (p. 75).
- 2.
Mr. Harvey Strosberg, Q.C., at the Third International Symposium on Informal Logic, University of Windsor, June, 1988.
- 3.
I owe this objection to M.A. van Rees.
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Blair, J.A. (2012). Relationships Among Logic, Dialectic and Rhetoric. In: Tindale, C. (eds) Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation. Argumentation Library, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2363-4_18
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