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The Concept of Customary International Law Situated Within the Framework of Obligation and the Framework of Authorization

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Abstract

This chapter analyzes the concept of customary international law from the perspective of the mutual exclusivity of the framework of obligation and the framework of authorization. As will be described in Sect. 10.2, in contrast to the clearly demarcated concept of conventional international law, the concept of customary international law is commonly regarded as giving rise to general rules of public international law, derived from patterns in the practice of States corresponding to opinio juris. As situated within the framework of obligation, the function of rules of customary international law is to restrict the freedom of States to act. At the same time, rules of customary international law are deemed to emanate from the exercise of the freedom of States to act, resulting in the formation of the practice of States. Conceived as consisting of rules inferred from the practice of States, the concept of customary international law cannot be situated within the framework of authorization. According to the framework of authorization, rules of customary international law would confer on States a power to act. That constellation precludes the possibility of seeing rules of customary international law as produced by a power of States to act, because that power of States to act must, in terms of unilateral causality, be seen as conferred by a rule of customary international law.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 276; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 77; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para 183.

    Waldock 1962, pp. 42–45; Quadri 1964, pp. 323–326; Günther 1970, pp. 37–49; Mosler 1974, pp. 121–129; Weil 1992, pp. 164–172; Charney 1993, pp. 536–542; Danilenko 1993, p. 81; Wolfke 1993, pp. 40–51; Zemanek 1997, paras 273–274; Dinstein 2006, paras 63–64.

  2. 2.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 276; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 77; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para 186.

    Waldock 1962, pp. 44–45; Mosler 1974, pp. 121–125, 131–132; Weil 1992, pp. 164–167; Danilenko 1993, pp. 94–97; Villiger 1997, paras 34–36, 56–59; Kelly 2000, p. 452.

  3. 3.

    Case of the S.S. “Lotus”, Judgment No. 9 of 7 September 1927, Series A.—No. 10, 28; Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 276; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 77; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para 185.

    Waldock 1962, pp. 45–49; Mosler 1974, pp. 125–129; Weil 1992, pp. 167–170; Danilenko 1993, pp. 98–103; Wolfke 1993, pp. 44–51; Villiger 1997, paras 65–68; Dinstein 2006, para 61.

  4. 4.

    Danilenko 1993, pp. 118–119; Villiger 1997, para 68; Dinstein 2006, para 72.

  5. 5.

    Strupp 1934, pp. 308–313; Günther 1970, pp. 127–132; Van Hooff 1983, pp. 85–116.

  6. 6.

    Henry 1928, pp. 83–84; Waldock 1962, pp. 40–41, 49–50; Akehurst 1974–1975, pp. 24, 29; Bos 1984, pp. 247–255; Weil 1992, pp. 186–189; Zemanek 1997, paras 273–277, pp. 312–319; Tomuschat 1999, Chap. IX, paras 32, 35–38; Dupuy 2002, pp. 168–179; Dinstein 2006, paras 42, 43, 47.

  7. 7.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 63.

  8. 8.

    Danilenko 1993, p. 95: ‘It has to be emphasized here that general participation in practice does not mean general active participation. In many areas of relations the consolidation of the required general practice may be achieved through an active practice of a limited group of states, who are most interested in a particular matter, and a more or less tolerant attitude towards the emerging trends by all other members of the international community.’; Capotorti 1994, pp. 129–130: ‘Même si un Etat s’abstient de l’action, dans des conditions telles que son abstention peut être qualifiée d’acquiescement, cela rentre dans la pratique susceptible de concourrir à la formation d’une norme coutumière.’; Villiger 1997, paras 48, 51.

  9. 9.

    Capotorti 1994, p. 132; Dinstein 2006, para 45.

  10. 10.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 277–278: ‘But even if it could be supposed that such a custom existed between certain Latin-American States only, it could not be invoked against Peru which, far from having by its attitude adhered to it, has, on the contrary, repudiated it by refraining from ratifying the Montevideo Conventions of 1933 and 1939, which were the first to include a rule concerning the qualification of the offence in matters of asylum’; Fisheries Case, Judgment of 18 December 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, 116, 131: ‘In any event the ten-mile rule would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she has always opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast.’

    Mosler 1974, pp. 132–133; Charney 1985, pp. 1–5; Stein 1985, pp. 458–459; Weil 1992, pp. 189–201; Wolfke 1993, pp. 66–67; Villiger 1997, paras 43–46; Zemanek 1997, para 85; Dinstein 2006, paras 48–52.

  11. 11.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 276; Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Merits), Judgment of 12 April 1960, ICJ Reports 1960, 6, 39–43; Separate Opinion Judge Wellington Koo, paras 18–21; Dissenting Opinion Judge Armand-Ugon, 82–84; Dissenting Opinion Judge Sir Percy Spender, 99–110; Dissenting Opinion Judge Chagla, 120–122; Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, Judgment of 13 July 2009, ICJ Reports 2009, 213, paras 141–144; Separate Opinion Judge Sepúlveda-Amor, paras 20–36.

  12. 12.

    Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Merits), Judgment of 12 April 1960, ICJ Reports 1960, 6, 43–44.

    Cohen-Jonathan 1961, pp. 135–137; Wolfke 1993, pp. 88–90; Villiger 1997, paras 81–82; Zemanek 1997, para 84; Dinstein 2006, paras 47, 54.

  13. 13.

    Koskenniem 2005, pp. 410–438.

  14. 14.

    Goldsmith and Posner 1999, pp. 1116–1120.

  15. 15.

    Case of the S.S. “Lotus”, Judgment No. 9 of 7 September 1927, Series A.—No. 10, 29: ‘It will suffice to observe that, as municipal jurisprudence is thus divided, it is hardly possible to see in it an indication of the existence of the restrictive rule of international law which alone could serve as a basis for the contention of the French Government.’

  16. 16.

    Haggenmacher 1986, paras 30–31.

  17. 17.

    Haggenmacher 1986, para 31.

  18. 18.

    Case of the S.S. “Lotus”, Judgment No. 9 of 7 September 1927, Series A.—No. 10, 29: ‘On the other hand, the Court feels called upon to lay stress upon the fact that it does not appear that the States concerned have objected to criminal proceedings in respect of collision cases before the courts of a country other than that the flag of which was flown, or that they have made protests (…). This fact is directly opposed to the existence of a tacit consent on the part of States to the exclusive jurisdiction of the State whose flag is flown, such as the Agent for the French Government has thought it possible to deduce from the infrequency of questions of jurisdiction before criminal courts. It seems hardly probable, and it would not be in accordance with international practice, that the French Government in the Ortigia – Oncle-Joseph case and the German Government in the Ekbatana-West-Hinder case would have omitted to protest against the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the Italian and Belgian Courts, if they had really thought that this was a violation of international law.’

  19. 19.

    Günther 1970, pp. 65–66.

  20. 20.

    Haggenmacher 1986, para 31.

  21. 21.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 274–275: ‘In the case of diplomatic asylum, the refugee is within the territory of the State where the offence was committed. A decision to grant diplomatic asylum involves a derogation from the sovereignty of that State. It withdraws the offender from the jurisdiction of the territorial State and constitutes an intervention in matters which are exclusively within the competence of that State. Such a derogation from territorial sovereignty cannot be recognized unless its legal basis is established in each particular case.’

  22. 22.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 276.

  23. 23.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 276: ‘The Party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other Party. The Colombian Government must prove that the rule invoked by it is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practiced by the States in question, and that this usage is the expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent on the territorial State.’

  24. 24.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 277: ‘But it has not been shown that the alleged rule of unilateral and definitive qualification was invoked or – if in some cases it was in fact invoked – that it was (…) exercised by the States granting asylum as a right appertaining to them and respected by the territorial State as a duty incumbent on them and not merely for reasons of political expediency.’

  25. 25.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 277–278.

  26. 26.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 279.

  27. 27.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 279.

  28. 28.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 282.

  29. 29.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 283.

  30. 30.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 284.

  31. 31.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 284.

  32. 32.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 286.

  33. 33.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 285: ‘The Court cannot admit that the States signatory to the Havana Convention intended to substitute for the practice of the Latin-American republics, in which considerations of courtesy, good-neighbourliness and political expediency have always held a prominent place, a legal system which would guarantee to their own nationals accused of political offences the privilege of evading national jurisdiction. Such a conception, moreover, would come into conflict with one of the most firmly established traditions of Latin America, namely, non-intervention. It was at the Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928, during which the Convention on Asylum was signed, that the States of Latin America declared their resolute opposition to any foreign political intervention. It would be difficult to conceive that these same States had consented, at the very same moment, to submit to intervention in its least acceptable form, one which implies foreign interference in the administration of domestic justice and which could not manifest itself without casting some doubt on the impartiality of that justice.’

  34. 34.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 287.

  35. 35.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 286.

  36. 36.

    Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, 266, 286.

  37. 37.

    Haya de la Torre Case, Judgment of 13 June 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, 71, 80–82.

  38. 38.

    Haya de la Torre Case, Judgment of 13 June 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, 71, 81–83.

  39. 39.

    Fisheries Case, Judgment of 18 December 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, 116, 131: ‘In these circumstances the Court deems it necessary to point out that although the ten-mile rule has been adopted by certain States both in their national law and in their treaties and conventions, and although certain arbitral decisions have applied it as between these States, other States have adopted a different limit. Consequently, the ten-mile rule has not acquired the authority of a general rule of international law.’

  40. 40.

    Fisheries Case, Judgment of 18 December 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, 116, 131: ‘In any event, the ten-mile rule would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway as she has always opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast.’

  41. 41.

    Haggenmacher 1986, para 36.

  42. 42.

    Fisheries Case, Judgment of 18 December 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, 116, 131.

  43. 43.

    Fisheries Case, Judgment of 18 December 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, 116, 132: ‘It does not at all follow that, in the absence of rules having the technically precise character alleged by the United Kingdom Government, the delimitation undertaken by the Norwegian Government in 1935 is not subject to certain principles which make it possible to judge as to its validity under international law. The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that only the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with regard to other States depends upon international law.’

  44. 44.

    Fisheries Case, Judgment of 18 December 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, 116, 133.

  45. 45.

    Fisheries Case, Judgment of 18 December 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, 116, 129: ‘The principle that the belt of territorial waters must follow the general direction of the coast makes it possible to fix certain criteria valid for any delimitation of the territorial sea; (…) in order to apply this principle, several States have deemed it necessary to follow the straight base-lines method and (…) they have not encountered objections of principle by other States.’

  46. 46.

    Fisheries Case, Judgment of 18 December 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, 116, 136–137: ‘The Court, having thus established the existence and the constituent elements of the Norwegian system of delimitation, further finds that this system was consistently applied by Norwegian authorities and that it encountered no opposition on the part of other States.’

  47. 47.

    Fisheries Case, Judgment of 18 December 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, 116, 138–139: ‘The Court notes that in respect of a situation which could only be strengthened with the passage of time, the United Kingdom Government refrained from formulating reservations. The notoriety of the facts, the general toleration of the international community, Great Britain’s position in the North Sea, her own interest in the question, and her prolonged abstention would in any case warrant Norway’s enforcement of her system against the United Kingdom.’

  48. 48.

    Dupuy 2002, pp. 150–152.

  49. 49.

    Haggenmacher 1986, paras 34, 37.

  50. 50.

    Kennedy 1987, pp. 82–90.

  51. 51.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 13.

  52. 52.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 15.

  53. 53.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 8.

  54. 54.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 28.

  55. 55.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, paras 76–78.

  56. 56.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 79.

  57. 57.

    Haggenmacher 1986, para 45.

  58. 58.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 83: ‘But as between States faced with an issue concerning the lateral delimitation of adjacent continental shelves, there are still rules and principles of law to be applied; and in the present case it is not the fact either that rules are lacking, or that the situation is one for the unfettered appreciation of the Parties.’

  59. 59.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 85.

  60. 60.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 85: ‘On a foundation of very general precepts of justice and good faith, actual rules of law are here involved which govern the delimitation of adjacent continental shelves – that is to say, rules binding upon States for all delimitations; – in short, it is not a question of applying equity simply as a matter of abstract justice, but of applying a rule of law which itself requires the application of equitable principles (…)’

  61. 61.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 91.

  62. 62.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, paras 18–20.

  63. 63.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 98.

  64. 64.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, Dissenting Opinion Judge Tanaka, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, 174–179, 182.

  65. 65.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, Dissenting Opinion Judge Lachs, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, 225–232.

  66. 66.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, Dissenting Opinion Judge Sørensen, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, 247, 253.

  67. 67.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, Dissenting Opinion Judge Morelli, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 7; Dissenting Opinion Judge Sørensen, 250–252.

  68. 68.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, paras 43–44.

  69. 69.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, Dissenting Opinion Judge Tanaka, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, 179–181; Dissenting Opinion, Judge Morelli, paras 3–6.

  70. 70.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, Dissenting Opinion Judge Tanaka, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, 187–191.

  71. 71.

    Kennedy 1987, pp. 90–99.

  72. 72.

    Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para 183.

  73. 73.

    Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para 186.

  74. 74.

    Charlesworth 1991, pp. 21–22.

  75. 75.

    Charlesworth 1991, pp. 18–19.

  76. 76.

    Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, paras 188–190.

  77. 77.

    Charlesworth 1991, pp. 25–26.

  78. 78.

    Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para 202.

  79. 79.

    Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, paras 206–209.

  80. 80.

    Charlesworth 1991, pp. 19–21.

  81. 81.

    Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para 186.

  82. 82.

    Charlesworth 1991, pp. 23–24.

  83. 83.

    Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, paras 188, 203; Separate Opinion Judge Ago, para 7.

    Weil 1992, pp. 172–179; Tomuschat 1999, Chap. V, para 4, Chap. VI, paras 5, 38, Chap. IX, para 41.

  84. 84.

    Dinstein 2006, paras 83–91.

  85. 85.

    Zemanek 1997, paras 53–55. A similar view is expressed by Dinstein 2006, paras 92–94.

  86. 86.

    Zemanek 1997, paras 179, 259, 315.

  87. 87.

    Sloan 1987, pp. 95–105.

  88. 88.

    Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, Judgment of 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports 2002, 3, paras 52–53: ‘It is (…) on the basis of customary international law that the Court must decide the questions relating to the immunities of such Ministers raised in the present case. In customary international law, the immunities accorded to Ministers for Foreign Affairs are not granted for their personal benefit, but to ensure the effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective States. In order to determine the extent of these immunities, the Court must therefore first consider the nature of the functions exercised by a Minister for Foreign Affairs.’

  89. 89.

    Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, Judgment of 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports 2002, 3, para 54.

  90. 90.

    Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, Judgment of 14 February 2002, Dissenting Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, ICJ Reports 2002, 3, paras 11–23.

    Kamto 2002, pp. 519–523; Salmon 2002, pp. 513; Sands 2002, pp. 541; Schultz 2002, pp. 736.

  91. 91.

    Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, Judgment of 14 February 2002, Separate Opinion Judge Koroma, ICJ Reports 2002, 3, para 5; Joint Separate Opinion Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, para 83; Separate Opinion Judge Rezek, para 10; Separate Opinion Judge Bula Bula, paras 41, 48.

  92. 92.

    Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, Judgment of 14 February 2002, Dissenting Opinion Judge Al-Khasawneh, ICJ Reports 2002, 3, para 8.

  93. 93.

    Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, Judgment of 14 February 2002, Dissenting Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, ICJ Reports 2002, 3, para 10.

  94. 94.

    Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, Judgment of 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports 2002, 3, paras 41–43.

  95. 95.

    Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, Judgment of 14 February 2002, Joint Separate Opinion Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, ICJ Reports 2002, 3, paras 53–58.

  96. 96.

    Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, Judgment of 14 February 2002, Dissenting Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, ICJ Reports 2002, 3, paras 48–62.

  97. 97.

    Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, Judgment of 14 February 2002, Separate Opinion President Guillaume, ICJ Reports 2002, 3, paras 16–17.

  98. 98.

    Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, Judgment of 14 February 2002, Declaration Judge Ranjeva, ICJ Reports 2002, 3, para 9: ‘Territoriality as the basis of entitlement to jurisdiction remains a given, the core of contemporary positive international law.’

  99. 99.

    Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, Judgment of 14 February 2002, Separate Opinion Judge Rezek, ICJ Reports 2002, 3, para 6: ‘In no way does international law as it now stands allow for activist intervention, whereby a State seeks out on another State’s territory, by means of an extradition request or an international arrest warrant, an individual accused of crimes under public international law but having no factual connection with the forum State.’

  100. 100.

    Mahiou 2008, pp. 172–176.

  101. 101.

    Case Concerning the Continental Shelf, Judgment of 24 February 1982, ICJ Reports 1982, 18, para 70.

  102. 102.

    Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, Arbitral Award of 30 June 1977, XVIII Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 3-413, para 70.

  103. 103.

    Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, Judgment of 14 June 1993, ICJ Reports 1993, 38, paras 46–48; Separate Opinion Judge Ajibola, 292–303.

    Tanaka 2008, pp. 913–924.

  104. 104.

    Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, Arbitral Award of 30 June 1977, XVIII Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 3-413, para 68.

  105. 105.

    Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, Judgment of 14 June 1993, Separate Opinion Judge Shahabuddeen, ICJ Reports 1993, 38, 138–144.

  106. 106.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, paras 18–20.

  107. 107.

    Case Concerning the Continental Shelf, Judgment of 24 February 1982, ICJ Reports 1982, 18, para 71.

  108. 108.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 19.

  109. 109.

    Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea, Judgment of 3 February 2009, ICJ Reports 2009, 61, paras 115–122.

  110. 110.

    Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea, Judgment of 3 February 2009, ICJ Reports 2009, 61, para 122; Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, Judgment of 14 June 1993, ICJ Reports 1993, 38, para 64.

  111. 111.

    Weil 1992, pp. 163–164; Dinstein 2006, para 67.

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    Jan Anne Vos

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Vos, J.A. (2013). The Concept of Customary International Law Situated Within the Framework of Obligation and the Framework of Authorization. In: The Function of Public International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-861-3_10

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