Abstract
Models in physics and economics often offer descriptions of imaginary situations. The descriptions are both thin–not much about the situation is filled in–and unrealistic–what is filled in is not true of many real situations. Yet we want to use the results of these models to draw conclusions about actually occurring situations. In the past I have proposed that we interpret these models as fables. The happenings in the model are only one concrete instantiation of a lesson that is more widely applicable when expressed in more abstract language. But there is a big problem– and it is a problem that besets not only reasoning from models but reasoning from real experiments as well. How do we know which ladder of abstraction to climb and how far up to go? A fable generally comes with the abstract lesson attached; most well-known parables, by contrast, require an interpretation from outside. Models, unfortunately, tend to be more like parables than fables. The right abstract interpretation is not supplied by the model itself. Where then should it come from?
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
Luke 15: 11–32.
- 2.
Matthew 20: 1–16 (The Holy Bible, King James Version): 20:1 For the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is an householder, which went out early in the morning to hire laborers into his vineyard. 20:2 And when he had agreed with the laborers for a penny a day, he sent them into his vineyard. 20:3 And he went out about the third hour, and saw others standing idle in the marketplace, 20:4 And said unto them; Go ye also into the vineyard, and whatsoever is right I will give you. And they went their way. 20:5 Again he went out about the sixth and ninth hour, and did likewise. 20:6 And about the eleventh hour he went out, and found others standing idle, and saith unto them, Why stand ye here all the day idle? 20:7 They say unto him, Because no man hath hired us. He saith unto them, Go ye also into the vineyard; and whatsoever is right, [that] shall ye receive. 20:8 So when even was come, the lord of the vineyard saith unto his steward, Call the laborers, and give them their hire, beginning from the last unto the first. 20:9 And when they came that were hired about the eleventh hour, they received every man a penny. 20:10 But when the first came, they supposed that they should have received more; and they likewise received every man a penny. 20:11 And when they had received it, they murmured against the goodman of the house, 20:12 Saying, These last have wrought but 1 hour, and thou hast made them equal unto us, which have borne the burden and heat of the day. 20:13 But he answered one of them, and said, Friend, I do thee no wrong: didst not thou agree with me for a penny? 20:14 Take that thine is, and go thy way: I will give unto this last, even as unto thee. 20:15 Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own? Is thine eye evil, because I am good? 20:16 So the last shall be first, and the first last: for many be called, but few chosen.
- 3.
The requisite deduction will sometimes not be literally on offer in the model but rather presumed.
- 4.
In either case exporting from the Galilean experiment requires both more and stronger assumptions than those supplied in the experiment. My own view (1989, 2009b) is that exporting often employs the logic of capacities, where the assumption that a factor has a capacity to study in the first place takes a great deal of highly varied independent evidence.
- 5.
Explicit attempts to deal with this problem often involve so-called “robustness” investigations: Vary these extra assumptions in different ways to see if the results are still more or less the same. Then, I suppose, we are supposed to do a quick induction to the conclusion that the results will be the same under the conditions that hold in the target situations. Not only is this inductive inference dicey but usually the variation is not very great. Also often the interest is not so much in varying the “extra-Galilean” assumptions but rather in adding in some further causes to see how the results are affected when a more realistic arrangement of causes occurs. This latter offers some help with the problem of whether the results are exportable from the experiment to other situations—the question “Can an induction be done at all?”—but not with the problem of which results to export.
- 6.
For a more detailed description of Galilean thought experiments and the problem of over constraint see my (2007, Chapter 15 ).
- 7.
My discussion of Lessing here is taken from my (1999, 35–48).
References
Cartwright, N. (1989), Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cartwright, N. (1999), The Dappled World. A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, N. (2007), Hunting Causes and Using Them. Approaches in Philosophy and Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, N. (2009a), “If No Capacities Then No Credible Worlds. But Can Models Reveal Capacities?”, in T. Gruene-Yannof (ed.), Economic Models as Isolating Tools or as Credible Worlds? Erkenntnis 70, 1: 45–58.
Cartwright, N. (2009b), “What is This Thing Called ‘Efficacy’?”, to appear in C. Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Galilei, G. ([1564–1642] 1914), Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, trans. H. Crew and A. de Salvio. New York: Dover.
Lessing, G. E. ([1759] 1967), Abhandlungen Uber die Fable. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam.
Pissarides, C. A. (1992), “Loss of Skill During Unemployment and the Persistence of Unemployment Shocks”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107: 1371–1391.
Rol, M. (2008), “Idealization, Abstraction, and the Policy Relevance of Economic Theories”, Journal of Economic Methodology, 15, 1: 69–97.
Schelling, T. (1978), Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton.
The Holy Bible, King James Version: http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=matthew%2020:1-16&version=9;
Acknowledgments
This work was carried out during a modeling project at the Institute for Advanced Study at the University of Durham and I am very grateful for their support. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments as well as the participants in the conference “The Experimental Side of Modeling” at San Francisco State University, March 2009.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Cartwright, N. (2010). Models: Parables v Fables. In: Frigg, R., Hunter, M. (eds) Beyond Mimesis and Convention. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 262. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3851-7_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3851-7_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-3850-0
Online ISBN: 978-90-481-3851-7
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)