Abstract
In paid crowdsourcing environment an organization post a task/problem atvarious platform like freelancer.com and the mass (crowd/developer) is invited to complete the problem. This environment is becoming an emerging trend to solve a problem with the brain of mass. At present the allocation and the payment made to the developers are mostly based on first price auction. However there is always a chance for manipulation in first price auction and also what punishment a developer should get if he try to do the same i.e. he can’t complete the task/problem within the stipulated time mentioned in his bid (if they manipulate by day to get the project) or try to manipulate the money demanded for project completion is not addressed. In this paper we have developed an incentive compatible mechanism that will prevent the developer from doing manipulation and also a novel penalty scheme is incorporated in our mechanism so that, the punishment-to-developer problem could be handle in an efficient way.
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Gupta, S., Mukhopadhyay, S., Gosh, D. (2013). An Efficient Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Paid Crowdsourcing. In: Kumar M., A., R., S., Kumar, T. (eds) Proceedings of International Conference on Advances in Computing. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 174. Springer, New Delhi. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-0740-5_72
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-0740-5_72
Publisher Name: Springer, New Delhi
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