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Die politische Theorie des Rational Choice: Anthony Downs

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Politische Theorien der Gegenwart II
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Zusammenfassung

Anthony Downs’ 1957 erschienenes Buch An Economic Theory of Democracy zählt zu den unbestrittenen Klassikern der Politischen Theorie. In ihrer einflußreichen Kritik des Rational-Choice-Ansatzes Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory zählen Green und Shapiro (1994: 7) das Buch von Downs neben Kenneth Arrows (1951) Social Choice and Individual Values und Mancur Olsons (1965) The Logic of Collective Action zu den drei Werken der Rational-Choice-Theorie, auf die sich der überwiegende Teil der ständig zunehmenden Publikationen in diesem Bereich gründet. Das Buch versucht, einer These von Joseph Schumpeter (1942) näher nachzugehen, die dieser in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy vertreten hatte. Der provozierende Ansatz Schumpeters bestand darin, die Motivation der Regierungstätigkeit genauso von ihrer sozialen Funktion zu trennen, wie dies im Bereich der Produktion von Konsumgütern der Fall ist. Diese These wurde von Downs zur Grundlage seiner Arbeit gemacht. Die ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie untersucht daher, wie sich die Akteure des politischen Bereichs, Parteien und Wähler, verhalten, wenn man sie wie Anbieter und Nachfrager auf einem Markt der politischen Möglichkeiten behandelt. Der Reiz der Downsschen Analyse besteht so in der Kombination einer originären Fragestellung aus dem Bereich der Politischen Theorie mit den Methoden der Wirtschaftswissenschaft.

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b. kommentierte Literatur

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© 2001 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

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Behnke, J. (2001). Die politische Theorie des Rational Choice: Anthony Downs. In: Brodocz, A., Schaal, G.S. (eds) Politische Theorien der Gegenwart II. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-12320-0_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-12320-0_15

  • Publisher Name: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-663-12321-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-663-12320-0

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