Abstract
One of the unique features of the digital currency Bitcoin is that new cash is introduced by so-called miners carrying out resource-intensive proof-of-work operations. To increase their chances of obtaining freshly minted bitcoins, miners typically join pools to collaborate on the computations. However, intense competition among mining pools has recently manifested in two ways. Miners may invest in additional computing resources to increase the likelihood of winning the next mining race. But, at times, a more sinister tactic is also employed: a mining pool may trigger a costly distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack to lower the expected success outlook of a competing mining pool. We explore the trade-off between these strategies with a series of game-theoretical models of competition between two pools of varying sizes. We consider differences in costs of investment and attack, as well as uncertainty over whether a DDoS attack will succeed. By characterizing the game’s equilibria, we can draw a number of conclusions. In particular, we find that pools have a greater incentive to attack large pools than small ones. We also observe that larger mining pools have a greater incentive to attack than smaller ones.
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Notes
- 1.
Rules for currency competition may differ by country. For example, in the United States the following rules are of importance. United States money, as identified by the U.S. Code, when tendered to a creditor always legally satisfies a debt to the extent of the amount tendered. However, no federal law mandates that a person or an organization must accept United States money as payment for goods or services not yet provided. That is, a business might specify a particular currency and therefore increase competition between currencies.
- 2.
Other attack motivations might include the facilitation of other cybercriminal activities, e.g., using DDoS as a means to extract payments from a mining pool as part of an extortion ploy [5]. Attacks might also be indicative of non-financial objectives, e.g., the earning of reputation in the attacker community or general disagreement with the goals and objectives of the Bitcoin community.
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Acknowledgements
This research was partly supported by the Penn State Institute for CyberScience, CyLab at Carnegie Mellon under grant DAAD19-02-1-0389 from the Army Research Office, and the National Science Foundation under ITR award CCF-0424422 (TRUST). We also thank the reviewers for their comments on an earlier draft of the paper.
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Johnson, B., Laszka, A., Grossklags, J., Vasek, M., Moore, T. (2014). Game-Theoretic Analysis of DDoS Attacks Against Bitcoin Mining Pools. In: Böhme, R., Brenner, M., Moore, T., Smith, M. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8438. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44774-1_6
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