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Being Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place in an Election – Voter Deterrence by Deletion of Candidates

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 7741))

Abstract

We introduce a new problem modeling voter deterrence by deletion of candidates in elections: In an election, the removal of certain candidates might deter some of the voters from casting their votes, and the lower turnout then could cause a preferred candidate to win the election. This is a special case of the variant of the Control problem in which an external agent is allowed to delete candidates and votes in order to make his preferred candidate win, and a generalization of the variant where candidates are deleted, but no votes. We initiate a study of the computational complexity of this problem for several voting systems and obtain \(\mathcal{NP}\)-completeness and \(\mathcal{W}[2]\)-hardness with respect to the parameter number of deleted candidates for most of them.

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Dorn, B., Krüger, D. (2013). Being Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place in an Election – Voter Deterrence by Deletion of Candidates. In: van Emde Boas, P., Groen, F.C.A., Italiano, G.F., Nawrocki, J., Sack, H. (eds) SOFSEM 2013: Theory and Practice of Computer Science. SOFSEM 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7741. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35843-2_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35843-2_17

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-35842-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-35843-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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