Abstract
We present a method to compile Yao’s two-player garbled circuit protocol into one that is secure against malicious adversaries that relies on witness indistinguishability. Our approach can enjoy lower communication and computation overhead than methods based on cut-and-choose [13] and lower overhead than methods based on zero-knowledge proofs [8] (or Σ-protocols [14]). To do so, we develop and analyze new solutions to issues arising with this transformation:
-
—
How to guarantee the generator’s input consistency
-
—
How to support different outputs for each player without adding extra gates to the circuit of the function f being computed
-
—
How the evaluator can retrieve input keys but avoid selective failure attacks
-
—
Challenging 3/5 of the circuits is near optimal for cut-and-choose (and better than challenging 1/2)
Our protocols require the existence of secure-OT and claw-free functions that have a weak malleability property. We discuss an experimental implementation of our protocol to validate our efficiency claims.
Chapter PDF
References
Pairing-Based Cryptography Library (2006), http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/
Boneh, D., Boyen, X.: Short Signatures Without Random Oracles and the SDH Assumption in Bilinear Groups. Journal of Cryptology 21, 149–177 (2008)
Brassard, G., Crépeau, C., Robert, J.M.: All-or-Nothing Disclosure of Secrets. In: Odlyzko, A. (ed.) CRYPTO 1986. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 234–238. Springer, Heidelberg (1987)
Camenisch, J., Chaabouni, R., Shelat, A.: Efficient Protocols for Set Membership and Range Proofs. In: Pieprzyk, J. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2008. LNCS, vol. 5350, pp. 234–252. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Even, S., Goldreich, O., Lempel, A.: A Randomized Protocol for Signing Contracts. Communications of ACM 28, 637–647 (1985)
Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Wigderson, A.: How to Play ANY Mental Game. In: 19th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 218–229. ACM, New York (1987)
Goldreich, O., Kahan, A.: How to Construct Constant-Round Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems for NP. Journal of Cryptology 9, 167–189 (1996)
Jarecki, S., Shmatikov, V.: Efficient Two-Party Secure Computation on Committed Inputs. In: Naor, M. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2007. LNCS, vol. 4515, pp. 97–114. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Kiraz, M.: Secure and Fair Two-Party Computation. Ph.D. thesis, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven (2008)
Kiraz, M., Schoenmakers, B.: A Protocol Issue for The Malicious Case of Yao’s Garbled Circuit Construction. In: 27th Symposium on Information Theory in the Benelux, pp. 283–290 (2006)
Kiraz, M., Schoenmakers, B.: An Efficient Protocol for Fair Secure Two-Party Computation. In: Malkin, T. (ed.) CT-RSA 2008. LNCS, vol. 4964, pp. 88–105. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Kolesnikov, V., Schneider, T.: Improved Garbled Circuit: Free XOR Gates and Applications. In: Aceto, L., Damgård, I., Goldberg, L., Halldórsson, M., Ingólfsdóttir, A., Walukiewicz, I. (eds.) ICALP 2008, Part II. LNCS, vol. 5126, pp. 486–498. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Lindell, Y., Pinkas, B.: An Efficient Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries. In: Naor, M. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2007. LNCS, vol. 4515, pp. 52–78. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Lindell, Y., Pinkas, B.: Secure Two-Party Computation Via Cut-and-Choose Oblivious Transfer. Crypto ePrint Archive (2010), http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/284
Lindell, Y., Pinkas, B., Smart, N.: Implementing Two-Party Computation Efficiently with Security Against Malicious Adversaries. In: Ostrovsky, R., De Prisco, R., Visconti, I. (eds.) SCN 2008. LNCS, vol. 5229, pp. 2–20. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Mohassel, P., Franklin, M.: Efficiency Tradeoffs for Malicious Two-Party Computation. In: Yung, M., Dodis, Y., Kiayias, A., Malkin, T. (eds.) PKC 2006. LNCS, vol. 3958, pp. 458–473. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Naor, M., Pinkas, B.: Oblivious transfer with adaptive queries. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, p. 791. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Nielsen, J., Orlandi, C.: LEGO for Two-Party Secure Computation. In: Reingold, O. (ed.) TCC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5444, pp. 368–386. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Peikert, C., Vaikuntanathan, V., Waters, B.: A framework for efficient and composable oblivious transfer. In: Wagner, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2008. LNCS, vol. 5157, pp. 554–571. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Pinkas, B., Schneider, T., Smart, N., Williams, S.: Secure Two-Party Computation Is Practical. In: Matsui, M. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5912, pp. 250–267. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Rabin, M.: How to Exchange Secrets by Oblivious Transfer. Tech. Rep. TR-81, Harvard Aiken Computation Laboratory (1981)
Woodruff, D.: Revisiting the Efficiency of Malicious Two-Party Computation. In: Naor, M. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2007. LNCS, vol. 4515, pp. 79–96. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Yao, A.: Protocols for Secure Computations. In: 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 160–164. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (1982)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 International Association for Cryptologic Research
About this paper
Cite this paper
shelat, A., Shen, Ch. (2011). Two-Output Secure Computation with Malicious Adversaries. In: Paterson, K.G. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2011. EUROCRYPT 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6632. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20465-4_22
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20465-4_22
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-20464-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-20465-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)