Abstract
I would like to begin my paper by making two apparently contradictory statements. The first is that the Lisbon Treaty clearly reverses the trend reflected in the Rome Treaty of 2004 and resolutely shelves any prospect of a European Constitution. Indeed, in line with both the German Presidency’s report dated June 20071 and the conclusions reached by the European Council in Brussels shortly afterwards,2 the Treaty deliberately abandons the term “constitution”. This therefore marks a sharp U-turn after the Rome Treaty, since the latter had constructed all its institutional and presentational strategy around that term.
English translation by Catharine Rose de Rienzo (née Everett-Heath).
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Notes
- 1.
Report from the Presidency to the European Council pursuing the Treaty reform process (14 June 2007): “A certain number of Member States underlined the importance of avoiding the impression which might be given by the symbolism and the title ‘Constitution’ that the nature of the Union is undergoing radical change. For them this also implies a return to the traditional method of treaty change through an amending treaty, as well as a number of changes of terminology, not least the dropping of the title ‘Constitution’”. From the Treaty of Rome onwards, legal scholars had expressed a similar point of view; see Caruso (2005).
- 2.
Presidency Conclusions – Brussels 21/22 June 2007 (11177/1/07), pp. 15 et seq.: “The IGC is asked to draw up a Treaty (hereinafter called the ‘Reform Treaty’) amending the existing Treaties with a view to enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the enlarged Union, as well as the coherence of its external action. The constitutional concept, which consisted in repealing all existing Treaties and replacing them by a single text called ‘Constitution’, is abandoned” (my italics).
- 3.
See Schmitz (2007), for the contrary opinion that the Treaty did possess the basic prerequisites of a Constitution.
- 4.
This is the general rule, as is well known. Derogations from it must be agreed by the parties (see Art. 24 VCLT 1969). Under Romano Prodi’s presidency, a solution derogating from the general rule was studied for the Rome Treaty of 2004 but it did not meet with the Member States’ favour. Known as the Penelope project and inspired by the federal techniques that will be considered below, it proposed subordinating the treaty’s entry into force to ratification by a qualified majority of the Member States. See Prodi (2004) and Ziller (2003), p. 191, on this subject.
- 5.
- 6.
This is what happened both in the case of the Swiss Federal Constitution of 1848 and in that of the German Basic Law of 1949. Indeed, although neither was approved unanimously, they both also became legally binding upon the sub-national entities that had voted against them. A different solution, on the other hand, was adopted under Art. VII of the Constitution of the United States of America, which provides as follows: “The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.”
- 7.
As regards the “Convention” method, see Atripaldi (2003), pp. 213 et seq., writing with reference to the Nice Charter but in terms that lend themselves to wider contexts.
- 8.
The Convention provided for by the Laeken Declaration of 15 December 2001 was composed of a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen (appointed directly by the European Council), 15 representatives of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States (one from each Member State), 13 government representatives from the accession candidate countries, 30 members of the national parliaments (two from each Member State), 26 representatives from the national parliaments of the candidate countries (two for each State), 16 members of the European Parliament and two Commission representatives. In addition, observers representing the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Ombudsman, respectively, also participated without voting rights.
- 9.
The importance of this aspect is emphasised by Napolitano (2004), p. 139.
- 10.
On the basis of the Annex to the Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council (15 and 16 October 1999), its composition was as follows: 15 representatives of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, a representative of the President of the European Commission, 16 members of the European Parliament designated by the latter and 30 members of the national parliaments (two from each national parliament).
- 11.
The Convention’s work lasted from 25 May to 17 September 1787. As is known, it was composed of 55 delegates from all the ex-colonies except Rhode Island, the latter preferring not to be represented.
- 12.
As regards the mandate given to the Convention tasked with drawing up the draft Constitutional Treaty, see for example: Ferrara (2002), pp. 177 et seq. As regards the “constitutional” problems the Convention was called to face, the account given by the Vice-Chairman is significant: see Amato (2003). As regards the work’s organisation, discussions and progress, see Floridia and Sciannella (2003); Ziller (2003), pp. 91 et seq. and Gabriele (2008), pp. 35 et seq. As regards the tension, in that particular case, between the Convention method and intergovernmental negotiations, see Amato (2004).
- 13.
The significance of this procedure is considered in Cerulli Irelli (2006), pp. 60 et seq.
- 14.
- 15.
Brussels European Council, 21/22 June 2007, Presidency Conclusions, paragraph No. 10.
- 16.
As regards the need to go beyond a strictly formal perspective, see Walker (1996), pp. 270 et seq.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
Publications on the Charter’s legal enforceability are endless. From amongst the most significant contributions, see Weber (2000); Pace (2001); Diez Picazo (2001); Bifulco et al. (2001); Braibant (2001); Ruggeri (2001); Carrillo Salcedo (2001); Weber (2002); Matia Portilla (2002); Rubio Llorente (2002); Jacqué (2002); Tomuschat (2002); Dutheil de la Rochère (2002); Toniatti (2002); Pagano (2003); Siclari (2003); Balduzzi (2003); Villani (2004); Skouris (2004); Stern (2006) and Pollicino and Sciarabba (2008).
- 20.
For example, the existence of a European Constitution in this very general sense is recognised in Cassese (1991), p. 447. For a critical approach, however, see Anzon (2003), pp. 303 et seq., emphasising that it is not to such a concept of “constitution” that reference should be made when attempting to answer the question as to whether, today, Europe has a Constitution. See, also Walker (1996), p. 269.
- 21.
De Martino (1951, 1954, 1955).
- 22.
- 23.
A different reasoning would apply were it to be held that the term “constitution” is only appropriate in the context of a state (as does Grimm (1995), p. 590). This perspective is increasingly contested, however, since the tendency nowadays is to recognise that constitutions may exist beyond the state. Indeed, see Weiler (1999); Pernice (1999); Walker (2004) and Poiares Maduro (2004). See, also, Luciani (2001); Pinelli (2002); pp. 183 et seq. and Ruggeri (2008), on this issue.
- 24.
Walker (1996), pp. 269 et seq., emphasises that, as a consequence of the specific characteristics both of the EU legal order and of the role of its executive (which cannot be compared to that of national executives), the principle of the separation of powers as we know it would not be indispensable at a European level.
- 25.
As regards this characteristic which distinguishes European sources from national sources on structural grounds, see D’Atena (2001).
- 26.
Violini (1998), pp. 1251 et seq., highlights the substantive similarities between the European Constitution (in the sense it is given here) and the Member States’ Constitutions.
- 27.
For this opinion see Fromont (1998), p. 132.
- 28.
See, Guzzetta and Marini (2006), pp. 405 et seq.
- 29.
- 30.
As regards the absence of a bill of rights in the federal Constitution, see Hamilton et al. (1787/1788).
- 31.
An extremely clear description of such structure may be found in Nawiasky (1920), p. 144: “The federal constitution […] is, of its essence, incomplete. It does not give birth to a self-contained legal order, but to a partial order, which may be considered an order insofar as it refers, for its missing part, to the constitutions of the Member States, which complete it.” Albeit from a different angle, Caruso (2005), p. XVI, emphasises the role of the Constitutions of the EU Member States for the purposes of guaranteeing the fundamental rights of European citizens.
- 32.
See, on this point, D’Atena (2005).
- 33.
An analogous line of thinking is expressed in Venizelos (2004), who speaks of a “fragmentary and in part unwritten European Constitution”.
- 34.
For this reason, the claim to read the European constitutional phenomenon by rigidly applying models obtainable from national constitutions or, more precisely, from a part of them, may be criticised [see, taking this line, De Siervo (2001)]. This without considering that to proceed in such a manner runs the risk of denying the “constitutional” character of national constitutions that incontestably enjoy such a character [this point is most opportunely emphasised, with reference to the German Basic Law, by Mangiameli (2008), p. 394].
- 35.
As regards the ensuing problems, see Häberle (2005), pp. 221 et seq.
- 36.
- 37.
It is not without significance that the concept of Teilverfassung is also used in relation to the European legal order, for the purposes of emphasising the latter’s effect on the Member States’ Constitutions. See, in this respect, Häberle (2005), pp. 221 et seq.
- 38.
- 39.
- 40.
The likening of Art. 6 TEU to a homogeneity clause is to be found in Mangiameli (2008), pp. 93 et seq. and p. 389.
- 41.
As is known, the Commission can, pursuant to Art. 7 TEU, apply sanctions against Member States that fail to respect the principles listed under Art. 2. Moreover, it can prevent third-party countries from becoming members of the Union (Art. 49 TEU).
- 42.
As regards the application of this theoretical perspective in the context of the relations between the European legal order and the national legal orders, see, in particular, Mac Cormick (1995).
- 43.
In this context, the classic theorisation developed in S. Romano, L’ordinamento giuridico (1918), reprint, Firenze, 1962, should be recalled, as well as the manner in which it was developed by the Italian school of public law. In particular, with specific reference to the principle of the relativity of legal values, see Gueli (1949) and Crisafulli (1970), p. 43.
- 44.
As regards the persistence of the two perspectives, see Barbera (2000), p. 80. According to Barbera, jurists today find themselves facing two alternatives: “either to choose the viewpoint favouring the national legal order or to choose the viewpoint favouring the Community legal order. If they choose the first viewpoint […], they cannot renounce the waning sovereign legitimacy of their own constitution; if they choose the second viewpoint […], they cannot renounce asserting the emerging sovereignty of the European constitution. Only were a federal constitution to be reached could the two viewpoints be united.” As regards the current transitional phase, see Häberle (2005), pp. 210 et seq. and Hofmann (2004), pp. 170 et seq.
- 45.
The literature on both the Maastricht-Urteil and the line adopted by the Italian Court is very extensive. For a highly informative outline, see Anzon (1999) (to which the reader is referred for other references). In addition, of the most recent publications, see Vaquero Cruz (2007). On the German Lisbon Judgment: Häberle (2010); and the studies in Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien (ZEuS): Dingemann (2009); Bergmann and Karpenstein (2009); Bröhmer (2009); Calliess (2009); Hahn (2009); Hector (2009).
- 46.
The interventions by national constitutional courts before treaty ratification are inspired by analogous requirements. For example, in November 2008, the Czech Court established the compatibility of some of the Lisbon Treaty provisions with the Czech Republic’s Constitution. In general, see Blanke and Mangiameli (2006), pp. LV et seq., on the significance of the ratification procedures provided for under the domestic legislation in the individual Member States.
- 47.
See, on this point, Sorrentino (2008), pp. 59 et seq., who highlights the significance that European law’s progressive appropriation of the Member States’ common constitutional values is assuming in this respect. As regards the debt Europe owes to national constitutional values, see Häberle (1999), pp. 3 et seq. On the other hand and as is known, the process of constitutional osmosis works in both directions, as European law’s growing influence on the legal orders of the Member States would confirm. On this subject, see, in general, Häberle (2005), pp. 229 et seq. and Sorrentino (2008), and, in analytical terms, Schwarze (2001) (where the issue is considered with reference to the legal orders in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Austria and Sweden) as well as Tizzano (2008) (taking a census of the influences in the areas of European citizenship, the Euro and banks, the single market for banking and financial services, the professions and pluralism for the press, the audiovisual media and telecommunications).
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D’Atena, A. (2012). The European Constitution’s Prospects. In: Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (eds) The European Union after Lisbon. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19507-5_1
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