Abstract
The Nash Equilibrium is a much discussed, deceptively complex, method for the analysis of non-cooperative games (McLennan and Berg, 2005). If one reads many of the commonly available definitions the description of the Nash Equilibrium is deceptively simple in appearance. Modern research has discovered a number of new and important complex properties of the Nash Equilibrium, some of which remain as contemporary conundrums of extraordinary difficulty and complexity (Quint and Shubik, 1997). Among the recently discovered features which the Nash Equilibrium exhibits under various conditions are heteroclinic Hamiltonian dynamics, a very complex asymptotic structure in the context of two-player bi-matrix games and a number of computationally complex or computationally intractable features in other settings (Sato, Akiyama and Farmer, 2002). This paper reviews those findings and then suggests how they may inform various market prediction strategies.
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Fellman, P.V. (2011). The Nash Equilibrium Revisited: Chaos and Complexity Hidden in Simplicity. In: Minai, A.A., Braha, D., Bar-Yam, Y. (eds) Unifying Themes in Complex Systems. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17635-7_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17635-7_13
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