Abstract
Related-key attacks are attacks against constructions which use a secret key (such as a blockcipher) in which an attacker attempts to exploit known or chosen relationships among keys to circumvent security properties. Security against related-key attacks has been a subject of study in numerous recent cryptographic papers. However, most of these results are attacks on specific constructions, while there has been little positive progress on constructing related-key secure primitives.
In this paper, we attempt to address the question of whether related-key secure blockciphers can be built from traditional cryptographic primitives. We develop a theoretical framework of “related-secret secure” cryptographic primitives, a class of primitives which includes related-key secure blockciphers and PRFs. We show that while a single related-secret pseduorandom bit is sufficient and necessary to create related-key secure blockciphers, hard-core bits with typical proofs are not related-secret psuedorandom. Since the pseudorandomness of hard-core bits is the essential technique known to make pseudorandomness from assumptions of simple hardness, this presents a very strong barrier to the development of provably related-key secure blockciphers based on standard hardness assumptions.
Supported by NSF grant CNS-0845662.
The original version of this chapter was revised: The copyright line was incorrect. This has been corrected. The Erratum to this chapter is available at DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_36
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Keywords
- Pseudorandom Generator
- Cryptographic Primitive
- Pseudorandom Function
- Fuzzy Extractor
- Pseudorandom Permutation
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Goldenberg, D., Liskov, M. (2010). On Related-Secret Pseudorandomness. In: Micciancio, D. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5978. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_16
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