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Politik in Nordamerika und Europa pp 177–195Cite as

Inequality in Collective Action Problems

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Abstract

Rainer-Olaf Schultze was a second supervisor for my dissertation and he took this role very seriously. He showed me what to do and how, and more importantly: what not to do. I was very grateful for his advice, if not always in the very first moment, than surely later on. Looking back, I am still grateful because his level of engagement was not at all a matter of course. Although my ways led me elsewhere soon, geographically and academically, Rainer-Olaf further supported me in the early phases of my career and we never lost contact. There was one strong bond between us, namely our disagreement about the value of rational choice analysis. In what follows I do not strive to persuade Rainer-Olaf of the usefulness of this kind of reasoning; instead I want to demonstrate what I have learned at least: the rational actor is a fiction.

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Authors
  1. Katharina Holzinger
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  1. Augsburg, Deutschland

    Jan Grasnick  & Katja Walter  & 

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Holzinger, K. (2012). Inequality in Collective Action Problems. In: Grasnick, J., Walter, K. (eds) Politik in Nordamerika und Europa. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-19498-1_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-19498-1_11

  • Publisher Name: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-531-19497-4

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