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Introduction

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Metaepistemology

Part of the book series: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy ((PIIP))

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Abstract

We introduce the basic threefold distinction that informs and structures metaepistemological debates: epistemic realism, anti-realism, constitutivism\constructivism. We explain the basic commitments of each side of the distinction and very briefly present some of the motivations as well as pros and cons for each side. We proceed to explain why metaepistemology is currently an emerging sub-field of epistemology that aspires both to be the analogue of metaethics and to inform metaethical debates. We present some recent metaepistemological debates and explain how these debates have explored interconnections and analogies with metaethical debates (e.g. parity and disparity arguments). We then show that this volume presents new cutting-edge work that advances metaepistemology and go on to briefly summarise the content of the rest of the volume.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Kyriacou (2016a) for an overview of some basic metaepistemological topics.

  2. 2.

    For epistemic realism, see Boghossian (2006), Cuneo (2007), Heathwood (2009), Kim (1988) and Kyriacou (2016b).

  3. 3.

    For analytic naturalism, see Goldman (1979, 2015) and Heathwood (2009). For synthetic, Cornell-style naturalism see Jenkins (2007). For non-naturalism (or robust realism), see Boghossian (2006).

  4. 4.

    See Cuneo (2007) and Kelly (2003, 2007).

  5. 5.

    For epistemic relativism see MacFarlane (2014) and Rorty (1979). For epistemic expressivism see Chrisman (2007), Kappel (2010) and Kyriacou (2012).

  6. 6.

    For instrumentalism see Kornblith (1993), Leite (2007), Cowie (2014) and Sharadin (forthcoming).

  7. 7.

    See Shah (2003) and Shah and Velleman (2005). For criticism, see Enoch (2006, 2011) and Côté-Bouchard (2016).

  8. 8.

    See Korsgaard (1996, 2008). See also Street (2006, 2009) who is a constructivist critical of Korsgaard’s Kantian constructivism.

  9. 9.

    Although some have talked of the “demise of epistemology” (Rorty 1979) this prediction has proven mistaken. Epistemology is thriving.

  10. 10.

    See Cuneo (2007) for a book-length defence of the moral-epistemic parity. See also Cuneo and Kyriacou (forthcoming) and Case (forthcoming).

  11. 11.

    For criticism of Heathwood (2009), see Rowland (2013), Cuneo and Kyriacou (forthcoming) and Kyriacou (forthcoming, sec. 5). For Heathwood’s rejoinder see his contribution to this volume.

  12. 12.

    For another argument against “the core expressivist manoeuvre” that draws from cognitive psychology results , see Kyriacou (2017).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Classics and Philosophy, University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus

    Christos Kyriacou

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

    Robin McKenna

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  1. Christos Kyriacou
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Correspondence to Christos Kyriacou .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus

    Christos Kyriacou

  2. University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

    Robin McKenna

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Kyriacou, C., McKenna, R. (2018). Introduction. In: Kyriacou, C., McKenna, R. (eds) Metaepistemology. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_1

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