Abstract
In this chapter, the authors describe the most commonly used award procedures to select a private partner. They present the results of empirical research papers investigating the determinants of the choice of award procedures and the efficiency of these procedures. This enables to discuss the conditions of appropriateness of the different award mechanisms, depending on the complexity of the project and the uncertainty of the environment.
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Notes
- 1.
The so-called special sectors directive 2004/17 on contracts relating to the water, energy, transport, and postal services sectors. Directive 2004/18 for “classical” public works, supply, and service contracts.
- 2.
These statistics are computed using the TED database (Tenders Electronic Daily), developed from projects published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
- 3.
See pages 14 and 15 of the European Directive 2004/18 on public procurement.
- 4.
In theory, goods or services of substantial proportions will be more complex on average than goods or services of modest proportions.
- 5.
Calls for tenders are generally organized into two phases. The first one is the application phase, which consists in the firms sending documents relating to their specific characteristics (turnover, number of employees, past experiences, etc.). The second one is the tendering phase, which consists in sending the qualitative and price-related elements corresponding to the need advertised by the contracting authority. Thus, the number of applications cannot be superior or equal to the number of tenders.
- 6.
Warren (2014) claims that public officers anticipate such effects and therefore do not choose the open procedure.
- 7.
This type of strategic behavior on the part of tenderers is known as a “low-balling strategy.”
- 8.
See also Williamson (1976), who provides, through the study of cable TV in Oakland city, a detailed example of the difficulty of eliminating abnormally low tenders and of the consequences on contract execution.
- 9.
It should be noted that the contracting authority’s wish to renew the partnership with the same partner may be explained by a search for efficiency. See for instance the policy implemented to this effect by the city of London in its calls for tenders for London bus transportation (Amaral, Saussier, & Yvrande-Billon, 2009).
- 10.
Order 2-06-09 Perfect Nettoyage. Available at the following address: http://static.marchespublicspme.com/file/documents/ordonnance-2-juin-2009-perfect-nettoyage.PDF
- 11.
The articles mentioned in this section are still in the exploratory phase, and their results are therefore likely to evolve.
- 12.
California Department of Transportation.
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Athias, L., Chever, L. (2018). The Relative Efficiency of Competitive Tendering. In: Saussier, S., de Brux, J. (eds) The Economics of Public-Private Partnerships. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68050-7_5
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