Abstract
We develop a notion of safety architecture, based on an extension to bow tie diagrams, to characterize the overall scope of the mitigation measures undertaken to provide safety assurance in the context of unmanned aircraft systems. We use a formal semantics as a basis for implementation in our assurance case tool, AdvoCATE. We also describe the functionality that a safety architecture affords to support both the related safety analysis and subsequent development activities. We motivate the need for a safety architecture through an example based upon a real safety case, whilst also illustrating its application and utility. Additionally, we discuss its role, when combined with structured arguments, in providing a more comprehensive basis for the associated safety case.
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Notes
- 1.
For example, see http://www.cgerisk.com/knowledge-base/risk-assessment/chaining-bowties/.
- 2.
We are aware of only one other tool that supports both BTDs and argument structures [11].
- 3.
The term barrier is often used interchangeably with control in bow tie literature, although we will distinguish them here.
- 4.
E.g., Properties whose violations could translate into weaknesses in the risk analysis and, as a consequence, in the implemented safety system.
- 5.
For example, BowTieXP: http://www.cgerisk.com/, BowTie Pro: http://www.bowtiepro.com/, RiskView: http://www.meercat.com.au/, THESIS BowTie: http://www.abs-group.com/, etc..
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Acknowledgements
This work was funded by the Safe Autonomous Systems Operations (SASO) project under the Airspace Operations and Safety Program of the NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate.
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Denney, E., Pai, G., Whiteside, I. (2017). Modeling the Safety Architecture of UAS Flight Operations. In: Tonetta, S., Schoitsch, E., Bitsch, F. (eds) Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security. SAFECOMP 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10488. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66266-4_11
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