Abstract
Given that part of the first chapter is devoted to describe ontology of geography with knowledge elicitation techniques, this chapter is more speculative, in the sense of defining notions such as geographical entities and boundaries, and tracing some philosophical tools useful for spatial representation. Regarding the first point, I point out that a criterion for the individuation of a geographical entity can also be the possession of boundaries, which give rise to a number of ontological conundrums and may themselves be difficult to individuate. Consequently, an analysis on (and a classification of) geographical boundaries might also be functional in order to determine what kinds of geographic entities exist and have to be included as fundamental. Regarding the spatial representation, I show that geo-ontological analysis has developed three main theoretical tools strictly interconnected and mutually interacting: mereology, topology and theory of spatial location.
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Notes
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In regards to this category, the two authors emphasized that geographers « are not studying geographical things as such things are conceptualized by naïve subjects. Rather, they are studying the domain of what can be portrayed on maps» (Smith and Mark 2001, p. 609).
- 2.
Cfr. Renz and Nebel (1999), Renz (1999), Bennett et al. (2002), Gangemi et al. (2002), Masolo et al. (2003).
- 3.
«One important issue to note here is the relationship between identity criteria and location. Current GIS and even modern spatial ontologies adopt the premise that an object must have some location. That location is, in general, arbitrary, but where an object can be is constrained by its physical constitution. The above thesis flies against the realities of many geospatial applications. For example, image interpretation experts determine the identity of objects by analyzing their relative location. Thus, looking at a tilted circular building in a high-resolution satellite image of northern Italy would lead to the interpretation that it could only be the Leaning Tower of Pisa. On the other hand, looking at a tilted building in Paris would mean that it could not be the Pisa Tower. Following the above example, it then becomes important to always ask which spatial relationships can be used to define distinct ontological entities. Physical entities, for example, are typically distinguished from abstract entities precisely by virtue of their necessary location in time and space. In general, we want to characterize precisely in what ways physical objects (or events) can be said to be located at particular locations in space. This raises questions about how the objects concerned are to be identified and how the locations are to be identified» (Bishr 2007, p. 449).
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«More detailed questions here are: What processes produce socio-economic units? What ontology should we use for them? (What is a town square? What is a neighborhood?) How do they begin to exist? How do they evolve through time? How do they cease to exist? Can socio-economic units move? Can they have intermittent existence? Can they be resuscitated? Under what conditions can they merge or split? With what sorts of regions can socio-economic units be associated? With regions of any dimension n? With scattered regions?» (Casati et al. 1998, p. 79).
- 5.
In particular to Smith (1995), Casati et al. (1998), Galton (2003), Bishr (2007).
- 6.
Such a taxonomy has been developed in Smith and Mark (1998), Smith and Varzi (2000).
- 7.
Smith shows three different monistic alternatives to the fiat-bona fide dualism. The first one maintains that all objects are the result of human conceptual articulations and, accordingly, that there exists an underlying world of bona fide objects is merely the expression. of an illegitimate ‘objectivist’ metaphysics, presupposing some notion of a ‘God’s eye view’ that is held to be inappropriate to our post-enlightenment age. The second alternative consider that no objects are fiat objects, that our talk of the latter is mere talk of no further ontological significance. Finally, the last one maintains that fiat objects are not created but merely selected from the infinite totality of geometrically possible regions of space (Smith 1995, p. 477).
- 8.
For a representational point of view, such a distinction might sometimes be conceptualized respectively in terms of geometrical lines and zones.
- 9.
In Galton’s opinion, all the distinctions proposed are not (in every case) entirely clear-cut: some cases can be classified in different ways depending on how they are interpreted, and we may find intermediate cases which seem to occupy a middle ground between two positions in the classification (Galton 2003, p. 152). Moreover, there can be several cases in which a boundary of one type can evolve into or otherwise give rise to a boundary of another type (Galton 2003, p. 159).
- 10.
According to Galton, «the nature of fiat boundaries may be clarified by reference to Searle’s theory of institutional facts (Searle 1995). Searle lists six properties which characterize institutional facts, namely:
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The self-referentiality of many social concepts (part of what makes an institutional fact true is the fact that some social group holds it to be true).
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The use of performative utterances in the creation of institutional facts (e.g., ‘I appoint you chairman’, ‘War is hereby declared’).
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The logical priority of brute facts over institutional facts.
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Systematic relationships amongst institutional facts.
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The primacy of social acts over social objects, of processes over products.
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The linguistic component of many institutional facts.
With reference to international boundaries , we may note that (1) if all social groups cease to believe in the existence of some boundary, then that boundary no longer exists, even if the associated physical paraphernalia (fences, border posts, and the like) persist; (2) many international boundaries are brought into existence by the signing of a bilateral agreement between the parties concerned, and these signings function as performative utterances; (3) underlying their performative character, however, is the brute fact that on one occasion certain humans made particular marks on paper, and later, when the boundary was demarcated on the ground, various erections of stone or barbed wire, etc., were constructed along a linear series of spatial locations; (4) the existence of an international boundary is bound up with an intricate network of trade agreements, immigration procedures, social relations, etc., which together constitute a system; (5) the boundary may be regarded as in a sense just the ‘continuous possibility’ of the activities characteristically associated with boundaries, such as the formalised boundary-crossing procedures and the deflection of trajectories that would otherwise cross over the line delineated as the boundary; and finally, (6) the definition of the boundary as expressed in the signed agreement is partly constitutive of the fact of the boundary’s existence» (Galton 2003, pp. 158–9).
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- 11.
For example, what is the relation between a geographical entity and the territory it occupies? Can a geographical entity survive or persist without a territory and definite borders? Can it survive or persist with radical changes in its territory or in its borders? Is it essential for a geographical entity to be located somewhere? Is it essential for it to be where it actually is or to have its actual borders?
- 12.
See also Simons (1987), Smith and Mark (1998), Casati and Varzi (1999), Mark et al. (1999).
- 13.
See also Smith (1994, 1995, 1996).
- 14.
For an analysis of the connection between mereology and topology and of the notion of mereotopology, see Smith 1995. For an analysis of the relation between the notions of topology and border, see Casati et al. (1998), Smith and Varzi (2000), Varzi (2007).
- 15.
Moreover, we can also conceive objects and events in terms of predicates assigned to corresponding spatial regions.
- 16.
This paragraph is taken from Tambassi 2016a, pp. 56–57.
- 17.
The last two paragraphs are taken from Tambassi 2016a, p. 57.
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Tambassi, T. (2018). Geographical Entities, Boundaries and Spatial Representation. In: The Philosophy of Geo-Ontologies . SpringerBriefs in Geography. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64033-4_2
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