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On the Role of the Credit Rating Agencies in the Euro Zone Crisis

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Book cover Political Economy Perspectives on the Greek Crisis

Abstract

We examine the determinants of credit ratings for 18 Eurozone countries over the period 2002–2013. Sovereign credit ratings are decomposed into high and low ratings, the high rated being AA− and above, and the low rated being A+ and below. We consider a set of macroeconomic and risk variables as their determinants. First, we find greater explanatory power for the former sample (high rated). Second, the results reveal an asymmetric response of cumulated current account for high and low ratings. Third, we provide evidence that the fiscal and the external sector are significant after 2009 only for the low rated economies. Focusing on Greece we provide evidence that the government debt and cumulative current account played a significant role in the downgrade of Greek bonds.

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Correspondence to Theodore Panagiotidis .

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Appendix

Appendix

Table A1

Authors

Dependent variables

Explanatory variables

Methodology/data

Important results

Cantor and Packer (1996)

Moody’s rating S&P rating

Per capita income

GDP growth

Inflation

Fiscal balance

External balance

External debt

Economic development

Default history

49 countries in 29 September 2001. Moodys and S&P and its average. Cross-section OLS

Per capita income, inflation, external debt, economic development and Default

History explain more than 90% of the variation of credit rating for Moodys, S&P and its average

Haque et al. (1998)

Institutional Investor

Euro money

Economic Intelligence unit

Economic variables:

Terms of trade

Export growth

Current account/GDP

Reserves/Imports

External debt/GDP

Real exchange rate

Growth

Inflation

Political variables

Coups

Assassination

General strikes

Guerilla warfare

Government crises

Purges

Cross section OLS

Credit rating appears to be determined mainly through the analysis of economic variables.

Political variables do not add any additional explanatory power

Eliasson (2002)

S&P rating

Per capita income

GDP growth

Inflation

Fiscal balance

External balance

External debt

Economic development

Default history

Short-term currency

Debt to foreign reserves

Export growth

Interest rate spreads

38 emerging countries from 1990 to 1999.

Static and dynamic panel model

Dynamc model is more robust than the static one.

Using static panel data model both spreads and short-term debt to reserves are significant variables.

Current account entered in both models with an unexpected sign

Bissoondoyal Bheenick (2005)

S&P rating

Moody’s rating

Per capita income

Inflation

Govt financial

balance/GDP

Govt debt/GDP

Real exchange rate

Foreign reserve

Net Exports/GDP

Unemployment rate

Unit

labor cost

Current

account/GDP

Foreign debt/GDP

95 countries from December 1995 to December 1999 Ordered Response Model.

First using rating from 1 to 9 and then from 1 to 21.

Estimated first full sample, second for high rated countries and third for low rated countries

Economic variables do not play an important role for the high rated sample of countries.

GNP per capita and inflation are the most significant factors for the full sample.

Moreover, current account balance and the level of foreign reserves do play an important role for low rated countries

Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006)

S&P rating

Fitch rating

Moody’s rating

Per capita income

GDP growth

Inflation

Economic development

Current account

Default history

Real exchange rate

Foreign debt/GDP

Ratio debt/GDP

Ratio reserves/imports

Ratio investment/GDP2Corruption index

Regulatory quality

86 countries in December 31 2003.

Cross section OLS

Ordered Logistic Model

OLS suggest that 11 explanatory variables are statistically significant.

In contrast ordered logistic model suggest only nine.

logistic model behaves better than the OLS model

Afonso (2003)

Moody’s Rati ng

S&P Rating

Per capita GDP

Inflation rate

GDP real growth rate

Development indicator

Default indicator

External debt-exports

ratio

Government deficit as a percentage of GDP

Cross-section OLS using both a linear and a logistic transformation of the data.

81 countries in June 2001

Logistic transformation turned out to be better for the overall sample, especially for the countries placed on the top end of the rating scale.

GDP per capita, external debt, economic development, default history, real growth rate and the inflation rate explained a big part of the variability of credit ratings

Rowland (2004)

Moody’s rating

S&P rating

EMBI Global composite Institutional Investor’s creditworthiness Index

GDP per capita

Real GDP growth rate

Fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP

Current account balance as a percentage of GDP

Debt-to-GDP ratio

Debt ratio

International reserves as a percentage of GDP Debt-service-to-GDP ratio Openness

Inflation rate

Default history

49 countries at the end of July 2003. Moodys and S&P OLS regression for sovereign credit ratings, sovereign spreads and creditworthiness

GDP per capita is a significant explanatory variable in all the regressions.

Regression on the determinants of the creditworthiness index has by far the lowest adjusted R value

Valle and Marin (2005)

Moody’s rating

Fitch rating

S&P rating

GDP per capita

GDP growth

Increase of the CPI

Fiscal balance/GDP

Balance of payments on current account/GDP

Internal debt of the state/GDP

Liquidity ratio

Industrialization

80 countries dated 28 of March 2003.

OLS regression using first 9 explanatory variables and the n 4 and 5

The model with 4 explanatory variables has as much power as the others.

GDP per capita, GDP growth and inflation found to be statistically significant and with the expected signs

Bautler and Fauver (2006)

Institutional investor

Moody’s rating

S&P rating

Ten year sovereign bond yields

GDP per capita

Inflation

Underdevelopment Index

Default dummy

Voice of the people

Political stability

Government effectiveness

Regulatory quality

Rule of law

Corruption control

Legal environment

composite

Emerging market dummy

Foreign debt/GDP

Common law dummy

86 countries in March 2004

OLS for th efull sample

2SLS using as instruments for legal environment the ethnolinguistic fractialiazation and French civil law origin.

Differentiation acrross low and high debt countries

Using OLS legal environment found to be statistically significant and its marginal effect in sovereign credit rating is much stronger than macroeconomic variables.

Using 2SLS the effect of legal environment on credit rating is smaller than OLS estimates indicate, although it is still quite large.

Sovereign credit rating are more sensitive in legal environment in low-debt countries than high-debt

Archer et al. (2007)

S&P rating

Moody’s rating

Fitch rating

Political factors:

Presidential ideology

Executive party tenure

Undivided government

Election cycles

Honeymoon periods

Economic Variables:

Total external debt

Inflation

Gdpper capita

Current account balance

Default history

Natural resources

50 developing countries

from 1987 to 2003.

Panel-corrected

standard errors

estimation using both

annual bond ratings and

two year moving average

All political variables, except

from executive party tenure,

are found to be statistically

insignificant.

The measure with the biggest

impact is history of bond default

in the previous five years.

Inflation, Gdp growth rates and

trade are highly accounted for

the three rating agencies

Afonso et al. (2007)

S&P rating

Moody’s rating

Fitch rating

Per capita income

Real GDP growth

Inflation

Unemployment

Government debt

Fiscal balance

Government effectiveness

External debt

Foreign reserves

Current account balance

Default history

130 countries from

1995 to 2005.

Linear panel estimation

using pool OLS, fixed effects

and random effects.

Differentiation across sub

periods, 1996–2000 a nd

2001–2005.

Differentiation across

rating levels, BBB+ and

above.

Ordered probit estimation and random effects ordered probit estimation fot the full sample

Per capita GDP, GDP real growth

rate, government debt,

government effectiveness,

external debt and external

reserves relevant for the

determination of the sovereign

credit ratings.

For the low rating levels,

external debt and external

reserves are more relevant

Inflation plays a bigger role for high rating levels.

Moreover, after the Asian crisis, it see ms there was a decline in the relevance of the current account variable in the specifications for Moody’s and S&P

Afonso et al. (2011)

Fitch rating Moody’s rating S&P rating

Per capita income

Real GDP growth

Unemployment

Inflation

Government debt

Fiscal balance

Government effectiveness

External debt

Foreign reserves

Current account balance

Default history

European Union dummies’

Regional dummies

130 countries from 1995 to 2005.

Linear panel random effects estimation.

Ordered probit random effects estimation

Per capita GDP, real GDP growth, government debt, and government deficit have a short-run impact on a country’s credit rating.

Government effectiveness, external debt, foreign reserves, and sovereign default dummies have only a long run impact

Zheng (2012)

S&P rating

Dagong rating

GDP per capita

Real GDP growth

Inflation

Fiscal balance

External balance

External debt

Internal debt

Economic development

Default history

43 countries in 2011.

Linear regression

using Dagong, S&P their

average and their difference

in both local and domestic

currency ratings as

dependent variable

Agencies use similar economic

risk indicators.

Inflation, external balance, and

the dummies for economic

development and default history

come out statistically significant

in both agencies’ ratings.

But Dagong assigns different weights to these indicators

Bozic and Magazino (2013)

Moody’s rating

Fitch rating

S&P rating

GNI growth

Per capita GNI

Current account balance

Inflation

Unemployment

Fiscal balance

Government debt

Real Interest Rate

Reserves

Default history

EMU membership

Fiscal balance squared

Government debt squared

139 countries in the period 1975–2010.

Unbalanced Panel using pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects and panel corrected standard errors. Differentiation across sub-periods 1975–1996 and 1997–2010 and on the development level

Per capita GNI, inflation, unemployment, fiscal balance, government debt and default history are statistically significant in almost all regressions and for all rating agencies.

EMU membership increases rating and both fiscal balance and government debt square are strongly significant

Garcia et al. (2014)

Moody’s rating

Fitch rating

S&P rating

Per capita income

GDP growth

Inflation

Fiscal balance

External balance

External debt

Economic development

Previous payment

behaviour Control of corruption

Government effectiveness Political stability and absence of violence

Regulatory quality

Rule of law Voice and accountability

82 countries 2004–2011 OLS.

First with 14 explanatory variables and then only with the three statistically significant of the First regression

External balance, economic development and regulatory quality are statistically significant

Boumparis et al. (2015)

Moody’s rating

Fitch rating

S&P rating

Average rating

GDP per capita

GDP growth rate Government debt

Inflation rate

Unemployment rate

Cumulated current account External balance Reserves

Regulatory quality

18 Euro zone countries from 2002 to 2013.

Pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects using cross sectional averages as additional explanatory variables

All variables except for cumulated current account are statistically significant government debt and cumulative current account exert a stronger positive impact on credit ratings post-2008.

No remaining cross sectional dependence

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Boumparis, P., Milas, C., Panagiotidis, T. (2017). On the Role of the Credit Rating Agencies in the Euro Zone Crisis. In: Bournakis, I., Tsoukis, C., Christopoulos, D., Palivos, T. (eds) Political Economy Perspectives on the Greek Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63706-8_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63706-8_8

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