Abstract
We examine the determinants of credit ratings for 18 Eurozone countries over the period 2002–2013. Sovereign credit ratings are decomposed into high and low ratings, the high rated being AA− and above, and the low rated being A+ and below. We consider a set of macroeconomic and risk variables as their determinants. First, we find greater explanatory power for the former sample (high rated). Second, the results reveal an asymmetric response of cumulated current account for high and low ratings. Third, we provide evidence that the fiscal and the external sector are significant after 2009 only for the low rated economies. Focusing on Greece we provide evidence that the government debt and cumulative current account played a significant role in the downgrade of Greek bonds.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Afonso, A. (2003). Understanding the determinants of sovereign debt ratings: Evidence for the two leading agencies. Journal of Economics and Finance, 27(1), 56–74.
Afonso, A., Gomes, P. M., & Rother, P. (2007). What hides behind sovereign debt ratings? (European Central Bank Working Paper 711).
Afonso, A., Gomes, P., & Rother, P. (2009). Ordered response models for sovereign debt ratings. Applied Economics Letters, 16(8), 769–773.
Afonso, A., Gomes, P., & Rother, P. (2011). Short and long run determinants of sovereign debt credit ratings. International Journal of Finance and Economics, 16(1), 1–15.
Archer, C. C., Biglaiser, G., & DeRouen, K. (2007). Sovereign bonds and the “democratic advantage”: Does regime type affect credit rating agency ratings in the developing world?. International Organization, 61(2), 341–365.
Baghai, R. P., Servaes, H., & Tamayo, A. (2014). Have rating agencies become more conservative? Implications for capital structure and debt pricing. The Journal of Finance, 69(5), 1961–2005.
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, E. (2005). An analysis of the determinants of sovereign ratings. Global Finance Journal, 15(3), 251–280.
Boumparis, P., Milas, C., & Panagiotidis, T. (2015). Has the crisis affected the behavior of the rating agencies? Panel evidence from the Eurozone. Economics Letters, 136, 118–124.
Boumparis, P., Milas, C., & Panagiotidis, T. (2017). Economic policy uncertainty and sovereign credit rating decisions: Panel quantile evidence for the Eurozone. Journal of International Money and Finance, 79, 39–71.
Bozic, V., & Magazzino, C. (2013). Credit rating agencies: The importance of fundamentals in the assessment of sovereign ratings. Economic Analysis & Policy, 43(2), 157–176.
Butler, A. W., & Fauver, L. (2006). Institutional environment and sovereign credit ratings. Financial Management, 35(3), 53–79.
Cantor, R., & Packer, F. (1996). Determinants and impact of sovereign credit ratings. Economic Policy Review, 2, 37–53.
Dergiades, T., Milas, C., & Panagiotidis, T. (2015). Tweets, Google trends, and sovereign spreads in the GIIPS. Oxford Economic Papers, 67(2), 406–432.
Eliasson, A. C., & Kreuter, C. (2002, January 29). Sovereign credit ratings (Deutsche Bank Research No. 02-1).
Garcia, M., Valle, T., Marin, J. (2014). Evolution of Sovereign Rating Models in the Current Crisis. GCG Georgetown University. April 2014. 8(1), 16–33.
Gros, D. (2011). External versus domestic debt in the euro crisis (CEPS Policy Brief No. 243, 1–5).
Haque, N., Mark, N. C., & Mathieson, D. J. (1998, April). The relative importance of political and economic variables in creditworthiness ratings (International Monetary Fund. Research Department. 1–13).
IMF. (2015). Greece: An update of IMF’s preliminary public debt sustainability analysis (IMF Country Report No. 15/186). Available from: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15186.pdf.
Livingston, M., Wei, J., & Zhou, L. (2010). Moody’s and S&P ratings: Are they equivalent? Conservative ratings and split rated bond yields. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 42, 1267–1293.
Mellios, C., & Paget-Blanc, E. (2006). Which factors determine sovereign credit ratings? The European Journal of Finance, 12(4), 361–377.
Rowland, P. (2004). Determinants of spread, credit ratings and creditworthiness for emerging market sovereign debt: A fallow-up study using pooled data analysis (Subgerencia de Estudios Económicos). Colombia: Banco de la República.
Valle, C. T., & Marin, J. M. (2005). Sovereign credit ratings and their determination by the rating agencies. Investment Management and Financial Innovations, 4, 159–173.
Zheng, L. (2012). Are sovereign credit ratings objective? A tale of two agencies. Journal of Applied Finance and Banking, 2(5), 43–61.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Appendix
Appendix
Table A1
Authors | Dependent variables | Explanatory variables | Methodology/data | Important results |
---|---|---|---|---|
Cantor and Packer (1996) | Moody’s rating S&P rating | Per capita income GDP growth Inflation Fiscal balance External balance External debt Economic development Default history | 49 countries in 29 September 2001. Moodys and S&P and its average. Cross-section OLS | Per capita income, inflation, external debt, economic development and Default History explain more than 90% of the variation of credit rating for Moodys, S&P and its average |
Haque et al. (1998) | Institutional Investor Euro money Economic Intelligence unit | Economic variables: Terms of trade Export growth Current account/GDP Reserves/Imports External debt/GDP Real exchange rate Growth Inflation Political variables Coups Assassination General strikes Guerilla warfare Government crises Purges | Cross section OLS | Credit rating appears to be determined mainly through the analysis of economic variables. Political variables do not add any additional explanatory power |
Eliasson (2002) | S&P rating | Per capita income GDP growth Inflation Fiscal balance External balance External debt Economic development Default history Short-term currency Debt to foreign reserves Export growth Interest rate spreads | 38 emerging countries from 1990 to 1999. Static and dynamic panel model | Dynamc model is more robust than the static one. Using static panel data model both spreads and short-term debt to reserves are significant variables. Current account entered in both models with an unexpected sign |
Bissoondoyal Bheenick (2005) | S&P rating Moody’s rating | Per capita income Inflation Govt financial balance/GDP Govt debt/GDP Real exchange rate Foreign reserve Net Exports/GDP Unemployment rate Unit labor cost Current account/GDP Foreign debt/GDP | 95 countries from December 1995 to December 1999 Ordered Response Model. First using rating from 1 to 9 and then from 1 to 21. Estimated first full sample, second for high rated countries and third for low rated countries | Economic variables do not play an important role for the high rated sample of countries. GNP per capita and inflation are the most significant factors for the full sample. Moreover, current account balance and the level of foreign reserves do play an important role for low rated countries |
Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006) | S&P rating Fitch rating Moody’s rating | Per capita income GDP growth Inflation Economic development Current account Default history Real exchange rate Foreign debt/GDP Ratio debt/GDP Ratio reserves/imports Ratio investment/GDP2Corruption index Regulatory quality | 86 countries in December 31 2003. Cross section OLS Ordered Logistic Model | OLS suggest that 11 explanatory variables are statistically significant. In contrast ordered logistic model suggest only nine. logistic model behaves better than the OLS model |
Afonso (2003) | Moody’s Rati ng S&P Rating | Per capita GDP Inflation rate GDP real growth rate Development indicator Default indicator External debt-exports ratio Government deficit as a percentage of GDP | Cross-section OLS using both a linear and a logistic transformation of the data. 81 countries in June 2001 | Logistic transformation turned out to be better for the overall sample, especially for the countries placed on the top end of the rating scale. GDP per capita, external debt, economic development, default history, real growth rate and the inflation rate explained a big part of the variability of credit ratings |
Rowland (2004) | Moody’s rating S&P rating EMBI Global composite Institutional Investor’s creditworthiness Index | GDP per capita Real GDP growth rate Fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP Current account balance as a percentage of GDP Debt-to-GDP ratio Debt ratio International reserves as a percentage of GDP Debt-service-to-GDP ratio Openness Inflation rate Default history | 49 countries at the end of July 2003. Moodys and S&P OLS regression for sovereign credit ratings, sovereign spreads and creditworthiness | GDP per capita is a significant explanatory variable in all the regressions. Regression on the determinants of the creditworthiness index has by far the lowest adjusted R value |
Valle and Marin (2005) | Moody’s rating Fitch rating S&P rating | GDP per capita GDP growth Increase of the CPI Fiscal balance/GDP Balance of payments on current account/GDP Internal debt of the state/GDP Liquidity ratio Industrialization | 80 countries dated 28 of March 2003. OLS regression using first 9 explanatory variables and the n 4 and 5 | The model with 4 explanatory variables has as much power as the others. GDP per capita, GDP growth and inflation found to be statistically significant and with the expected signs |
Bautler and Fauver (2006) | Institutional investor Moody’s rating S&P rating Ten year sovereign bond yields | GDP per capita Inflation Underdevelopment Index Default dummy Voice of the people Political stability Government effectiveness Regulatory quality Rule of law Corruption control Legal environment composite Emerging market dummy Foreign debt/GDP Common law dummy | 86 countries in March 2004 OLS for th efull sample 2SLS using as instruments for legal environment the ethnolinguistic fractialiazation and French civil law origin. Differentiation acrross low and high debt countries | Using OLS legal environment found to be statistically significant and its marginal effect in sovereign credit rating is much stronger than macroeconomic variables. Using 2SLS the effect of legal environment on credit rating is smaller than OLS estimates indicate, although it is still quite large. Sovereign credit rating are more sensitive in legal environment in low-debt countries than high-debt |
Archer et al. (2007) | S&P rating Moody’s rating Fitch rating | Political factors: Presidential ideology Executive party tenure Undivided government Election cycles Honeymoon periods Economic Variables: Total external debt Inflation Gdpper capita Current account balance Default history Natural resources | 50 developing countries from 1987 to 2003. Panel-corrected standard errors estimation using both annual bond ratings and two year moving average | All political variables, except from executive party tenure, are found to be statistically insignificant. The measure with the biggest impact is history of bond default in the previous five years. Inflation, Gdp growth rates and trade are highly accounted for the three rating agencies |
Afonso et al. (2007) | S&P rating Moody’s rating Fitch rating | Per capita income Real GDP growth Inflation Unemployment Government debt Fiscal balance Government effectiveness External debt Foreign reserves Current account balance Default history | 130 countries from 1995 to 2005. Linear panel estimation using pool OLS, fixed effects and random effects. Differentiation across sub periods, 1996–2000 a nd 2001–2005. Differentiation across rating levels, BBB+ and above. Ordered probit estimation and random effects ordered probit estimation fot the full sample | Per capita GDP, GDP real growth rate, government debt, government effectiveness, external debt and external reserves relevant for the determination of the sovereign credit ratings. For the low rating levels, external debt and external reserves are more relevant Inflation plays a bigger role for high rating levels. Moreover, after the Asian crisis, it see ms there was a decline in the relevance of the current account variable in the specifications for Moody’s and S&P |
Afonso et al. (2011) | Fitch rating Moody’s rating S&P rating | Per capita income Real GDP growth Unemployment Inflation Government debt Fiscal balance Government effectiveness External debt Foreign reserves Current account balance Default history European Union dummies’ Regional dummies | 130 countries from 1995 to 2005. Linear panel random effects estimation. Ordered probit random effects estimation | Per capita GDP, real GDP growth, government debt, and government deficit have a short-run impact on a country’s credit rating. Government effectiveness, external debt, foreign reserves, and sovereign default dummies have only a long run impact |
Zheng (2012) | S&P rating Dagong rating | GDP per capita Real GDP growth Inflation Fiscal balance External balance External debt Internal debt Economic development Default history | 43 countries in 2011. Linear regression using Dagong, S&P their average and their difference in both local and domestic currency ratings as dependent variable | Agencies use similar economic risk indicators. Inflation, external balance, and the dummies for economic development and default history come out statistically significant in both agencies’ ratings. But Dagong assigns different weights to these indicators |
Bozic and Magazino (2013) | Moody’s rating Fitch rating S&P rating | GNI growth Per capita GNI Current account balance Inflation Unemployment Fiscal balance Government debt Real Interest Rate Reserves Default history EMU membership Fiscal balance squared Government debt squared | 139 countries in the period 1975–2010. Unbalanced Panel using pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects and panel corrected standard errors. Differentiation across sub-periods 1975–1996 and 1997–2010 and on the development level | Per capita GNI, inflation, unemployment, fiscal balance, government debt and default history are statistically significant in almost all regressions and for all rating agencies. EMU membership increases rating and both fiscal balance and government debt square are strongly significant |
Garcia et al. (2014) | Moody’s rating Fitch rating S&P rating | Per capita income GDP growth Inflation Fiscal balance External balance External debt Economic development Previous payment behaviour Control of corruption Government effectiveness Political stability and absence of violence Regulatory quality Rule of law Voice and accountability | 82 countries 2004–2011 OLS. First with 14 explanatory variables and then only with the three statistically significant of the First regression | External balance, economic development and regulatory quality are statistically significant |
Boumparis et al. (2015) | Moody’s rating Fitch rating S&P rating Average rating | GDP per capita GDP growth rate Government debt Inflation rate Unemployment rate Cumulated current account External balance Reserves Regulatory quality | 18 Euro zone countries from 2002 to 2013. Pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects using cross sectional averages as additional explanatory variables | All variables except for cumulated current account are statistically significant government debt and cumulative current account exert a stronger positive impact on credit ratings post-2008. No remaining cross sectional dependence |
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Boumparis, P., Milas, C., Panagiotidis, T. (2017). On the Role of the Credit Rating Agencies in the Euro Zone Crisis. In: Bournakis, I., Tsoukis, C., Christopoulos, D., Palivos, T. (eds) Political Economy Perspectives on the Greek Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63706-8_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63706-8_8
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-63705-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-63706-8
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)