Abstract
The goal of this chapter is to explore this analytic bias—how it is manifested, why it appears so extensive, and what unwitting limitations it imposes on our strategic options to counterterrorism. We use data from a study of the Syrian opposition network that was conducted in the CORE Lab at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California (Lucente and Wilson, Crossing the red line: social media and social network analysis for unconventional campaign planning, 2013). The original study sought to provide a window into the armed opposition units against the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad. This chapter proceeds as follows: We begin by reviewing the various strategies that can be used for disrupting dark networks. These can be broken down into two broad categories—kinetic and nonkinetic. The former uses coercive means for disruption while the latter seeks to undermine dark networks using with subtler applications of power. Drawing on a previous analysis, we illustrate how some of these strategies can be implemented, while at the same time highlighting our own bias in that study toward central actors. We then turn to an analysis of the Syrian opposition network, highlighting how a central focus can blind analysts to other important aspects of a network; in this case, elements that ultimately aligned themselves with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). We conclude with some implications for the future use of SNA to monitor and disrupt dark networks.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Dark networks are defined here as illegal and covert networks (Raab and Milward 2003).
- 2.
Our original article included only four nonkinetic strategies. A fifth was added to a later publication (Everton 2012).
- 3.
These multirelational networks are referred to as multiplex (multiple types of relational networks) that are combined and “stacked” together.
- 4.
Unless otherwise noted, we created the network graphs presented in this paper with the social analysis tool, Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar 2015).
- 5.
The original researchers treated the multimodal data as what social network refer to as a one-mode network, which was technically incorrect since individuals are generally considered a different type of actor than political groups and military units. Ideally, they would have coded all of the data at the individual level using the leaders of the military units and political groups rather than the units and groups themselves. That granular level of data was simply unavailable, however, so the military units and political groups essentially functioned as “stand-ins” for the leaders of those units and groups. Thus, it is legitimate to treat and analyze the network as a one-mode network. The data have also been refined and cleaned since the original analysis, so the number of actors in the network is somewhat different. The network’s structure remains essentially the same, however.
- 6.
This is not the same network graph presented by Lucente and Wilson (2013: 25, Fig. 2), which they generated using the graph drawing program , Gephi (Bastian et al. 2009). It shows the network as consisting of two main clusters separated by a central cluster of a small group of actors whereas here the central cluster is broken down into three separate but central clusters.
- 7.
The standard centralization algorithm calculates the variation between the centrality scores of all actors in the network with the highest centrality score in the network. See Everton (2012:152). Centralization indices were calculated with the social network analysis program, UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002).
- 8.
There are numerous social network analysis clustering algorithms that assign actors to distinct subnetworks based on the network’s pattern of ties. In general, these algorithms assume that ties within a subnetwork are denser than across subnetworks. The Louvain method is a widely accepted clustering algorithm that has been implemented in numerous social network analysis packages. In Fig. 8 node color indicates the subnetworks to which the various actors have been assigned by the Louvain algorithm.
- 9.
This was determined by the names of the individuals, political organizations, and military units included in this subnetwork.
- 10.
For example, a recent version of UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002) includes at least 23 different types of centrality measures, which is far more than the number of cohesion measures it estimates (11) and clustering algorithms it implements (12).
References
Abuza Z (2003) Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: crucible of terror. Lynne Reinner Publishers, Boulder
Allman MJ, Winright TL (2010) After the smoke clears: the just war tradition and post war justice. Orbis Books, Maryknoll
Anklam P (2007) Net work: a practical guide to creating and sustaining networks at work and in the world. Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford
Anonymous (2009) Deception 2.0: Deceiving in the Netwar Age. Unpublished Paper. Task Force Iron, Iraq
Arquilla J (2009) Aspects of netwar and the conflict with al Qaeda. Information Operations Center, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey
Axelrod R (1973) Schema theory: an information processing model of perception and cognition. Am Polit Sci Rev 67(4):1248–66
Baker WE, Faulkner RR (1993) The social-organization of conspiracy: illegal networks in the heavy electrical-equipment industry. Am Sociol Rev 58(6):837–60
Bastian M, Sebastien H, Mathieu J (2009) Gephi: an open source software for exploring and manipulating networks. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media
Batagelj V, Mrvar A (2015) Pajek 4.06. University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana
Bavelas A (1948) A mathematical model for group structure. Hum Organ 7:16–30
Bavelas A (1950) Communication patterns in task-oriented groups. J Acoust Soc Am 22:725–30
Berman A (2012) Backgrounder: rebel groups in Jebel Al-Zawiyah. Institute for the Study of War, Washington, DC
Bindemann M (2010) Scene and screen center bias early eye movements in scene viewing. Vision Res 50:2577–87
Blondel VD, Jean-Loup G, Renaud L, Etienne L (2008) Fast unfolding of communities in large networks. J Stat Mech. arXiv:0803.0476v2
Bolling J (2012) Backgrounder: rebel groups in northern Aleppo province. Institute for the Study of War, Washington, DC
Bonacich P (1972) Factoring and weighting approaches to status scores and clique identification. J Math Sociol 2:113–20
Bonacich P (1987) Power and centrality: a family of measures. Am J Sociol 92(5):1170–82
Borgatti SP (2005) Centrality and network flow. Soc Networks 27(1):55–71
Borgatti SP, Everett MG (2006) A graph-theoretic perspective on centrality. Soc Networks 28(4):466–84
Borgatti SP, Everett MG, Freeman LC (2002) UCINET for windows: software for social network analysis. Analytical Technologies, Harvard
Brimley S, Singh V (2008) Stumbling into the future? The indirect approach and American strategy. Orbis 52(2):312–31
Carley KM, Lee J-S, Krackhardt D (2002) Destabilizing networks. Connections 24(3):79–92
Carlyle T (1841/2013) On heroes, hero-worship, and the heroic in history. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, New York
Cook KS, Emerson RM (1978) Power, equity and commitment in exchange networks. Am Sociol Rev 43:712–39
Cook KS, Emerson RM, Gilmore MR, Yamagishi T (1983) The distribution of power in exchange networks. Am J Sociol 89:275–305
Cooper H (2009) Dreaming of Splitting the Taliban. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/weekinreview/08COOPER.html?_r=1
Cunningham D, Everton SF, Wilson G, Padilla C, Zimmerman D (2013) Brokers and key players in the internationalization of the FARC. Stud Confl Terror 36(6):477–502
DiMaggio PJ (1997) Culture and cognition. Annu Rev Sociol 23:263–87
Emerson RM (1972a) Exchange theory, part I: a psychological basis for social exchange. In: Berger J, Zelditch M, Anderson B (eds) Sociological theories in progress, vol 2. Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, pp 38–57
Emerson RM (1972b) Exchange theory, part II: exchange relations and network structures. In: Berger J, Zelditch M, Anderson B (eds) Sociological theories in progress, vol 2. Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, pp 58–87
Erickson BH (1981) Secret societies and social structure. Soc Forces 60(1):188–210
Everett MG, Borgatti SP (2005) Extending centrality. In: Carrington PJ, Scott J, Wasserman S (eds) Models and methods in social network analysis. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 57–76
Everton SF (2012) Disrupting dark networks. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Famis AG-S (2014) Illegal networks or criminal organizations: structure, power, and facilitators in cocaine trafficking structures. In: Morselli C (ed) Crime and networks. Routledge, London, pp 131–47
Felter J, Fishman B (2007) Al-Qa’ida’s foreign fighters in Iraq: a first look at the Sinjar records. Combating Terrorism Center, West Point. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf
Freeman LC (1977) A set of measures of centrality based on betweenness. Sociometry 40:35–41
Freeman LC (1979) Centrality in social networks I: conceptual clarification. Soc Networks 1:215–39
Fridovich DP, Krawchuck FT (2007) Special operations forces: indirect approach. Joint Forces Q 44(1):24–27
Friedkin NE (1991) Theoretical foundations for centrality measures. Am J Sociol 96(6):1478–504
Gerdes LM (2015) Dark dimensions: classifying relationships among clandestine actors. In: Gerdes LM (ed) Illuminating dark networks: the study of clandestine groups and organizations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 19–38
Holliday J (2011) The struggle for Syria in 2011. Institute for the Study of War, Washington, DC
Holliday J (2012a) Syria’s armed opposition. Institute for the Study of War, Washington, DC
Holliday J (2012b) Syria’s maturing insurgency. Institute for the Study of War, Washington, DC
Hook S (1950) The hero in history. Humanities Press, New York
Karadağ E (ed) (2015) Leadership and organizational outcomes: meta-analysis of emprical studies. Springer, New York
Kilcullen D (2009) The accidental guerrilla: fighting small wars in the midst of a big one. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Koschade S (2006) A social network analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: the applications to counterterrorism and intelligence. Stud Confl Terror 29:559–75
Krawchuck, FT (n.d.) Winning the global war on terrorism in the pacific region: special operations forces’ indirect approach to success. http://igcc.ucsd.edu/pdf/krawchuk.pdf
Krebs V (2002) Mapping networks of terrorist cells. Connections 24(3):43–52
Leavitt HJ (1951) Some effects of communication patterns on group performance. J Abnorm Soc Psychol 46:38–50
Lucente S, Wilson G (2013) Crossing the red line: social media and social network analysis for unconventional campaign planning. Special Warfare January-March: 22–28.
Lum T, Niksch LA (2006) The Republic of the Philippines: background and U.S. Relations: congressional research service report to congress. U.S. Congress, Washington DC
Magouirk J, Atran S, Sageman M (2008) Connecting terrorist networks. Stud Confl Terror 31:1–16
Marks S, Meer T, Nilson M (2005) Manhunting: a methodology for finding persons of national interest. Master of Science Master of Science, Naval Postgraduate School
McCulloh I, Carley KM (2011) Detecting change in longitudinal social networks. J Soc Struct. 12(3). http://www.cmu.edu/joss/content/articles/volume12//McCullohCarley.pdf
Milward HB, Raab J (2006) Dark networks as organizational problems: elements of a theory. Int Public Manag J 9(3):333–60
Moreno JL (1934/1953). Who shall survive? Foundations of sociometry, group psychotherapy and sociodrama. Beacon House, Beacon
Nash R, Bouchard M (2015) Travel broadens the network: turning points in the network trajectory of an American Jihadi. In: Bouchard M (ed) Social networks, terrorism and counter-terrorism: radical and connected. Routledge, New York, pp 61–81
O’Bagy E (2012a) Backgrounder: Syria’s political struggle. Institute for the Study of War, Washington, DC
O’Bagy E (2012b) Jihad in Syria. Institute for the Study of War, Washington, DC
O’Bagy E (2012c) Syria’s political opposition. Institute for the Study of War, Washington, DC
Patel NG, Rorresa C, Joly DO, Brownstein JS, Boston R, Levy MZ, Smith G (2015) Quantitative methods of identifying the key nodes in the illegal wildlife trade network. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 112(26):7948–53
Pedahzur A, Perliger A (2006) The changing nature of suicide attacks: a social network perspective. Soc Forces 84(4):1987–2008
Peter TA (2008) U.S. begins hunting Iraq’s bombmakers, not just bombs. Christian Science Monitor. http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0908/p04s01-wome.html
Raab J, Milward HB (2003) Dark networks as problems. J Public Adm Res Theory 13(4):413–39
Rabasa A (2005) Islamic education in Southeast Asia. In: Fradkin H, Haqqani H, Brown E (eds) Current trends in Islamist ideology. Washington, DC, Hudson Institute, pp 97–108
Ramakrishna K (2005) Delegitimizing global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia. Contemp Southeast Asia 27(3):343–69
Ramakrishna K (2009) Governmental responses to extremism in Southeast Asia: ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ approaches. In: de Borchgrave A, Sanderson T, Gordon D (eds) Conflict, community, and criminality in Southeast Asia and Australia: assessments from the field. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, pp 31–36
Ramakrishna K (2012) Engaging former JI detainees in countering extremism: can it work? RSIS Commentaries, 003/2012. http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0032012.pdf
Roberts, N, Everton SF (2011) Strategies for combating dark networks. J Soc Struct. 12(2). http://www.cmu.edu/joss/content/articles/volume12//RobertsEverton.pdf
Rodriguez JA (2005) The March 11th terrorist network: in its weakness lies its strength. EPP-LEA Working Papers. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.98.4408
Rubin AJ (2011) Few Taliban leaders take Afghan offer to switch sides. In New York Times. New York Times, New York, p A1
Rumelhart DE (1980) Schemata: the building blocks of cognition. In: Spiro RJ, Bruce BC, Brewer WF (eds) Theoretical issues in reading comprehension: perspectives from cognitive psychology, linguistics, artifical intelligence, and education. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, pp 33–57
Sageman M (2004) Understanding terror networks. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia
Sharp JM, Blanchard CM (2012) Syria: unrest and U.S. Policy. Congressional Research Office, Washington, DC
Simmel G (1906) The sociology of secrecy and of secret societies. Am J Sociol 11:441–98
Sparrow MK (1991) The application of network analysis to criminal intelligence: an assessment of the prospects. Soc Networks 13:251–74
U.S. Special Operations Command (2003) Doctrine for joint psychological operations: joint publication 3-53. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_53.pdf
Syrian National Council (2012) Syrian National Council Website. Syrian National Council, Istanbul. http://www.syriancouncil.org
Wilson, G (2006) Anatomy of a successful COIN operation: OEF-Philippines and the indirect approach. Military Review 5 (November–December):38–48
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Roberts, N., Everton, S. (2016). Monitoring and Disrupting Dark Networks: A Bias Toward the Center and What It Costs Us. In: Dawoody, A. (eds) Eradicating Terrorism from the Middle East. Public Administration, Governance and Globalization, vol 17. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31018-3_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31018-3_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-31016-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-31018-3
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)