Abstract
If the gift in fact is central to deconstruction, then it is at work even when Derrida doesn’t write explicitly about it. This chapter turns to Derrida’s essay “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” and demonstrates how within it the gift can be contextualized in his deconstruction more generally. The gift is considered in relation to negation/affirmation (“denegation”), Being, khora, and economy. “Denegation” (Verneinung, or denial) is a psychoanalytic principle that insists that whatever a subject most forcefully rejects is in fact that which the subject most innately desires to affirm. Affirmation is here called “de-negation” and any rejection of the gift from coming into phenomenal appearance can have an affirmative function. Next, the gift is conceived as the progressive “displacer” of Being and “the transcendental horizon that belonged to it.” Third, since deconstruction is aligned with Khōra, a central concept in Derrida’s œuvre, the gift can be conceived in relation to it as that which takes from phenomenal experience in such a way as to draw attention to what is absent. Fourthly, one might associate the gift with that which deformalizes understanding in consciousness. Overall, this essay of Derrida’s is significant for it’s being an early response to the work of younger Marion who was outspoken about concerns that deconstruction was an apophatic negation and deceptive sophism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
Martin Heidegger, “Zeit und Sein,” in Zur Sache des Denkens (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 1969), p. 25.
- 2.
“Comment ne pas parler? How to avoid speaking? Plus précisément: comment ne pas parler de l’être.” Jacques Derrida, Comment ne pas parler. Dénégations, en Psyché. Inventions de l’autre (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1987), p. 587.
- 3.
“It is thus necessary to separate oneself twice: both from those who know – one could say here, from the philosophers or the experts in ontology – and from the vulgar profane who manipulate predicative language as naive idolaters. One is not far from insinuating [sous-entendre] that ontology itself is a subtle or perverse idolatry; one will hear this [en-tendra], in an analogous and different way, through the voice of Levinas or Jean-Luc Marion.” Jacques Derrida, “How to avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other Volume II. eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 158.
- 4.
Ibid., p. 157.
- 5.
Jacques Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” Derrida and Negative Theology, eds. Harold G Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 77.
- 6.
Ibid., p. 75
- 7.
For Derrida, “one is never certain of being able to attribute to anyone a project of negative theology as such.” Jacques Derrida, “How to avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other Volume II. eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 143.
- 8.
Ibid., p. 147.
- 9.
Marion eventually attempts to absorb denegation into his phenomenology of givenness. “The negative…can be understood as the operator of dialectical givenness, which puts the concept into motion, to the point of producing it in actuality (Hegel). Finally, the void is given in the deception of anticipated perception or in the frustrated expectation of affection, indeed desire. Every negation and every denegation, every negative, every nothing, and every logical contradiction suppose a givenness, which authorizes us to recognize them and thus do justice to their particularities – in short, a given that permits us at the very least to discuss them.” Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey Kosky (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 55.
- 10.
“These slight disturbances underlie the same sentence. At the same time stable and unstable, this sentence allows itself to be carried by the movements of what I am calling “denial” (denegation), a word that I would like to hear prior even to its elaboration in a Freudian context (this is perhaps not easy and assumes at least two preconditions: that the chosen examples extend beyond both the predicative structure and the ontotheological or metaphysical presuppositions that still underlie psychoanalytic theorems).” Derrida continues to suggest that there “is a secret of denial and a denial of the secret. The secret as such, as secret, separates and already institutes a negativity; it is a negation that denies itself. It de-negates itself. This de-negation does not happen to it by accident; it is essential and originary.” Jacques Derrida, “How to avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other Volume II. eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 158.
- 11.
“This denial [dénégation] does not happen [to the secret] by accident; it is essential and originary. … The enigma … is the sharing of the secret, and not only shared to my partner in the society but the secret shared within itself, its ‘own’ partition, which divides the essence of a secret that cannot even appear to one alone except in starting to be lost, to divulge itself, hence to dissimulate itself, as secret, in showing itself: dissimulating its dissimulation. There is no secret as such; I deny it. And this is what I confide in secret to whomever allies himself to me. This is the secret of the alliance.” Jacques Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Derrida and Negative Theology, eds. Harold G. Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 95
- 12.
Jacques Derrida, “A Conversation with Jacques Derrida” in Deconstruction in a Nutshell, ed. John D. Caputo (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), p. 6. See also Derrida’s “The Force of Law,” wherein the distinction is made between “law” and “justice.” Derrida insists that “we might say it is legal, that it conforms to law, and perhaps, by metaphor, that it is just, but we would be wrong to say that the decision was just.” He goes on to claim that “…there is never a moment that we can say in the present that a decision is just…” Jacques Derrida, “The Force of Law: ‘The Mystical Foundation of Authority’” in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, trans. Mary Quaintance, ed. Drucilla Cornell et al. (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 23.
- 13.
And he continues: “The paradox in the instituting moment of an institution is that, at the same time that it starts something new, it also continues something, is true to the memory of the past, to a heritage, to something we receive from the past, from our predecessors, from the culture.” Jacques Derrida, “A Conversation with Jacques Derrida” in Deconstruction in a Nutshell, ed. John D. Caputo (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), p. 6.
- 14.
For Derrida “God is not merely the end, but the origin of this work of the negative.” Jacques Derrida, “How to avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other Volume II. eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 146. Further, “God is not simply his place, not even in his most holy of places. He is not and he has no place, he does not take place [n’a pas lieu], or rather he is and has/takes place [a lieu] but without being and without place, without being his place.” Ibid., p. 163.
- 15.
Ibid., p. 162.
- 16.
“What “différance,” “trace,” and so on, “mean-to-say”—which consequently does not mean to say any-thing—would be “something” “before” the concept, the name, the word, that would be nothing, that would no longer pertain to being, to presence or to the presence of the present, or even to absence, and even less to some hyperessentiality. Yet the ontotheological reappropriation always remains possible—and doubtless inevitable insofar as one is speaking, precisely, in the element of ontotheological logic and grammar. One can always say: hyperessentiality is exactly that, a supreme being that remains incommensurable with the being of all that is, that is nothing, neither present nor absent, and so on. If in fact the movement of this reappropriation appears irrepressible, its ultimate failure is no less necessary. But I concede that this question remains at the heart of a thinking of différance or of a writing of writing.” Ibid., p. 148.
- 17.
In interpreting Heidegger, Derrida asserts that “it [Being] should always have been written under erasure.” Being comes before negation, and there is “nothing negative about it!” Ibid., p. 148.
- 18.
“Being is a perennial topic in this essay: “I will limit myself to the question that my title imposes: How to avoid speaking? Or more precisely: How to avoid speaking of Being?” Ibid., p. 188.
- 19.
Ibid., 188.
- 20.
Martin Heidegger, “Zeit und Sein,” in Zur Sache des Denkens (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 1969), p. 25.
- 21.
Jacques Derrida, “How to avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other Volume II. eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 188.
- 22.
Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl’s “Origin of Geometry”: An Introduction, John P. Leavey and David B. Allison (Stony Brook, NY: Hays, 1978), p. 152. For Kevin Hart, this reference in Origin of Geometry “anticipates a thinking of the gift and in particular the impossibility of giving in the present…” See also Kevin Hart, “Review of The Gift of Death”, in Modern Theology 12: 4 (1996): 495–96.
- 23.
Jacques Derrida, Glas, trans John P. Leavey and Richard Rand (Lincoln: University of Nebraska press, 1990), p. 242.
- 24.
Ibid., p. 242–243.
- 25.
For a concise summary of Derrida’s “How to Avoid Speaking” see Christina Gschwandtner, Postmodern Apologetics?: Arguments for God in Contemporary Culture (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2012), p. 62. For her, the “unnaming” ultimately “names” the divine by “marking distinctions between appropriate and inappropriate speech.”
- 26.
Jacques Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” Derrida and Negative Theology, eds. Harold G Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 103.
- 27.
“As Jean-Luc Marion rightly remarks, praise is ‘neither true nor false, nor even contradictory,’ although it says something about thearchy, about the Good and about analogy; and if its attributions or namings do not belong to the ordinary value of truth, but rather to a supertruth ruled by superessentiality, praise nonetheless does not merge with the movement of prayer itself, which does not speak about but to. Even if this address is immediately determined by the discourse of praise and if the prayer addresses itself to God by speaking (to him) about him, the apostrophe of prayer and the determination of praise are not the same but two different structures: ‘Trinity!! Higher than any being, any divinity. . . . Guide of Christians in the wisdom of heaven!’” Jacques Derrida, “How to avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other Volume II. eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 177.
- 28.
Ibid., p. 179. Indeed, this is because “a predicate can always conceal another predicate, or even the nakedness of an absence of predicate, the way the veil of a garment – sometimes indispensable – may both dissimulate and make visible the very thing that it dissimulates – and render it attractive at the same time. Hence the voice of an utterance can conceal another, which it then appears to quote without quoting it, presenting itself as another form, namely, as a quotation of the other.”
- 29.
Jacques Derrida, “Khôra” in On the Name, ed. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 126. See also p. 95.
- 30.
There is not space to fully elaborate upon this here, but Derrida draws his conception of Khora from Heidegger and Plato: “Heidegger immediately specifies that Plato could not elaborate the original content of epekeina tes ousias as the transcendence of Dasein (‘der ursprtingliche Gehalt des epekeina als Transzendenz des Daseins’). He makes an analogous gesture with regard to the khdra: in the Einführung in die Metaphysik, a brief parenthesis suggests that Plato fell short of thinking the place (Ort), a thinking that nonetheless suggested itself to him. Plato would, in truth, have only prepared (vorbereitet) the way for the Cartesian interpretation of space as extensio (Ausdehnung).’ Elsewhere I have tried to show what is problematic and reductive about this perspective. Seventeen years later, the last page of Was heisst Denken? again mentions khdra and khdrismos, without any explicit reference to the Timaeus. Plato, who is supposed to have given the most decisive Deutung for Western thought, situates the kharismos, the interval or separation, the spacing, between beings and Being. And yet ‘[he khdra] heisst der Ort,’ ‘[he khora] is the locus, the site, place.’ For Plato, beings and Being are thus ‘differently located [verschieden georted.’ Thus when Plato gives thought to the different location [die verschiedene Ort] of beings and Being, he is asking for the wholly other place [nach dem ganz anderen Ort] of Being, as against the place of beings.” Jacques Derrida, “How to avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other Volume II. eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 177.
- 31.
Jacques Derrida. “Khôra” in On the Name. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 107.
- 32.
“The passage by way of negativity of the discourse on the khora is neither a last word nor a mediation in the service of a dialectic, an elevation toward a positive or true meaning, a Good or a God. It is not a matter here of negative theology; there is reference to neither an event nor a gift, nor an order, nor a promise, even if, as I have just underlined, the absence of promise or order, the barren, radically anhuman and atheological nature of this “place” obliges us to speak and to refer to it in a certain unique way, as to the wholly other that would not even be transcendent, absolutely remote, nor immanent or close.” Jacques Derrida, “How to avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other Volume II. eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 174.
- 33.
Ibid., p. 174.
- 34.
For indeed “under the name of khora, the place belongs neither to the sensible nor to the intelligible, neither to becoming nor to nonbeing (the khora is never described as a void), nor to being: according to Plato, the quantity or the quality of being are measured against its intelligibility. All the aporias, which Plato does not dissimulate, would signify that there is there [il’y a la] something that is neither a being nor a nothingness; something that no dialectic, participationist schema, or analogy would allow one to rearticulate with any philosopheme whatsoever: neither ‘in’ Plato’s works nor in the history that Platonism inaugurates and dominates. The neither-nor can no longer be reconverted into both-and.” Ibid., p. 172.
- 35.
See here Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1967), p. 29. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Robinson and Macquarrie. (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), p. 51.
- 36.
Jacques Derrida, “How to avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other Volume II. eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 174.
- 37.
Ibid., p. 174. Derrida continues: “To obey this injunction without order or promise, an injunction that has always already taken place, one must think that which – standing beyond all given philosophemes – will have nevertheless left a trace in language, for example, the word khora in the Greek language, insofar as it is caught up in the network of its usual meanings. Plato had no other. Along with the word, there are also grammatical, rhetorical, logical, and hence also philosophical possibilities. However insufficient they may be, they are given, already marked by this unheard-of trace, promised to the trace that has promised nothing.”
- 38.
Ibid., p. 150. Indeed “with the ascent beyond the sensible, one gains in conciseness, for ‘the more we take flight upward, the more our words are confined to the ideas we are capable of forming.’” Yet “there is also something beyond this economical conciseness. By passing beyond the intelligible itself, the apophatikai theologai aim toward absolute rarefaction, toward silent union with the ineffable:”
- 39.
Ibid., p. 150.
- 40.
Ibid., p. 156. Derrida then raises the question, which has definite phenomenological undertones: “And yet is any problem more novel today than that of consciousness? Here one is tempted to designate, if not to define, consciousness as that place in which is retained the singular power not to say what one knows, to keep a secret in the form of representation. A conscious being is a be-ing capable of lying, of not presenting in a discourse what it nonetheless has an articulated representation of: a being that can avoid speaking.”
- 41.
For Hegel, the master/slave dialectic ultimately results in giving the slave freedom through self-awareness as a subject. And since the end point or aim of the overall dialectic is “absolute knowledge” and absolute self-consciousness, there is a sense in which it is better to be a slave, for Hegel.
- 42.
Jacques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978.), p. 255. See also Omid Nodoushani, “A Postmodern Theory of General Economy: The contribution of Georges Bataille”, in Culture and Organization 5:2 (1999): 331–345.
- 43.
Jacques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978.), p. 275.
- 44.
Jacques Derrida, “How to avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other Volume II. eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 308, note 8.
- 45.
Jacques Derrida, God, The Gift, and Postmodernism, eds. John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Indianapolis IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 71
- 46.
Ibid., p. 75
- 47.
Jacques Derrida, “The Force of Law: ‘The Mystical Foundation of Authority,’” in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, ed. Drucilla Cornell et al., (New York, Routledge, 1992), p. 25 & pp. 68–91.
- 48.
And similarly, in the Gift of Death, Derrida recalls Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the Story of Abraham and Isaac, and contends that “[Responsibility] requires one to respond as oneself and as an irreplaceable singularity, to answer for what one does, says, gives; but it also requires that, being good and through goodness, one forget or efface the origin of what one gives.” Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 51.
- 49.
The influence Lévinas has had on Derrida is immense, most especially in Derrida’s early writings that concern “the Other,” and the impossibility of presence, yet also in his later writings, where he turns to the Lévinas of Judaism and “the promise” in order to initiate the so-called “return” to religion.
- 50.
Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). The Gift of Death was originally entitled “the Ethics of the Gift,” and was presented at a conference in Royaumont France in December 1990, prior to its publication in French as L’éthique du don: Jacques Derrida et la pensée du don: colloque de Royaumont (Paris: Metailié, 1992).
- 51.
Ibid., p. 41. Here Derrida reads Heidegger and Lévinas in order to arrive at the conclusion that the gift of self-sacrifice can lead to self-recognition or “individuality,” yet one must keep in mind Derrida’s concerns for Bataille’s theory of absolute “negativity.”
Additional Works Cited
Beardsworth, Richard. Derrida and the Political. New York, NY: Routledge, 1996.
Bourdieu, Pierre. Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique. Précédé de trois études d’ethnologie kabyle. Paris: Droz, 1972.
Bourdieu, Pierre. Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1977.
Coward, Harold G., Toby Foshay, and Jacques Derrida. Derrida and Negative Theology. Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1992.
Derrida, Jacques. “A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event” in The Late Derrida. Ed. Mitchell, W. J. T., and Arnold I. Davidson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.
Derrida, Jacques. Cinders, trans. Ned Lukacher. Lincoln NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1991.
Derrida, Jacques. Comment ne pas parler. Dénégations, en Psyché. Inventions de l’autre. Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1987.
Derrida, Jacques. Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice. New York, N.Y.: Cardozo Law Review, 1990.
Derrida, Jacques. “From Restricted to General Economy” in Writing and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
Derrida, Jacques. “Force of Law: the Mystical Foundation of Authority.” in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice. ed. Drucilla Cornell. New York: Routledge, 1992.
Derrida, Jacques. Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money. Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Derrida, Jacques. “Hospitality,” in Acts of Religion, New York, NY: Routledge, 2001.
Derrida, Jacques. “Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility: A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida,” in Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley (eds), Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy. London: Routledge. 1999.
Derrida, Jacques. “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” Derrida and Negative Theology, eds. Harold G Coward and Toby Foshay Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1992.
Derrida, Jacques. “How to avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other Volume II. eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2008.
Derrida, Jacques. “Khora” in On the Name. ed. Thomas Dutoit. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995.
Derrida, Jacques. La voix et le phenoméne. Paris: Press Universitaires de France. 1967.
Derrida, Jacques. Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle Invites Jacques Derrida to Respond. trans Rachel Bowlby, Sanford, CA: Stanford U Press. 2000.
Derrida, Jacques. “Sauf le nom.” Trans. John P. Leavey, Jr. On the Name. Ed. Thomas Dutoit. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995.
Derrida, Jacques. The Gift of Death, trans. David Wills. Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
Derrida, Jacques and Jean-Luc Marion, God, the Gift, and Postmodernism eds. John D Caputo, and Michael J. Scanlon. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1999.
Derrida, Jacques, and John D. Caputo. Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida. New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 1997.
Derrida, Jacques, and Elizabeth Rottenberg. Negotiations: interventions and interviews, 1971–2001. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2002.
Hart, Kevin. “Review of The Gift of Death,” in Modern Theology 12: 4 (1996): 495–96.
Hart, Kevin and Yvonne Sherwood (eds.). Derrida and Religion: Other Testaments. London: Routledge, 2004.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, Robinson and Macquarrie. New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962.
Heidegger, Martin. Grundprobleme Phanomenologie (1919/20) in Gesamtausgabe 58 ed. Hans-Helmuth Gander. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993.
Heidegger, Martin. On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.
Heidegger, Martin. Sein und Zeit. Max Niemeyer Verlag; 19 edition, 2006.
Heidegger, Martin. Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1967.
Heidegger, Martin. “Zeit und Sein,” in Zur Sache des Denkens. Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 1969.
Horner, Robyn. “Theology After Derrida,” in Modern Theology, 29 (2013): 230–247.
Jonkers, Peter & Ruud Welten. God in France: Eight Contemporary French thinkers on God. Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2005.
Lacan, Jacques. “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function.” In Ecrits, trans. Héloïse Fink, and Bruce Fink. Ecrits: the first complete edition in English. New York: Norton, 2006.
Lacan, Jacques. The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954–1955. trans. Jacques-Alain Miller. New York, N.Y: Norton, 1988.
Lévinas, Emmanuel. “God and Philosophy” in The Levinas Reader. trans Richard A Cohen and Alphonso Lingis. Ed. Sean Hand. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.
Mensch, James. “Derrida’s ‘New Thinking’: A Response to Leonard Lawlor’s ‘Derrida and Husserl.” in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 36.2 (2005): pp. 208–219.
Moore, Gerald. “Crises of Derrida: Theodicy, Sacrifice and (Post-)deconstruction.” in Derrida Today 5, (2012): pp. 264–282.
Pippin, Robert. Hegel on Self-Consciousness: Desire and Death in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011.
Sebbah, François-David. Testing the Limit: Derrida, Henry, Levinas, and the Phenomenological Tradition. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Alvis, J.W. (2016). The Gift in Derrida’s Deconstruction: Affirming the Gift Through Denegation. In: Marion and Derrida on The Gift and Desire: Debating the Generosity of Things. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 85. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27942-8_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27942-8_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-27940-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-27942-8
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)