Abstract
To those of you who know David Lodge’s satirical novel Small World it might be enlightening to confess that the invitation to deliver this keynote speech, flattering as it may be, instantly reminded me of Professor Arthur Kingfisher’s similar undertaking at the conference on ‘The Crisis of the Sign’ which in the book takes place in Chicago.
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Notes
- 1.
Grize’s Piaget-inspired “natural” logic is a notable exception, but then the question arises: ought we call this “natural” logic modern? It rather seems to belong to the “psychological” stage of the development of Logic. Authors such as Peirce, Dewey and Quine, by the way, have put forward ideas on logic which are of similar interest to the study of argumentation.
- 2.
In van Eemeren et al. (1987) we stressed the “process/product ambiguity” of the term argumentation, which relates it not only to a process but also to a product. O’Keefe, Trapp and others seem to make too much out of this, which is, I think, partly due to their solely concentrating on the use of this word in English.
- 3.
- 4.
Cf. Furbank (1977, 77).
- 5.
- 6.
Philosophical reflection may, of course, take rather diverse questions into consideration, and all kinds of positions can be adopted, varying from allegedly strict positivism to so-called soft hermeneutics. As far as I am concerned, the study of argumentation should not be tied and confined to just one particular meta-theoretical stance. Its philosophical range should allow for general laws to be established or discovered as well as for special and unique pieces of argumentation to be interpreted and judged. This means that the classical dichotomy between nomothetic and ideographic is not considered to be a conundrum to be resolved. It also means that neither an exclusively finalist nor an exclusively causal methodology is favoured in advance.
- 7.
We must be prepared to recognize that the way reasonableness is dealt with often combines or intermingles with a variety of other epistemological, ideological, didactic, or perhaps just practical, premisses. Some of these are of philosophical significance, some are not. Together they may imply a philosophy of argumentation which is part of a world view which is rather less coherent than one would hope for. As Barth (1974) has clearly pointed out with regard to the use of generic expressions, we should be aware of the dangers of sometimes hidden lapses from a consistent world view caused by eclectic insertions of preconceived ideas, and not belittle their consequences.
- 8.
For geometrical philosophers who happen to be absolutists such an undisputable certainty would eventually be the Absolute.
- 9.
These relativist tendencies are most prominent in Wittgensteinian ideas about inconvertible language games which can be characterized by their distinct modes of argumentation. If they were to be characterized by their varying modes of argumentation, and not the other way round, Toulmin’s fields of argument would fit in here. Anyway, the anthropological-relativist main point is that there is not just one reality behind the diversity of argumentation modes, but several, depending on people’s ways of life, and that it’s no use to try to find one common denominator.
- 10.
Just like the anthropological reasonableness conception itself, attempts to make plausible that this divergence exists by showing some of its symptoms seem to belong to the psychological phase (I won’t say that they got stuck in that phase). As far as argument forms are concerned, I don’t think that they ever succeeded in proving their point. I would rather say that classical, medieval and current logics display, on closer inspection, striking similarities. Without any doubt, however, at other levels of presentation there are very interesting cultural socio-geographical and temporal differences, which are in fact most intriguing.
- 11.
In order to describe “epistemes”—or, for that matter, people’s “schemes of argumentation” material information is required. It is doubtful whether this information can be arrived at, say transcendentally, by normative introspection, as is obviously thought by some scholars of argumentation. The question arises who is to tell what these claims are worth. One could, however, also try to get the required information empirically, by a meticulous description of argumentative reality, but then a full-scale examination of all kinds of argumentative practices is called for. Either way, epistemological relativism appears hard to avoid, and communication problems are created rather than solved. In the Perelman School of New Rhetoric, which in the study of argumentation most prominently represents the anthropological-relativist perspective on reasonableness, an unclear mixture is offered of the introspection and the empirical approach. Nevertheless, the anthropologists are to be credited for providing some vital insights, which allowed critical rationalists to develop their perspective. Judging from appearances you might think that there is also a considerable influence the other way round, but this is not so. Though Perelman pays a lot of lip-service to dialectics, it is clear from its general set-up that his theoretical approach is in fact still “idea- ist”, as Hacking (1975) terms it. Coining one of Perelman’s phrases, it could be called quasi-dialectical.
- 12.
If a certain group of people deliberately have been given a special status that authorizes them to lend conventional validity to what they consider to be intersubjectively valid, this is a special form of cultural relativism. Some philosophers assign such an authority to what they call the “Science Forum”, Perelman and his New Rhetoricians have their “Universal Audience”, and there are also modern variants of conventionalism, such as the “consensus theory”, which have a similar function. It is not always altogether clear, however, exactly who is entitled to be a member of the elite group and why. Sometimes the reasoning even, threatens to become circular: when the group is defined by its ways of arguing or by its use of language (“academic discourse”).
- 13.
Cf. Barth (1974).
- 14.
See for a more elaborate exposition of this philosophical rationale van Eemeren and Grootendorst, “Rationale for a Pragma-Dialectical Perspective” (1988).
- 15.
Beth, for one, defended this position.
- 16.
Judging from his own account of logic in The Uses of Argument, as if there were only syllogistic logic, it would not come as a big surprise if Toulmin actually thought otherwise.
- 17.
I owe this insight to Beth.
- 18.
Here I have to resist the temptation to enlarge upon the many advantages of the speech act approach. See Grootendorst (Chap. 33).
- 19.
Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 119–149).
- 20.
In van Eemeren et al. (1987) we gave a survey of contributions to the theory of argumentation in which the already classical works of Crawshay-Williams (1957), Naess (1966), Toulmin (1958) and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) feature most prominently. After the completion of that book (in 1981) so many interesting theoretical approaches to argumentation are proposed that I can do nothing more than refer to a few examples of books where they can be found: Barth and Krabbe (1982), Johnson and Anthony Blair (1983), Cox and Willard (1982), Cox et al. (1985), Woods and Walton (1987). Our own theoretical ideas are summarized in van Eemeren and Grootendorst, “Fallacies in Pragma-Dialectical Perspective” (1987a, b).
- 21.
Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst, Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies (1991).
- 22.
Even more striking differences exist between Western and Eastern cultures. In countries like Japan, for instance, it seems that expressing one’s differences of opinion is not done, because of “face.” Within Western cultures, at least at the level of presentation, the argumentation styles in predominantly “Anglo-saxon” countries and predominantly “Teutonic” countries already differ considerably. In my opinion, a really interesting explanation of these differences can’t be given without taking into account the differing philosophical traditions in the background.
- 23.
- 24.
Functionalization means that argumentation is treated as a goal-oriented language usage activity, externalization that argumentation is related to the verbal expression of standpoints and other positions, socialization that argumentation is linked to one or more language users who have to be convinced, and dialectification that argumentation is placed in the context of a critical discussion in which pro- and contra-argumentation is advanced, so that a regulated interaction of speech acts can take place. Together, these four steps provide the normative starting-point for a resolution-oriented reconstruction of argumentative discourse.
- 25.
The first transformation that is needed entails selection from the text as it is presented. Elements that are relevant for the process of resolution are recorded, elements that are irrelevant for this purpose are omitted. This transformation amounts to the removal of information that is not required for the chosen goal. For this reason it is known as dialectical deletion. The second transformation entails a process of completion. This is partly a matter of explicitizing implicit elements, partly of supplying unexpressed steps. In such cases something is added that is not explicitly present. Thus this transformation is supplementary by nature; it is accordingly called addition. The third transformation entails a degree of ordering or rearrangement. What may be an effective order of presentation in analytical terms has to do with the way in which the process of resolution would proceed in the ideal situation, and this need not necessarily be the same as the actual chronology. This transformation of ordering or rearranging the relevant elements is called dialectical permutation. The fourth transformation entails an attempt to produce a clear and uniform notation of elements fulfilling the same dialectical function in the text. Ambiguities and vaguenesses are replaced by unambiguous and clear formulations, et cetera. The transformation of translating the literal wording into the language of dialectical theory amounts to replacing formulations by standard formulations and is accordingly called dialectical substitution.
- 26.
In order to give the speaker or writer at least the benefit of the dialectical doubt, this analysis may in certain cases even lead to following the strategy of maximal argumentative interpretation. This strategy, together with other, similar strategies, ensures that every part of the discourse that may play a part in the resolution of the dispute is taken into consideration.
- 27.
In van Eemeren et al. (1989) we report on a series of empirical tests and experiments on argument recognition in which both these operationalisations play a part. (Previous reports about this project are in Dutch.) Other reports on empirical research which are of interest here, are supplied by, for instance, Benoit (1987) and Trapp et al. (1987).
- 28.
In the resolution-oriented reconstruction of argumentative discourse the “rational cogency” effect aimed for by an argumentation is the externalized acceptance of a standpoint. Its cognitive analogue in the discussant’s psychological reality would be that the person who accepts the standpoint is convinced. There is a vital difference, however, between being convinced and being persuaded. Whereas being persuaded consists in the instantaneous effect of responding as desired to the argumentation, being convinced presupposes some further reflection, on the part of the recipient. In fact, instead of saying that someone “is” convinced one should rather say that getting convinced is an ongoing process, and it is hard to tell for sure when precisely it has come to an end. Critical-rationalist philosophers would even say that there is no reason to assume that “the” “final” point of convincingness is ever reached. So there is no apparant reason to assume, contrary to critical-rationalist philosophy, one final mental state of being convinced.
- 29.
- 30.
Persons willing to adopt the required discussion attitude, thus guaranteeing the conventional validity of the rules, should accept doubt as an integral part of their way of life and use criticism towards themselves and others to solve problems by trial and error, They use argumentative discussion as a means to detect weak points in their viewpoints regarding knowledge, values and objectives, and eliminate these weaknesses where possible. Such persons are opposed to protectionism with regard to viewpoints and to the immunization of any kind of viewpoint against criticism. Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst, “Rationale for a Pragma-Dialectical Perspective” (1988).
- 31.
Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst, “Rationale for a Pragma-Dialectical Perspective” (1988).
- 32.
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van Eemeren, F.H. (2015). Argumentation Studies’ Five Estates. In: Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse. Argumentation Library, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20955-5_5
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