Skip to main content

Part of the book series: Biosemiotics ((BSEM,volume 13))

Abstract

It is often asserted that the existence of human language sets us apart from non-humans, and makes us incomparably special. And indeed human language does make our Umwelt (Jakob von Uexküll), our lifeworld, uniquely open-ended. However, by committing what I term the anthropocentric mistake, i.e. falsely assuming that all true reality is linguistic, we close in on ourselves and our language-derived practices, and as a result we lose sight of much that truly matters (including a proper understanding of our human nature). Like Sebeok and Hoffmeyer I hold that language is a modeling system, but unlike them I argue that language is not external to the Umwelt, but internal to it. Language changes the human Umwelt not by escaping or sidelining it, but by fundamentally transforming it. In consequence supra-linguistic phenomena as well are modeled as internal to the human Umwelt. The Umwelt model presented is termed the tripartite Umwelt model, and includes three aspects of Umwelt: the core Umwelt, the mediated Umwelt and the conceptual Umwelt. Linguistic practices are placed within the latter, but it is furthermore claimed that a number of animals too have conceptual Umwelten, which are said to be characterized by predicative reasoning, the habitual, mental attribution of specific features to someone or something. The activity of languaging is presented as more-than-linguistic, with reference to the distributed language perspective. Given all the dark matter underpinning and surrounding verbal practices, a foray into the hinterland of language is called for. A section on the genesis and modalities of language addresses the origin and evolution of language, acquisition of language in childhood and a simple typology of the various linguistic modalities of the human Umwelt. The concluding section treats Ivar Puura’s notion semiocide, and the question: how can we language as if nature mattered?

[Man] knows that there are in the soul tints more bewildering, more numberless, and more nameless than the colours of an autumn forest [...] Yet he seriously believes that these things can every one of them, in all their tones and semi-tones, in all their blends and unions, be accurately represented by an arbitrary system of grunts and squeals. He believes that an ordinary civilized stockbroker can really produce out of his own inside noises which denote all the mysteries of memory and all the agonies of desire.

(Chesterton 1904, p. 88)

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1.

    Barbieri 2012b, p. 450.

  2. 2.

    Heidegger 1977, p. 213.

  3. 3.

    Hoffmeyer 1993 [1996, p. 102].

  4. 4.

    Sebeok 1987, p. 347.

  5. 5.

    Husserl 1936–1939 [1970, p. 358].

  6. 6.

    Abram 1997, p. 73.

  7. 7.

    Marcel 1962.

  8. 8.

    Chang 2009, p. 170.

  9. 9.

    Ibid., referring to Uexküll 1981 [1987, p. 176].

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    Uexküll 2013, p. 454; cf. Uexküll 1917.

  12. 12.

    Cf. Uexküll 1917, pp. 219–220.

  13. 13.

    Cf. also the passage corresponding to ibid., p. 236, where Uexküll addresses the difference, in his eyes, between English language and German language with regard to propagation of influence: “Every English word comes from an English heart”.

  14. 14.

    Barbieri 2012b, p. 449.

  15. 15.

    Or more specifically, as Barbieri points out: “The primary modelling system consists […] of two types of models, one that represents the environment [the Umwelt] and one that carries information about the body [the Innenwelt]” (Barbieri 2012a, p. 40).

  16. 16.

    Zaliznjak et al. 1977; cf. Chang 2009, p. 172.

  17. 17.

    Lotman 1991.

  18. 18.

    Augustyn 2013, p. 98.

  19. 19.

    Sebeok and Danesi 2000, p. 108.

  20. 20.

    Augustyn 2015, p. 180.

  21. 21.

    Sebeok 1991, p. 334.

  22. 22.

    A precursor to this model, which is the invention of the author, is the notions conceptual world and conceptualized Umwelt experience (cf. Tønnessen 2003, p. 290), representing two of seven distinctive human features. “The conceptual world”, it is stated, “has its roots in sensory perception, and its concepts are meaningful only by reference – direct or indirect – to concrete objects of perception (cf. Uexküll 1928, pp. 334–340)” (lbid.).

  23. 23.

    Cf. Uexküll 1928, p. 101.

  24. 24.

    However, in all normal instances, i.e. whenever the perceiver is capable of having memories or at least is capable of anticipating events, our actual encounters with others involve mediation, and thus the mediated Umwelt, as well. Only in exceptional cases, in consequence, are “face-to-face” encounters solely located within the core Umwelt.

  25. 25.

    Cf. Uexküll 2010, pp. 113–118. In the human context, the mediated aspect of Umwelt arguably dominates in modern culture, as reflected in cultural practices including day-long interaction with screens.

  26. 26.

    Note that by attributing a conceptual Umwelt to an animal one does not attribute language to it. The question “Do animals have language?” is as controversial as the related question “Is Man an animal, yes or no?” The answers given often appear to be derived from emotion and identity rather than fact. At any rate the disputed terms (animal, language) have to be precisely defined, and a definition agreed on by all discussants, before such discourses take on the character of being meaningful. This is no small task, since the “ayes” and the “nays” both tend to operate with tailormade definitions that make their stands highly meaningful.

  27. 27.

    Westling 2014, pp. 49–50.

  28. 28.

    Cowley 2013.

  29. 29.

    Cowley 2006.

  30. 30.

    Sapir 1949, p. 162.

  31. 31.

    Abram 1997, p. 255.

  32. 32.

    Hodges 2007, p. 601.

  33. 33.

    Skinner 1953.

  34. 34.

    An implication of this claim is that the core Umwelt is generally code-based, and that the mediated Umwelt and the conceptual Umwelt are interpretation-based. If this is correct, the interpretive threshold is not located where animals with a nervous system meet creatures without a nervous system, as Barbieri holds, nor where the biotic meets the abiotic, as Hoffmeyer holds. Instead, it is, at least in our context, located where core experience meets mediated experience (and since these aspects often intermingle, the dividing line is not in plain sight).

  35. 35.

    Maturana 1970.

  36. 36.

    Thibault 2011, p. 215.

  37. 37.

    Cowley 2014.

  38. 38.

    Cowley 2011a, p. 4.

  39. 39.

    Ibid., p. 2.

  40. 40.

    Love 2004.

  41. 41.

    According to Paul Thibault (personal correspondence), the origin is really Love 1990.

  42. 42.

    Neumann and Cowley 2013.

  43. 43.

    Thibault 2011, p. 214.

  44. 44.

    Ibid..

  45. 45.

    Ibid., p. 215.

  46. 46.

    Steffensen et al. 2010, p. 210.

  47. 47.

    Ibid.

  48. 48.

    Cowley 2011a, p. 2.

  49. 49.

    Thibault 2000, p. 294.

  50. 50.

    Steffensen 2013.

  51. 51.

    Stuart 2010, pp. 308–309. Indirect touch, writes Stuart, “can be achieved [e.g.] through a look where one becomes the object of someone else’s subjective attention and experience” (ibid., p. 309).

  52. 52.

    Given that enkinaesthesia is, in a way, felt togetherness and thus implicitly social and potentially emphatic, it can even be said to be part of the groundwork of morality. In this sense the phenomenon of enkinaesthesia does not lack a normative dimension.

  53. 53.

    In Tønnessen 2010 language, which is claimed to have the appearance though not substance of a total system, is described as one of three grand systems – “Nature, Language , the Economy – all of which apparently in quest of hegemony over our lives, as natural beings – linguistic creatures – economic stakeholders” (p. 383).

  54. 54.

    For similar presentations of the notion of the anthropocentric mistake, cf. ibid., p. 377 and Tønnessen 2011, pp. 325–326.

  55. 55.

    Thomas and Thomas 1928, pp. 571–572.

  56. 56.

    Abram 1997, p. 27.

  57. 57.

    Cowley 2011b.

  58. 58.

    Cowley 2012a.

  59. 59.

    Abram 2010, p. 17 (this observation was further developed in Abram 1997, where the philosopher analyses the connection between the emergence of written languages and the emergence of philosophy).

  60. 60.

    Uexküll 1934–1940 [1956, p. 109].

  61. 61.

    Everett 2012.

  62. 62.

    Cowley 2012b, p. 285, with reference to Everett 2012, p. 198.

  63. 63.

    Cowley 2012b, p. 285.

  64. 64.

    Tønnessen 2014.

  65. 65.

    Johansson 2013, p. 35.

  66. 66.

    Ibid.

  67. 67.

    Ibid., p. 57.

  68. 68.

    Ibid., p. 39.

  69. 69.

    Chomsky 2010.

  70. 70.

    Abram 1997, p. 82.

  71. 71.

    Abram 2010, pp. 197–198.

  72. 72.

    Barbieri 2012b, p. 458.

  73. 73.

    But Chomsky , of course, takes language to be a language faculty, and his view is therefore, in this respect, fundamentally different from that which follows from an Uexküllian Umwelt perspective, or from the DL perspective.

  74. 74.

    Bateson 1972.

  75. 75.

    Hoffmeyer 1993 [1996, p. 101]. Hoffmeyer further asserts that “[t]hrough speech, human beings broke out of their own subjectivity because it enabled them to share one large, common umwelt. While pre-lingual creatures had recourse only to their own finite umwelts, speech had the benefit that it could turn the world into a mystically produced common dwelling place” (ibid., p. 112).

  76. 76.

    Tønnessen 2009.

  77. 77.

    Barbieri 2012b, p. 457.

  78. 78.

    Ibid., p. 460.

  79. 79.

    Tønnessen 2010.

  80. 80.

    Puura 2013, p. 152; cf. Puura 2002.

  81. 81.

    Puura 2013, p. 152.

  82. 82.

    Maran 2013, p. 148.

  83. 83.

    Stibbe 2012, p. 16.

  84. 84.

    Daston and Mitman (eds.), 2005.

  85. 85.

    Stuart 2010.

References

  • Abram, D. (1997). The spell of the sensuous. Perception and language in a more-than-human world. New York: Vintage Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Abram, D. (2010). Becoming animal: An earthly cosmology. New York: Pantheon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Augustyn, P. (2013). What connects biolinguistics and biosemiotics? Biolinguistics, 7, 96–111.

    Google Scholar 

  • Augustyn, P. (2015). Biology, linguistics, and the semiotic perspective on language. In E. Velmezova, K. Kull, & S. J. Cowley (Eds.), Biosemiotic perspectives on language and linguistics (pp. 169–189). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barbieri, M. (2012a). Organic codes and the natural history of mind. In L. Swan (Ed.), Origins of mind (Biosemiotics, Vol. 8, pp. 21–52). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Barbieri, M. (2012b). Organic codes and the origin of language. In L. Swan (Ed.), Origin(s) of design in nature (Cellular origin, life in extreme habitats and astrobiology, Vol. 23, pp. 445–473). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an ecology of mind. New York: Ballantine.

    Google Scholar 

  • Camus, A. (1942 [1983]). The myth of Sisyphus and other essays. New York: Vintage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chang, H.-L. (2009). Semioticians make strange bedfellows! or, once again: “Is language a primary modelling system?”. Biosemiotics, 2009(2), 169–179.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chesterton, G. K. (1904). G.F. Watts. London: Duckworth.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky, N. (2010). Some simple Evo Devo theses: How true might they be for language? In V. Déprez, H. Yamakido, & R. K. Larson (Eds.), The evolution of human language (pp. 45–62). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Coetzee, J. M. (1999). The lives of animals. In J. M. Coetzee, M. Garber, P. Singer, W. Doniger, & B. Smuts (Eds.), The lives of animals (pp. 15–72). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cowley, S. J. (2006). Language and biosemiosis: Towards unity? Semiotica, 162, 417–443.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cowley, S. J. (2011a). Distributed language. In S. J. Cowley (Ed.), Distributed language (pp. 1–14). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Cowley, S. J. (2011b). Taking a language stance. Ecological Psychology, 23, 1–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cowley, S. J. (2012a). Distributed language: Cognition beyond the brain. Proceedings of the humanities international forum. Moscow: Russian State University for the Humanities.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cowley, S. J. (2012b). Linguistic fire and human cognitive powers. Pragmatics & Cognition, 20(2), 275–294.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cowley, S. J. (2013). Interactivity: Implications for language and cognition. Paper presented at the workshop agency in health care: Phenomenology and experience, University of Stavanger, 15th April 2013.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cowley, S. J. (2014). Bio-ecology and language: A necessary unity. Language Sciences, 41(A), 60–70.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Daston, L. J., & Mitman, G. (Eds.). (2005). Thinking with animals: New perspectives on anthropomorphism. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Everett, D. L. (2012). Language: The cultural tool. New York/London: Pantheon Books (Random House USA)/Profile (UK).

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger, M. (1977). Letter on humanism. In M. Heidegger, Basic writings: From being and time (1927) to the task of thinking (1964) (pp. 213–266). New York: Harper Collins.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hodges, B. H. (2007). Good prospects: Ecological and social perspectives on conforming, creating, and caring in conversation. Language Sciences, 29, 584–604.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hoffmeyer, J. (1993 [1996]). Signs of meaning in the universe. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1936–1939 [1970]). The origin of geometry. In E. Husserl, The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology: An introduction to phenomenological philosophy (pp. 353–378). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johansson, S. (2013). The talking Neanderthals: What do fossils, genetics, and archeology say? Biolinguistics, 7, 35–74.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lotman, J. M. (1991). Universe of the mind: A semiotic theory of culture. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Love, N. (1990). The locus of languages in a redefined linguistics. In H. G. Davis & T. J. Taylor (Eds.), Redefining linguistics (pp. 53–117). London/New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Love, N. (2004). Cognition and the language myth. Language Sciences, 26, 525–544.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maran, T. (2013). Enchantment of the past and semiocide. Remembering Ivar Puura. Sign Systems Studies, 41(1), 146–149.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marcel, G. (1962). Homo viator: Introduction to a metaphysic of hope. New York: Harper & Brothers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Markoš, A. (2002). Readers of the book of life: Contextualizing developmental evolutionary biology. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maturana, H. (1970). Biology of cognition (Biological Computer Laboratory [BCL] research report 9.0). Urbana: University of Illinois.

    Google Scholar 

  • Neumann, M., & Cowley, S. J. (2013). Human agency and the resources of reason. In S. J. Cowley & F. Vallée-Tourangeau (Eds.), Cognition beyond the brain: Computation, interactivity and human artifice (pp. 13–30). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Puura, I. (2002). Loodus meie mälus. Eesti Loodus, 11, 24–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Puura, I. (2013). Nature in our memory. Sign Systems Studies, 41(1), 150–153 [translation of Puura 2002 by E. Sütiste and T. Maran].

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sapir, E. (1949). The status of linguistics as a science. In D. G. Mandelbaum (Ed.), Selected writings of Edward Sapir (pp. 160–166). Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sebeok, T. A. (1987). Toward a natural history of language. Semiotica, 65(3–4), 343–358.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sebeok, T. A. (1991). In what sense is language a “primary modelling system”? In M. Anderson & F. Merrell (Eds.), On semiotic modeling (pp. 327–340). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sebeok, T. A., & Danesi, M. (2000). The forms of meaning: Modeling systems theory and semiotic analysis. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Skinner, B. F. (1953). Operant behavior. In B. F. Skinner (Ed.), Science and human behavior (pp. 59–90). New York: The Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steffensen, S. V. (2013). Human interactivity: Problem-solving, solution-probing, and verbal patterns in the wild. In S. J. Cowley & F. Vallée-Tourangeau (Eds.), Cognition beyond the brain: Interactivity and human thinking (pp. 195–221). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Steffensen, S. V., Thibault, P., & Cowley, S. J. (2010). Living in the social meshwork: The case of health interaction. In S. J. Cowley, J. C. Major, S. V. Steffensen, & A. Dinis (Eds.), Signifying bodies: Biosemiosis, interaction and health (pp. 201–237). Braga: Portuguese Catholic University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stibbe, A. (2012). Animals erased: Discourse, ecology, and reconnection with the natural world. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stuart, S. (2010). Enkinaesthesia, biosemiotics, and the ethiosphere. In S. J. Cowley, J. C. Major, S. V. Steffensen, & A. Dinis (Eds.), Signifying bodies: Biosemiosis, interaction and health (pp. 305–330). Braga: Portuguese Catholic University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thibault, P. (2000). The dialogical integration of the brain in social semiosis: Edelman and the case for downward causation. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 7(4), 291–311.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thibault, P. (2011). First-order languaging dynamics and second-order language: The distributed language view. Ecological Psychology, 23(3), 210–245.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thomas, W. I., & Thomas, D. S. (1928). The child in America: Behavior problems and programs. New York: Knopf.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tønnessen, M. (2003). Umwelt ethics. Sign Systems Studies, 31(1), 281–299.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tønnessen, M. (2009). Umwelt transitions: Uexküll and environmental change. Biosemiotics, 2(1), 47–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tønnessen, M. (2010). Steps to a semiotics of being. Biosemiotics, 3(3), 375–392.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tønnessen, M. (2011). I, Wolf: The ecology of existence. In J. Servan & A. F. Aarø (Eds.), Environment, embodiment and gender (pp. 315–333). Bergen: Hermes Text.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tønnessen, M. (2014). Umwelt trajectories. Semiotica, 198, 159–180.

    Google Scholar 

  • Uexküll, J. von (1917). Darwin und die Englische Moral. Deutsche Rundschau, 173, 215–242.

    Google Scholar 

  • Uexküll, J. von (1928). Theoretische Biologie (2nd ed.). Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Uexküll, J. von (1934–1940 [1956]). Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen: Ein Bilderbuch unsichtbarer Welten. Bedeutungslehre. Hamburg: Rowohlt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Uexküll, J. von (2010). A foray into the worlds of animals and humans with a theory of meaning. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press [translation of Uexküll 1934–1940 (1956) by J. D. O’Neil].

    Google Scholar 

  • Uexküll, J. von (2013). Darwin and the English morality. Biosemiotics, 6(3), 449–471 [translation of Uexküll 1917 by M. Tønnessen, English language editing by J. Beever].

    Google Scholar 

  • Uexküll, T. von (1981 [1987]). The sign theory of Jakob von Uexküll. In M. Krampen, K. Oehler, R. Posner, T. A. Sebeok & T. von Uexküll (Eds.), Classics of semiotics (pp. 147–179). New York: Plenum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Westling, L. (2014). The zoosemiotics of sheep herding with dogs. In K. Tüür & M. Tønnessen (Eds.), The semiotics of animal representations (pp. 33–52). Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zaliznjak, A. A., Ivanov, V. V., & Toporov, V. N. (1977). Structural-typological study of semiotic modeling systems. In D. P. Lucid (Ed.), Soviet semiotics: An anthology (pp. 47–58). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

My thanks go to Nelly Mäekivi for pointing me to the quotes reiterated in the mottos of this article (Chesterton) and of section “I Language , Therefore I Model” (Coetzee). Thanks also to Paul Thibault and Stephen Cowley, for very stimulating discussions on the nature of language, cognition, human interactivity, agency, modern pitfalls etc. This work has been carried out thanks to the support of the research project Animals in Changing Environments: Cultural Mediation and Semiotic Analysis (EEA Norway Grants/Norway Financial Mechanism).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Morten Tønnessen .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Tønnessen, M. (2015). Umwelt and Language. In: Velmezova, E., Kull, K., Cowley, S. (eds) Biosemiotic Perspectives on Language and Linguistics. Biosemiotics, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20663-9_5

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics