Abstract
This chapter places the contemporary maritime disputes in the South China Sea in the context of the debate on “Asian Regionalism” and the rise of China. Special attention is given to how the configurations of an entity called “Chinese characteristics” in international relations, and that of a “civilizational state”, have given new directions to the concept of “China’s Dream” and the “Asian Dream”, with consequences for ASEAN as a regional organization and for member states embroiled in maritime disputes. The current tension can only be overcome through an interdisciplinary approach to research and policy that takes on board the social transformation of transborder issues.
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Notes
- 1.
According to Kaplan (2011), roughly two-thirds of South Korea’s energy supplies, nearly 60 % of Japan’s and Taiwan’s, and about 80 % of China’s crude oil imports are transported across the South China Sea. Proven oil reserves below the seabed amount to seven billion barrels, and the estimates of natural gas are put at 900 trillion cubic feet. Foreign Policy; at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_south_china_sea_is_the_future_of_conflict (1 March 2012).
- 2.
China’s dependence on oil imports is growing due to the finite limits of domestic production combined with an explosion in car ownership. Oilprice; at: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Whose-Oil-Will-Quench-Chinas-Thirst.html (1 March 2012).
- 3.
Starting with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, cooperation was furthered by the establishment of a common market—the European Economic Community (EEC), which included a European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM)—set out in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Political cooperation proceeded with the Single European Act, which supplemented and amended the Treaty of Rome and came into action in 1986. After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, a new chapter in the process of European unification led to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, paving the way for the enlargement of the community as well as a deepening of economic integration and the setting up of a common currency.
- 4.
Following ASEAN’s unsuccessful engagement under Indonesia’s chairmanship to mediate the conflict between Cambodia and Thailand over a long-disputed area of land near Cambodia’s 900-year-old Preah Vihear temple, both countries decided to bring the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2011. The ICJ upheld the submissions of Cambodia concerning sovereignty over the temple in 2013. International Court of Justice; at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=284&p1=3&p2=3&case=45&p3=5 (2 March 2012).
- 5.
The absence of public debate in Vietnam on these negotiations remains a major flaw from a political point of view, especially regarding the merit or demerit of bilateral negotiations to settle both land and sea border issues.
- 6.
The purpose of UNCLOS III is to establish a comprehensive set of rules governing the oceans and to replace previous UN Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I in 1958 and UNCLOS II in 1960), which were considered inadequate. China was excluded from the United Nations at the time of UNCLOS I and II.
- 7.
Along with these administrative and legal declarations, other signs of the country’s assertion of its successful image have included the Beijing Olympics (2008), the National Parade (2009), and the Shanghai Expo (2010). China’s incumbent President—Xi Jinping—directed all three events (Callahan 2014).
- 8.
Some examples are: visits to claimed islands by Philippine politicians in 2011 and the Scarborough Shoal stand-off in 2012; Vietnam’s renovation of Buddhist temples abandoned since 1975 and construction of new temples in 2012 on a couple of islands in the Spratly Islands that were under its control; China’s construction of Sansha city on Woody Island (13 km2 of land area) in the Paracel archipelago in 2012 to administer a sea area of more than two million square kilometres or a quarter of that country’s total land area; the placement and eventual withdrawal of mega-oil rig HD–891 in May 2014 in Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone in July 2014. The most recent initiative by China is the implementation of a large land reclamation project, involving dredgers on at least five features, that aims to turn tiny reefs into islands big enough to handle military hardware, personnel and recreation facilities for workers. On one reef (Fiery Cross), the construction of a runway—long enough to accommodate fighter jets and surveillance aircrafts—is ongoing (“China Building Aircraft Runway in Disputed Spratly Islands”; in: The New York Times, Asia Pacific, 16 April 2015: A8).
- 9.
Wei-Wei Zhang is currently Professor of International Relations at Fudan University in Shanghai. In the mid-1980s he served as a senior English interpreter for Deng Xiaoping and other leaders.
- 10.
On close reading, Wei-Wei uses the term Western to refer mainly to the US and tends to conflate a wide range of theorizations on the economic and the political into one frame labelled as ‘Western’. His measure of ‘civilization’ contains a mixture of quantitative and qualitative variables, some of which are doubtful: (1) population size; (2) size of territory; (3) rate of economic growth; (4) enduring traditions; (5) a unique society built on the family and community‐based structure; (6) a unique language; and (7) a unique political system that blends Western economics with China’s humanist traditions. For a discussion on the downside of Chinese traditional culture for innovation see: Van Someren/Van Someren-Wang (2013).
- 11.
China especially resists the Western-based norms of democracy, good governance and human rights.
- 12.
Between November 2004 and August 2011, the People’s Republic of China established a total of 353 Confucius Institutes and 473 related Confucian classrooms in 104 countries, all of which are “aimed at developing Chinese language and culture teaching resources and making services available worldwide, meeting the demands of overseas Chinese learners [and other learners] to the utmost degree, and contributing to global cultural diversity and harmony” [PRC Ministry of Education 2012, cited by Pan (2013: 2)].
- 13.
Debating Tian Xia as a cosmology and moral discourse merits a separate discussion. Callahan noted the progression of views of the prominent Chinese philosopher Zhao Tingyang, starting with elaborating the meanings of Tian Xia in China’s ancient thought through to his recommendation that contemporary China should draw on its own cultural resources to build the All Under The Same Heaven system for a unified global government, which will guarantee peace and harmony for China and the world (Zhao 2005, 2009, 2011 in Callahan 2014). For a comparative discussion on Confucian cosmology and the conceptualization of security, see Brauch, Oswald Spring, Mesjasz et al. (2008: 173–310).
- 14.
Interest in the building of an international relations (IR) theory with Chinese characteristics dates back to Mao Tse-tung’s call in 1965 when he advocated such a theory under the guiding principle of Marxism. This call was dropped after the start of the Cultural Revolution (Chan 1998: 17–18).
- 15.
Some major issues are the restrictions on the export of various forms of rare earths, intellectual property rights, and failure to enforce its own law on food safety (Aaronson 2010).
- 16.
For a debate on non-Western international relations, see Acharya/Barry (2010).
- 17.
Although the Philippines invited other claimants to join the initiative, none had come forward at the time of writing (May 2015).
- 18.
In: The Diplomat; at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/pla-officer-china-must-establish-south-china-sea-adiz/ (1 March 2014).
- 19.
HIS Jane’s 360; at: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/24/world/asia/china-south-china-sea/index.html (27 December 2015).
- 20.
In: The Diplomat; at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/beijings-fait-accompli-in-the-south-china-sea/ (15 April 2015).
- 21.
South China Morning Post; at: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1783156/china-says-us-welcome-use-bases-built-disputed-areas (1 May 2015).
- 22.
In: The Diplomat; at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/no-china-is-not-reclaiming-land-in-the-south-china-sea/ (12 June 2015).
- 23.
In ancient times, Chinese scholars called the East China Sea Donghai (東海) or the ‘Eastern Sea’, and the South China Sea Nan Hai (南海) or ‘Southern Sea’. The contemporary names of the East and South China Seas are used here without any intention to prejudice any party among the claimants.
- 24.
Hainan was also known as Tianya Haijiao (天涯海角) or ‘The Edge of the Sky’ and ‘The End of the Sea’. Tianya Haijiao is used today in promotional campaigns by the tourist industry for its remoteness and beauty. Sanyaweb; at: http://www.sanyaweb.com/sight_sanya_the_end_of_earth.html (1 March 2014).
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Truong, TD., Knio, K. (2016). Introduction. In: The South China Sea and Asian Regionalism. SpringerBriefs in Environment, Security, Development and Peace(), vol 24. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13551-9_1
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