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International Economic Sanctions and Fundamental Rights: Friend or Foe?

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The Influence of Human Rights on International Law

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Abstract

After a short presentation of what is generally meant by “economic sanctions” (Sect. 9.2), this paper will focus on a single question, which is to know if, and to what extent, fundamental human rights (which, in this paper, will be considered as including human rights law and humanitarian law) affect the recourse to, and the practice of, economic sanctions in international relations. Upon analysis, it will be explained that the violation of fundamental rights can be a trigger for the adoption of “smart” economic sanctions (Sect. 9.3) but on the reverse that the protection of fundamental rights is also a strong argument to deny the legality of such sanctions (Sect. 9.4). Finally, it will be concluded that if international human rights and humanitarian law does influence the practice of international economic sanctions, this is still to a (too) limited extent (section “Conclusion”).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    “Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.” The League used its power to adopt economic sanctions only against Italy after its invasion of Etiopia; the sanctions consisted of an arms embargo, a prohibition of loans and bank credits to the Italian government, a ban on the import of Italian goods and products, and a ban on the export of any kind of goods that could be used for military purposes. These sanctions were lifted in 1936. See D’Hollander, Economic sanctions as a means to enforce human rights, Thesis, McGil University, National Library of Canada, Montréal, 1995, 124 p, p. 5.

  2. 2.

    Among the measures not involving armed force that the Council may adopt, Article 41 of the Charter mentions “complete or partial interruption of economic relations.”

  3. 3.

    Resolutions 418 (1977).

  4. 4.

    Resolution 569 (1985).

  5. 5.

    Cortright and Lopez (2000).

  6. 6.

    Resolution 661 (1990).

  7. 7.

    Resolution 713 (1991).

  8. 8.

    Resolution 733 (1992).

  9. 9.

    Resolution 748 (1992).

  10. 10.

    Resolution 864 (1993).

  11. 11.

    Resolution 873 (1993).

  12. 12.

    Resolution 1918 (1994).

  13. 13.

    Resolution 1132 (1997).

  14. 14.

    Resolution 1267 (1999).

  15. 15.

    Resolution 1493 (2003).

  16. 16.

    Resolution 1521 (2003).

  17. 17.

    Resolution 1591 (2005).

  18. 18.

    Resolution 1636 (2005).

  19. 19.

    Resolution 1718 (2006).

  20. 20.

    Resolution 1907 (2009).

  21. 21.

    Resolution 1737 (2006).

  22. 22.

    Dubouis (1967), p. 105.

  23. 23.

    Mangin (2001), p. 16.

  24. 24.

    The first case in which the European Community has adopted, through its Member States, economic sanctions was in the South Rhodesia case. The first case in which it economically sanctioned a State despite the absence of a decision to this effect by the UN Security Council immediately followed the US hostages crisis in Teheran in 1979, and targeted Iran; see Dewost (1982), p. 219. Since then, the EU has frequently had recourse to this policy.

  25. 25.

    Resolutions 181 and 182 (1963), 191(1964). By contrast, Resolution 282(1970) explains that the threat to peace is not so much the apartheid policy as such but the situation resulting from it, characterized by “the measures being taken by the Government of South Africa to enforce and extend those policies beyond its borders,” “the constant build-up of the South African military and police forces,” “the extensive arms build-up of the military forces of South Africa [which] poses a real threat to the security and sovereignty of independent African States opposed to the racial policies of the Government of South Africa, in particular the neighbouring States.” In Resolution 311(1972), the Council said that the situation in South Africa seriously disturbs international peace and security “in southern Africa.” This suggests that it is the regional consequences of the policy of apartheid that have been seen as a threat to peace, not the domestic situation of human rights in South Africa. Resolution 477(1976) states clearly that the threat to peace is based on the conviction of the Council that “the violence and repression by the South African racist régime have greatly aggravated the situation in South Africa and will certainly lead to violent conflict and racial conflagration with serious international repercussions.” Resolution 418(1977) also puts that the situation in South Africa “will certainly lead to violent conflict and racial conflagration with serious international repercussions.”

  26. 26.

    Ruez (1992), p. 610, note 216.

  27. 27.

    Para. 1, emphasis added. For an analysis of this resolution, see Carpentier (1992) and Pellet (2012).

  28. 28.

    Emphasis added. The same kind of wording is to be found in subsequent resolutions on Somalia. In Resolution 794 (1992), the Counsel determined that “the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia (…) constitutes a threat to international peace and security.” The “human tragedy” is a notion far more comprehensive than the notion of violation of human rights. Contra, see Kerbrat (1995), p. 12.

  29. 29.

    Emphasis added. In the same vein, Resolution 2053(2012) determines that “the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [which was characterized notably by the “humanitarian situation and the persistent high levels of violence and human rights abuses and violations against civilians”] continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region” (emphasis added).

  30. 30.

    See the Final Document of the 2005 World Summit (the 2005 Outcome), paras. 138 and 139, UNGA, A/60/L.1.

  31. 31.

    On the Responsibility to Protect, see, among many others, Chaumette and Thouvenin (2013).

  32. 32.

    See http://www.iofc.org/fr/node/56537. Accessed 28 July 2014.

  33. 33.

    See, for another example, the Executive Order 13566, February 25, 2011, declaring a national emergency to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by the extreme measures Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, his government, and close associates have taken against the people of Libya, including using weapons of war, mercenaries, and wanton violence against unarmed civilians, all of which have caused a deterioration in the security of Libya and pose a serious risk to its stability. For other examples, see, e.g., Malloy (2013).

  34. 34.

    7 June 2004, doc. 10198/1/04 REV 1 PESC 450.

  35. 35.

    Quoted in Padover (1942), p. 108.

  36. 36.

    See Gordon (2011), pp. 317–317, also quoted by Browne (2011).

  37. 37.

    Press release SG/SM/7338 (24 March 2000), quoted by Bossuyt, “The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions, Economic and Social Council,” E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33, June 21, 2000, footnote 39.

  38. 38.

    Bossuyt, op. cit., para. 63.

  39. 39.

    Rapport du premier séminaire d’experts sur les sanctions financières ciblées, 17–19 mars 1998 (Interlaken I), p. 14, at http://www.un.org/french/sc/committees/groupes/sanctions.shtml. Accessed 28 July 2014. See also UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 8: The relationship between economic sanctions and respect for economic, social and cultural rights, 12 December 1997, E/C.12/1997/8, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/47a7079e0.html. Accessed 28 July 2014.

  40. 40.

    Millennium Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, “We the Peoples”: The Role of the United Nations in the twenty-first Century, United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 2000, p. 50.

  41. 41.

    This is taken from Gordon (2011), p. 318.

  42. 42.

    If “smart,” this policy is not necessarily wise in the case of internal conflict since it reinforces the party that has already a good access to the arms located in the territory. In the Syrian case, one might think that arms embargo reinforces the regime rather than anything else.

  43. 43.

    There again, if the main source of revenue of the country comes from the exportations of those products, as targeted as it is, the sanction could cause collateral damages.

  44. 44.

    This kind of regime, applied in particular to respond to violations of human rights, has no clear results and is often completed with stronger sanctions. According to Malloy (2013), p. 82, “empirical analysis of the immediate and discrete instrumental effects of sanctions suggests that the design and content of foreign policy-based and national security-based programs often lead to more significant effects on a target group or state, at least in the short run, than has been true with human rights-based programs.”

  45. 45.

    6749/05 PESC 159, para. 16.

  46. 46.

    See, e.g., Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part. 560, and the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part. 535.

  47. 47.

    Gebert (2013). To be noted is that the interesting study of Shagabutdinova and Berejikian (2007) is not conclusive concerning the efficiency of economic sanctions regarding the protection of human rights. They find that smart sanctions are more efficient and less damaging for the population than traditional sanctions but acknowledge the universal consensus that economic sanctions “even when used for humanitarian purposes, often unintentionally impose significant hardship on innocent population,” p. 61.

  48. 48.

    Gebert (2013), p. 8.

  49. 49.

    Browne (2011), p. 21.

  50. 50.

    Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, para. 33.

  51. 51.

    Opinion of Advocate general Yves Bot, pt. 81–82.

  52. 52.

    Fourteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2083 (2012) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, S/2013/467, para. 30.

  53. 53.

    See, e.g., Thouvenin (2009, 2012).

  54. 54.

    On these reforms, see, e.g., Gordon (2011), pp. 328 ff.; Thouvenin (2012).

  55. 55.

    Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council (“OMPI I”), pt. 141; Case C-417/11P Council v Bamba (“Bamba”), pt. 50.

  56. 56.

    Joined Cases T-439/10 and T-440/10 Fulmen v Council (21 March 2012) (“Fulmen”), pt. 49; Case T-509/10 Kala Naft, pt. 73; Case T-15/11 Sina Bank v Council (“Sina Bank”), pt. 67–69.

  57. 57.

    Fulmen, pt. 48; Case T-562/10 HTTS Hanseatic Trade Trust & Shipping GmbH v Council (“HTTS”), pt. 32, Kala Naft, pt. 72; Case T-53/12 CF Sharp Shipping Agencies Ptd Ltd v Council (“CF Sharp”), pt. 35–36; Case T-421/11 Qualitest FZE v Council (“Qualitest”), pt. 32–33; Sina Bank, pt. 56–57.

  58. 58.

    Case C-376/10 P, Tay Za.

  59. 59.

    Joined Cases T-439/10 and T-440/10, Fulmen v. Council.

  60. 60.

    Case T-496/10.

  61. 61.

    Fulmen, pt. 102.

  62. 62.

    Pt. 99; see also T-496/10, Bank Mellat, pt. 100.

  63. 63.

    OMPI I, pt. 131.

  64. 64.

    OMPI I, pt. 131.

  65. 65.

    Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Kadi (18 July 2013), pt. 131.

  66. 66.

    Gordon (2011), p. 332.

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  1. University Paris West Nanterre La Défense, Nanterre, France

    Jean-Marc Thouvenin

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  1. University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany

    Norman Weiß

  2. Université Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense, Nanterre la Défense, Hauts-de-Seine, France

    Jean-Marc Thouvenin

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Thouvenin, JM. (2015). International Economic Sanctions and Fundamental Rights: Friend or Foe?. In: Weiß, N., Thouvenin, JM. (eds) The Influence of Human Rights on International Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12021-8_9

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